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ABSTRACT
Technological innovation is an important consideration to many strategic 
managers and thus is important to research in Strategic Management. Deepening the 
field's understanding o f what technology is and how it works can be facilitated by 
participating in a growing dialogue between the Strategic Management and 
Management of Technology communities. This dissertation considers elements o f both 
fields and examines the premise that at the industry level, incumbents act to manipulate 
the "share of mind" or "cognitive legitimacy" of the performance and cost/price 
characteristics o f product-technology innovations that, in aggregate, portend to either 
enhance or destroy prevailing industry competences. A forecasting technique well- 
known to technological communities (Morphological Analysis) is used to dissect 
technologies and competences, dimensionalize competence enhancement and 
destruction, and test hypotheses. Major findings suggest that: Morphological Analysis 
has great potential as a tool for aiding academic research in technological change; 
technologies were evolving in the chosen industry much as the Strategic Management 
and Management of Technology literatures predicted; and in the experimental setting, 
the depiction of this evolution in the public media showed a bias towards 
newsworthiness, but otherwise portrayed the new industry activity accurately.
However, interpretations suggested that one phenomenologically distinct technological 
trajectory was likely to become established in the short-term, despite the finding that 
this trajectory was not necessarily the most rational socioeconomic choice.
CHAPTER Is INTRODUCTION
In recent years, it has become clear to many types of researchers that innovation 
is important to the success o f many types o f businesses (Baden-Fuller & Stopford, 
1994; Betz, 1987; Betz, 1993; Burgelman & Sayles, 1986; Freeman, 1994; Freeman, 
1990;Kanter, 1983; Marceau, 1994; Pinchot, 1985; Roberts, 1991). Some of them 
(Betz, 1987; Burgelman & Sayles, 1986; Freeman, 1994; Marceau, 1994) have helped 
resurrect and promote the contributions of earlier philosopher-economists (Rostow, 
1990) who noted the impact that technological innovation, in particular, has had on 
firm success, industry evolution and revolution, and general economic growth and 
prosperity. While Strategic Management researchers generally recognize that 
innovation is an important strategic issue, they have not paid a great deal of attention to 
the endogenous role of technology. At least part of the explanation of why technology 
is rarely considered to be more than a "functional" element of corporate or business 
strategy, or a dimension of the macroenvironment, lies in an understanding of how 
Strategic Management developed as a field o f study.
Strategic Management owes most o f its pedigree to several broad research 
traditions: Industrial Organization (and Neoclassical Economics in general), Marketing, 
and Administrative Behavior (Organizational Behavior, Organizational Theoiy, 
Psychology, and Political Science) (Barney & Zajac, 1995; Jemison, 1981). The 
impact o f Economics (Aubretsch, 1995; Porter, 1985; Tirole, 1990) has possibly been 
the most profound, but its treatment o f technological innovation and change has usually 
been problematic (Sake, 1994). For example, traditional production functions are 
often used to help explain technological innovation (Carlsson, 1994), but such 
depictions are highly abstract and do not clearly distinguish economic from technical 
factors (Goodman and Lawless, 1994), Alternatively, sometimes technological 
innovation is operationalized as a "Pythagorean count" such as number of patents, but
1
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measures like this are known to be rather weak proxies for what technology is at its 
heart (Aubretsch, 1995; Lissoni & Metcalfe, 1994; Sahal, 1981). Overall, the 
economics view of technological innovation and change is friendly to evolution but 
fundamentally antithetical to revolution (Goodman & Lawless, 1994). To the extent 
that Strategic Management has adopted the views o f mainstream economics, then, its 
view o f technological innovation would seem to be similarly problematic (Coombs, 
1994; Bijker, 1995; Marceau, 1994). Porter's (1980) five forces model, for example, 
has been criticized as being inadequate under conditions o f instability, radical change, 
or hypercompetition. It has been necessary to develop concepts like "punctuated 
equilibrium" (Gersick, 1991) to help account for these conditions, as if they were 
anomalous.
Technological innovation is important to the Marketing tradition, as it is often 
the genesis o f both product and service differentiation (Abell, 1980; Zeithaml, 
Parasuranam, & Berry, 1985). However, its impact on Strategic Management in this 
area also shows limitations. First, enamoration with the customer/consumer is 
somewhat deterministic, simultaneously inspiring and constraining innovation (Littler, 
1994; Utterback, 1994). That is, the importance of being "close to the customer" 
notwithstanding, consumers are often myopic to truly innovative possibilities, at least 
where product technologies are concerned. Second, and relatedly, research in 
Marketing has largely avoided the technology-development problem in and of itself 
(Davidow, 1986; Page & Rosenbaum, 1988; Shanklin & Ryans, 1988). Marketing 
certainly appreciates the strategic need to coordinate with technologists (especially the 
R&D function), and does not shy away from high technology products per s e . But 
while Marketing has impressively championed the "market pull" view of technological 
innovation, it has left the "technology push" view and associated issues to other 
disciplines (like R&D Management and Engineering). Whether of not Marketing's
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focus has been appropriate to its natural domain, the point is that Strategic Management 
has inherited a mostly user-oriented view of technology from that field.
The study of Administrative Behavior has made important contributions to 
understanding the organizational dynamics of innovation. The consensus seems to be 
that innovation is affected by static organizational characteristics like structure/size and 
formalization/centralization; dynamic organizational characteristics like 
communications, planning and decision-making; and relatively intangible 
organizational characteristics like climate and culture (Imperato & Harari, 1995; Katz, 
1988; Nadler et al., 1995). In this view, however, management's influence on 
innovation seems somewhat removed. The message is that innovation is a spontaneous, 
probabilistic occurrence, and therefore management's greatest contribution lies in its 
ability to establish innovation-conducive conditions. More to the point, what is 
conspicuously absent is a focused and in-depth treatment of the development of new 
technologies. In the main, then, it seems as if Strategic Management scholars have 
demurred the problem of developing new technologies, as a major concern, to other 
disciplines.
This situation might be interpreted in one of two ways. One, it might be 
assumed that as Strategic Management has evolved, it has adopted parts o f other 
disciplines -- theories, models, and constructs -- and developed an eclectic quasi­
paradigm of its own that understands technological innovation to be the natural 
outcome of good (or simply other types of) management (Granstrand & Sjolander,
1994). The second possibility is that due to the specific individual foci of its 
intellectual benefactors, the Strategic Management synthesis has always lacked the 
vehicle by which technological innovation could be considered as centrally important 
(Coombs, 1994). Either way, it is difficult for a Strategic Management researcher to
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focus on the strategic importance o f technological innovation from the standpoint of 
that discipline's richer traditions.
Fortunately, the rapidly developing Resource/Competence-based perspective is 
very accommodating in this regard. In general, advocates of this broad perspective hold 
that organizational capabilities, resources, and other firm-specific assets affect 
competitive advantage (Bamey, 1991; Grant, 1991; Peteraf, 1993; Schendel, 1994; 
Wemerfelt, 1984). In particular, Hamel and Prahalad (1994) have developed a 
framework that is intentionally designed to transcend the blinders that market/industry 
"structure" models often impose. They have advocated a truly long-term view designed 
to help find, develop and match an organization's "core" competence with broadly 
defined functional needs. This invites the technological innovation issue into the 
Resource/Competence-based perspective for a very simple, but consistently overlooked 
reason. In contrast to neoclassical economics' materialistic operationalizations of 
technology, and in contrast to Marketing's end-user bias, and in contrast to 
Administrative Behavior's abstractions, it is a common understanding in other scholarly 
communities that technology is first and foremost human-based competence (Betz,
1993). Specifically, technology is not simply the result of competence; technology ]s 
competence. Accepting this definition is to also adopt the Resource/Competence 
perspective of Strategic Management.
In other words, the competence(s) that is(are) are needed to translate basic 
scientific knowledge into problem-solving functionality is(are) potentially the source(s) 
of sustained competitive advantage. Naturally, firms that hold such advantages are 
motivated to protect and enhance them, while their present and future competitors are 
motivated to attack and destroy them (Grandstrand & Sjolander, 1994; Pavitt, 1994). 
Where innovation is concerned, firms already possessing competitively advantageous 
technologies (typically industry incumbents) are motivated to make
"competence-enhancing" innovations, or innovations which build on existing expertise 
and make the innovating firms stronger (Anderson & Tushman, 1990; Faitlough, 1994; 
Tushman & Anderson, 1986; Utterback, 1994). Firms that do not possess technologies 
that are presently competitively advantageous are motivated to make "competence- 
destroying" innovations, or innovations that are different in ways that, when successful 
on large scales, force incumbents to either make massive investments o f many types or 
suffer the consequences of obsolescence. At the industry level, and especially in 
mature industries, competence-enhancing innovations create and/or strengthen existing 
entry barriers; competence-destroying innovations lower, destroy, and/or re-create such 
barriers. At issue, then, is long-term industiy survival, rejuvenation, or replacement.
Competence enhancement and destruction are highly related (but not perfectly 
analogous) to two other concepts: incremental and discontinuous technological change 
(Betz, 1987). An incremental technological change is a small improvement in an 
existing technology, while a discontinuity is a conscious switch from the use o f one 
technology to the use of another. For example, it is common folklore that Thomas 
Edison toiled for many years experimenting with different materials in order to both 
invent, and then continuously improve the efficiency of, both incandescent light bulbs 
and a publicly accessable infrastructure o f Direct-Current (DC) electric power. 
Eventually, however, even Edison's incremental tenacity was obviated by his arch-rival 
George Westinghouse, who developed a much more sophisticated and efficient system 
by exploiting Alternating-Current (AC) technology (Butts & Grimm, 1994).
Incremental and discontinuous changes can be graphically depicted rather simply when 
guided by a general understanding o f technology s-curves, but competence 
enhancement and destruction are technologically, sociologically, and economically 
much more complex. Case in point: both competence-enhancing and
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competence-destroying technological discontinuities occur, but most research has been 
able to distinguish the two only through historical analysis (Utterback, 1994).
Statement of the Problem
It is safe to assert that one of Strategic Management's more enduring goals is the 
development of theories and models that improve strategic business decisions aimed at 
improving long-term organizational performance (Summer et al., 1990). Here, 
historical accounts of industrial change brought about by technological discontinuities 
have important value, in that descriptions o f the past can serve as analogies to present 
problems. But in terms of Strategic Management's underlying norm, the real issue is 
technological forecasting, which in the case o f discontinuities has been described as 
complex to impossible (Tushman & Anderson, 1986; Betz, 1993). Given enough data, 
the past can usually be described and understood; but scholars agree that regardless of 
our appreciation of histoiy, the prediction of discontinuities will continue to be 
troublesome.
Considering the gravity o f the issue, any improvement in managing 
discontinuities proactively would be an important contribution (Prahalad & Hamel,
1994). To begin, it is important to observe that R&D and Engineering researchers and 
practitioners have, for many years, struggled to develop tools and techniques that can be 
used to help forecast technological change (Twiss, 1988). They agree that accurate 
prediction is difficult-to-impossible, but have made important progress in terms of 
being able to forecast likely paths and trajectories. Of keen interest here is the 
technique, ubiquitous in R&D communities, called Morphological Analysis (Ayres, 
1969; Betz, 1993). A fundamental advantage o f this technique is that it enters the 
"black box" of technology in an extraordinarily objective way. It views a product 
(however simple or complex) as a collection o f natural (i.e., naturally occurring, or 
governed by natural "law") phenomena (and knowledge thereof), or as a consciously
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manipulated coordination of natural occurrences. The immediate advantage to the 
forecaster is that Morphological Analysis is unconstrained by prevailing socio­
economic structures and shortsighted biases. An additional advantage, and one that is 
key to the present problem, is that is has conceptual links to discontinuities. In short, 
Morphological Analysis can be used as an aid in the ostensibly impenetrable problem of 
forecasting discontinuities.
Naturally, the next issue is how to apply the objectivity offered by 
Morphological Analysis amid the complexities of socioeconomic dynamism. Earlier it 
was stated that in Hamel and Prahalad's (1994) view, accepting existing market and 
industry structures as given is to unnecessarily limit one's ability to foresee other 
possibilities. Considering that the main issue is that technological discontinuities do, in 
fact, sometimes change these structures, changes among them should be considered in 
an accommodating theoretical framework. To be specific, it is reasonable to assert that 
if an industry is to be transformed (via competence destruction) by a discontinuous 
technological innovation, the new technology must achieve a certain level o f "cognitive 
legitimacy" in society at large (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994). The more radical the innovation, 
the higher is this hurdle of cognitive legitimacy. Since established technologies have 
already achieved a high level o f cognitive legitimacy, incremental improvements to 
them face a relatively low level of resistance to change in the marketplace. 
Discontinuous changes, especially those which threaten to change lifestyles or broad 
socioeconomic infrastructures, face much higher levels of resistance. The battle for 
new markets, industry definition, and a sustainable long-term position is first and 
foremost the battle for cognitive legitimacy -  or what Hamel and Prahalad (1994) 
called "share of mind."
The key problem, then, is this: Faced with the possibility of competence- 
destruction on an industrial scale, and armed with the fundamental ability to foresee
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general technological trends and trajectories, how do industry incumbents attempt to 
shape the cognitive legitimacy o f existing and radically new technologies?
Significance of the Study
The main purpose o f this study is to contribute to the development o f a view and 
associated technique by which practitioners and researchers can make real-time 
assessments o f discontinuous technological changes and associated strategic responses. 
As implied, improvement over historical retrospection requires that the problem be 
broken down into two fundamental parts: determination of technological trends and 
accompanying competences; and an empirical examination of the proactive strategic 
responses that would be expected from profit-seeking firms.
In order to do a real-time assessment, it is most appropriate to identify a mature 
industry (and therefore a set o f generally mature technologies), that is apparently on the 
verge o f discontinuous change. In a mature industry, s-curves are likely to be near 
their peaks, which invites rejuvenation or replacement via discontinuous technological 
change. Here, a natural experiment is in progress. Existing California law requires that 
beginning in 1998, automakers that sell large numbers of autos in the state must make 
available a certain percentage of zero-emission vehicles. The movement has spread 
rapidly, has had strong federal support, and as o f this writing similar legislation exists 
or is pending in other states that collectively account for 33% of all U.S. auto sales 
(Winn, 1994). The legislated penalties for failure will be severe, and the commercial 
consequences o f success are difficult to accurately imagine. Here, electrically powered 
autos are the only viable solution; choices within that envelope, however, are diverse 
and complex. Without a doubt, the most limiting technological constraint is what is 
commonly, though somewhat inaccurately, described as the "batteiy" problem. In a 
nutshell, electric autos do not go very far on one "fill-up." Firms are experiencing great
9
pain and expense as they try to write the technological rules of this new (or certainly 
changing) industry.
In order to assess this situation from the morphological perspective, a 
Morphological Analysis o f the parameters that govern "batteries" will first be 
developed. This analysis will produce a matrix, or map, that will depict technological 
possibilities (and by definition, concomitant competences) along two general 
dimensions. In short, the argument is that natural law objectively dimensionalizes 
technology, technological competence, and the potential for enhancement or 
destruction in future competitive space.
The subcategories in each dimension will then be used as categorical predictors 
of several specific strategic responses that the literature implies incumbents are prone 
to make. Specifically, incumbents should be expected to make competence-enhancing 
innovations, while (potential) new entrants should be expected to make competence- 
destroying innovations. Each morphological dimension will be used to measure this 
prediction. Second, incumbents should be expected to defend existing competences by 
promoting their advantages, and likewise attack the disadvantages o f potentially 
competence-destroying technologies. In short, competence-enhancing innovations have 
early performance and price advantages, while competence-destroying innovations have 
future performance and price advantages. (The advantages o f one type o f innovation 
are, by definition, the disadvantages of the other type.) At the nexus of potential 
industry renewal, the struggle is largely one for simple "cognitive legitimacy." The 
literature suggests that incumbents attempt to shape the cognitive legitimacy o f their 
technologies through proactive information campaigns. As such, a structured content 
analysis of several thousand mass media extracts will be conducted to look for 
"legitimation" trends and biases.
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This study will make several contributions. First, it will help extend an ongoing 
cross-disciplinary dialogue between the Strategic Management and Management of 
Technology communities. Aside from the inherent appeal o f theoretical cross­
fertilization, it has been well-established that technological innovation is one of the 
more important drivers of both strategic success and macroeconomic progress. Second, 
it will extend the ongoing development o f the Resource/Competence-based view of 
Strategic Management. This view is relatively young, but widely acclaimed for its 
potential. Third, it will help diffuse into wider circles Morphological Analysis, a tool 
that has been available as a forecasting technique for almost fifty years. Fourth, it will 
contribute to an understanding of how to analyze technological discontinuities in real 
time. While doing so, however, it will respect the caveat that technology forecasting 
has proved to be an inherently frustrating undertaking. In this light, even small gains 
will be insightful. Finally, it will help extend an understanding of an important 
contemporaiy problem in a vital industry (Graves, 1994; Winn, 1994). Assuming that 
legislators continue their resolve, the electric automobile industry will emerge in some 
form. The locus of that emergence is not at all certain, and even global patterns are not 
yet clear.
Summary of Remaining Chapters
This introduction has framed a set of conditions and the choices they imply 
towards studying an important topic in an equally important context. Subsequent 
chapters review the relevant literature, generate specific propositions and hypotheses, 
propose a study design, present the results of tests and analyze their implications.
As the relevant literature comes from several research areas, Chapter 2 
(Literature Review) is divided into segments. First, Strategic Management will be 
considered. Mintzberg's (in Frederickson, 1990) "ten schools" will be used as a 
framework for analyzing some of the relevant weaknesses in the field's main streams of
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thought, Second, a portion of the Management of Technology literature will be 
reviewed, showing the existence o f models and frameworks that (a) consider 
technological innovation as centrally important, and (b) are directly applicable to the 
level o f analysis that is of central concern to the business strategist. Third, the history, 
strengths, and weaknesses of Morphological Analysis will be reviewed, explicating 
some of its fundamental potentials and caveats. Fourth, Institutional Theory will be 
introduced as a correct perspective for assessing one important strategic concern, that 
being the legitimation of existing and emerging technologies.
In Chapter 3, the dimensionalization of technologies/competences in the 
morphological perspective is explained, and then propositions and hypotheses are 
developed by weaving together some of the plainer relationships among the major 
constructs presented in the literature review.
In Chapter 4, the design o f the study is presented. A Morphological Analysis of 
electrochemical power sources is developed by following the "rules" explained in the 
literature. The resulting matrix was used as a baseline for testing the hypotheses. The 
sample, variables, measures, coding technique, and tests are also described.
In Chapter 5, results of testing the hypotheses are reviewed and discussed. 
Results of each test were statistically strong, though not always in the direction 
hypothesized. Contrasts among the major findings indicated the need for additional 
analysis before interpretation.
Chapter 6 provides additional tests of hypotheses under revised assumptions. 
Again, results were strong, indicating that Technology Cycles frameworks are powerful 
but that the public media was not substantially biased. Serendipitous findings indicated 
how various technological trajectories were developing, which had important 
implications regarding the development of socioeconomic and technoeconomic 
infrastructures.
Chapter 7 presents the implications of the results of all tests organized by each 
major body of literature. Limitations o f the study are then discussed prior to 
summarizing implications for future research.
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
The following literature review juxtaposes several bodies of literature in order 
to highlight several areas of mutual concern. First, the Strategic Management literature 
is reviewed, showing a conundrum faced by researchers interested in the importance of 
technology, and describing a recently developing solution to this conundrum. Second, a 
portion of the Management of Technology literature is reviewed, focusing on 
Technology Cycles and their importance to the Strategic Management point of view. 
Third, a portion of the R&D Management literature is reviewed, describing 
Morphological Analysis in depth and examining its potential as an academic research 
tool. Fourth, Institutional Theory is briefly reviewed, concentrating on how the 
cognitive legitimation of new technologies might occur. The chapter concludes by 
summarizing the main points and suggesting an important research question.
Strategic Management
In 1942, economist Joseph Schumpeter (Schumpeter, 1976) articulated a basic 
view of economic growth that grappled with a problem that had perplexed economists 
since Adam Smith: how to consider technological change as an endogenous variable in 
a model o f macroeconomic development (Rostow, 1990). While lionizing the impact 
of the individual entrepreneur, he asserted that technological innovation is the principal 
engine of capitalism's constant rejuvenation; that economic equilibria are always being 
displaced by incremental changes in existing technologies and, more famously, by 
spontaneous and discontinuous innovations. This latter dynamic he described as 
"creative destruction," a term which has since become common and which has received 
significant empirical support (Fellner, 1970; Freeman, 1994; Nelson, 1993; Rothwell, 
1994; Schmookler, 1965; Solow, 1957; Steinmueller, 1994; Villard, 1958):
13
14
Creative Destruction is the essential fact of capitalism ... [capitalism] 
can not be understood irrespective o f it, or, in fact, on the hypothesis 
that there is a perennial lu ll... the problem that is usually being visualized 
is how capitalism administers existing structures, whereas the relevant 
problem is how it creates and destroys them. As long as this is not 
recognized, the invesitigator does a meaningless job (Schumpeter, 1976: 83-4).
However, Schumpeter's work fell short o f being a full theory, and despite 
important progress made by other scholars, mainstream economics has generally 
maintained its dependence on models that assume equilibration, not creative 
destruction (Carlsson, 1994; Freeman, 1994; Lissoni & Metcalfe, 1994; Rostow, 1990). 
This description is not made to disparage the study o f Economics, but to suggest a 
partial explanation of why the study o f Strategic Management (which depends on 
Economics for much of its theoretical foundation) maintains a similar view of 
technological change. As Strategic Management is an eclectic Held, however, it is 
difficult to identify "the" strategic paradigm; a totally comprehensive literature review, 
therefore, would be unnecessarily exhausting. The main point can be illustrated 
succinctly by reviewing the most dominant approaches to Strategic Management. 
Mintzberg (in Frederickson, 1990) has provided an adequate framework in his 
evaluation of the field's "ten schools."
First, several o f these schools are at most tangentially concerned with 
technology. In the Design school, epitomized by Selznick's (1957) emphasis on 
leadership and organizational purpose, technological change is at best implied. In 
Andrews' view (1987), technology is principally an environmental consideration, and 
associated change is generally a matter o f reactive adaptation, not creative destruction. 
The Cognitive school (March & Simon, 1958; Simon, 1957) has contributed concepts 
like "bounded rationality," "tacit knowledge," and "mental set" to an understanding of 
the strategist himself/herself, but an understanding of these concepts does little to 
advance an understanding of technology and technological change. The Political
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school (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) is concerned with resource dependencies and inter* 
organizational relationships, in which technological change plays a relatively 
unimportant role. The Cultural school (Ouchi, 1981; Peters and Waterman, 1982) is in 
a sense a reaction to the difficulties o f managing extreme environmental dynamism, 
wherein technological change is perhaps an assumption but not the main focus. 
Members of the Environmental/Contingency school (Bums and Stalker, 1961; Hannan 
and Freeman, 1977; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Woodward, 1965) typically view 
technology as being a vague environmental variable, or as a component of the 
organization that is practically indistinguishable from both its structure and general 
processes (Scott, 1993).
Other schools give considerable credit to the importance of technology, but 
generally view it not as a main strategic concern, but as an important tactical weapon to 
be used within industries. The view that strategists can actively participate in making 
wholesale structural changes through the management o f technology is occasionally 
acknowledged, but is consistently underdeveloped. For example, the Planning and 
Positioning schools are largely concerned with the structure o f existing markets and 
industries (Ansoff, 1965; Hofer & Schendel, 1978; Porter 1980, 1985), and perhaps 
best illustrate the enormous impact that Marketing and Industrial Organization have 
had on the field. In frameworks such as the Product Life Cycle, Portfolio Analysis, and 
the Five Forces Model, technology is sometimes an important focus, as implied by 
variables such as product differentiation and proprietary rights. However, the 
underlying economic assumptions are mainstream, and strategic implications are 
largely concerned with managing growth, maturation, and decline ~  not re-creation 
(Hayes & Wheelright, 1988; Howard & Moore, 1988; Moore, 1988; von Hippel, 1988), 
In the Learning school (Burgelman, 1983; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Quinn, 1980), 
technological uncertainty is a driving concern but, ironically, the school has been
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criticized as being overly reactive to the present and hence not truly "strategic." In the 
Configurational school, Miles and Snow (1978) considered technology to be important 
in the Engineering phase of the adaptive cycle, but the crux of their framework is the 
Administrative phase, where crucial technology decisions have already been made and 
R&D's role is mostly to address cost containment. Finally, Mintzberg's (1979) 
configurational framework is an "all o f the above as required" approach that considers 
technological change to no greater extent than even the sum of the other schools 
described.
Schumpeters focus has not gone completely unnoticed in Strategic 
Management, however, and does have a tenuous place in Mintzberg's Entrepreneurial 
school. However, Mintzberg noted:
Mainstream economics always held back on the role of the leader.
It preferred the abstraction of the competitive market and the 
predictability of the skeletal leader to the vagaries o f strategic vision and 
the innovative market niche (Mintzberg, 1990).
In other words, though the Entrepreneurial school champions the entrepreneur 
as opposed to the steward, its place in Strategic Management (vis-a-vis technological 
innovation) has remained relatively minor because of theoretical problems that have 
remained unresolved since Schumpeter's time:
To undertake such new things is difficult and constitutes a distinct 
economic function, first, because they lie outside o f the routine tasks 
which everybody understands and, secondly, because the environment 
resists in many ways... To act with confidence beyond the range of 
familiar beacons and to overcome that resistance requires aptitudes that 
are present in only a small fraction of the population and that defines 
the entrepreneurial type as well as the entrepreneurial function (Schumpeter, 
1976: 132).
This is not to suggest that the entire field feels that entrepreneurship is 
unimportant, because the opposite is generally true. Likewise, nowhere in the Strategic
Management field is it outwardly professed that technology and technological change 
are unimportant. The point is that pending the fuller development of a popular 
economic paradigm that considers the "creative destruction" phenomenon 
endogenously, it will be difficult for a "Technology School" to flower fully within the 
evolving Strategic Management field. Thus, Strategic Management researchers 
interested in the primacy of technology seem to face a dilemma. The options implied 
by the above discussion seem to be: (a) accept the most popular Economics paradigms 
and study technology as a secondary, tactical, or functional consideration using proxy­
like measures, or (b) accept the Schumpeterian view that entrepreneurial vigor and 
technological expertise are foremost strategic concerns, while using undeveloped 
and/or possibly cross-disciplinary theory.
In pursuit of an agreeable solution, it is noteworthy that many researchers have 
recently "returned" to advocating a view of strategic management that emphasizes the 
wise development and deployment of organizational resources (assets) and 
competences (skills) (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993; Schendel; 1994; Wemerfelt, 1984). 
Some advocates have stressed the importance of pursuing abnormal returns to tangible 
assets (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993; Conner, 1991; Ginsberg, 1994; Grant, 1991), while 
others have placed greater emphasis on the selection and development of human-based 
competences (Barney, 1992; Bessant, 1994; Lado & Wilson, 1994; Pavitt, 1994; Pisano, 
1994; Prahalad & Hamel, 1990). With respect to the latter, new product development 
and product innovation have been identified as being important sources of competitive 
advantage (Barney, 1992; Hayes & Pisano, 1994; Lado & Wilson, 1994; Pisano, 1994; 
Stalk, Evans, & Schulman, 1992), but the consensus is not yet clear on exactly what 
skill accounts for innovation: "The capability that wins tomorrow is the capability to 
develop the capability to develop the capability that innovates faster (or better), and so 
on" (Collis, 1994:148). Regardless, the point is that the Resource/Competence-based
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perspective is eclectic, flexible, and receptive to viewing all innovation-related issues in 
terms of human-based skill (Rothwell, 1994; Schendel, 1995).
Hamel and Prahalad (1994) are popular spokesmen in this regard. They have 
asserted that strategy should be viewed first as competition for share of mind, or 
opportunity share. This requires a total reconsideration of the meaning of industry and 
market structures. Extant understandings are so deeply embedded in the popular 
equilibrium models that strategic decisions are susceptible to rigidity and myopia, and 
the development of truly strategic thinking can become retarded. The essence of 
strategy, in their view, is to invest in, develop, and match an organization's "core" 
competence to foreseeable customer-oriented functionality, broadly defined:
Just as it is necessary to abstract away from business units to 
underlying core competencies, it is necessary to abstract away from 
traditional product and service definitions and focus on underlying 
functionalities (85)...
It is the marriage o f core competence and functionality thinking 
that points a firm toward unexplored competitive space. It is core 
competence and functionality thinking that allows companies to go 
beyond what is to what could be (88).
Because this view focuses on competences and functionalities, rather than 
existing industry and market structures, it invites technology under its umbrella as a 
prime consideration -  however, this depends on operationalizing technology not as 
economists have done (Sahal, 1981; Sako, 1994), but as many technologists prefer. 
Consider that Betz (1993) defined technology as "the knowledge of the manipulation of 
nature for human purposes" (374). If technology is knowledge, and if knowledge is the 
basis of skill, and if skill is competence, then technology is competence. Looking past 
materialistic conceptualizations o f technology and adopting the view that technology, 
not unlike its cousin science, is knowledge, allows it to be considered as a candidate for
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core competence in Competence-based views (Pavitt, 1994; Sako, 1994, Tyler & 
Sttensma, 1995).
Furthermore, while technologists often prefer to conceive of technology as 
competence, they just as often prefer to measure it in terms of functional performance 
because functional measurements (a) can be objectively obtained, (b) have immediate 
and practical utility to managers, (c) take into account all types o f innovations, (d) 
account for product characteristics, and (e) track the diffusion of technology (Goodman 
and Lawless, 1994)..
In short, Hamel and Prahalad stated that strategic thinkers should strive to match 
their firms' core competence with broad-based customer functionality, while 
technologists have very similarly stated that technology is both competence and 
functional performance. Despite some areas of underlying theoretical 
underdevelopment, this match seems direct.
Management of Technology
In order to proceed, it is necessary to emphasize what so far has only been 
alluded -  that many researchers in fields other than Business Administration have for 
years wrestled with the problem of endogenous technological change, with significant 
success. "Technology i s ... a fundamental force for change affecting firms and their 
environments. There is no science yet of technological change, but there are some 
helpful conceptual frameworks and guidelines" (Goodman and Lawless, 1994: 178).
The specific "frameworks and guidelines" referenced here are technology s-curves and 
technology cycles. S-curves will be reviewed first, as an understanding o f this concept 
is essential to understanding technology cycles.
In their most elemental form, s-curves are not simply a theoretical abstraction; 
thousands have been developed and their explanations are simple and well-accepted 
(Becker & Speltz, 1983, 1986; Foster, 1982, 1986 a/b, 1988; Merino, 1990; Roussel,
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1984). As originally conceived, an s-curve is an actual plot o f the performance of a 
technology (in any vital dimension of performance) v. time (or, as originally conceived, 
(Research and Development (R&D) effort). It takes some time (and/or effort) to get 
acceptable performance out of a new, little known technology, but eventually an 
accumulation of knowledge, effort, investment, and number o f involved people 
synergizes and the growth in performance accelerates. However, this growth eventually 
inverts as a natural limit is asymptotically approached, and the result is an s-curve. 
Upward movement along an s-curve depicts incremental improvement in the chosen 
performance parameter o f a particular technology, while a transition to a different 
technology that has a higher theoretical performance limit is termed and graphically 







Figure 2,1 S-Curves and a Technological Discontinuity.
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Many scholars, consultants and practitioners have noted the profound 
management implications of the many decisions related to incremental v. discontinuous 
technological change. Understanding the s-curve has become fundamental to 
understanding how technologies evolve at higher levels o f analysis, and/or in complex 
products and product systems. The following review focuses on a general rubric often 
called "Technology Cycles" which, for reasons that will become clear, are particularly 
salient to Strategic Management decisions.
Abernathy and Utterback (1988) summarized several years of their research by 
articulating a framework that has become well-known and well-accepted in the 
Management o f Technology literature. They found that in general, technology evolves 
in an industry in three fundamental stages. In the early Fluid Stage, competition is 
based on functional product performance. Product users are the prime stimuli for 
innovation, and thus product innovations dominate competitive dynamics. Changes in 
production processes are relatively easy to accommodate, and production is generally 
small-scale. In the second, Transitional Stage, competition is still based on product 
variation, but expanding internal capability stimulates major process innovations as 
well. At least one product design usually comes to "dominate" the market or industry, 
and production processes become more and more efficient and entrenched. In the 
latter, Specific Stage, competition is based on cost reduction and quality, which 
stimulates incremental improvements in both products and processes. Product 
differentiation becomes difficult, and process improvements promote efficiency.
Ford and Ryan (1988) expressed a framework of Technology Life Cycles that 
focused entirely on strategic decisions relevant to whether a firm should develop 
technologies internally or sell them. With a minimum of description as to the 
underlying dynamics, they identified the following stages of technology cycles: 
technology development, technology application, application launch, application
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growth, technology maturity, and degraded technology. Despite their lack of specifics, 
this framework has also become a common general reference.
In 1985, Abernathy and Clark (1988) departed from the deterministic 
implications of the emerging "cycle" mentality, by describing four types o f innovations 
in terms of two dimensions that are fundamentally independent of time: (a) effect on 
existing markets, and (b) effect on existing firm/industry competences. Architectural 
Innovations are those where "new technology... departs from established systems of 
production, and opens up new linkages to markets and users. They create new 
industries or reform old ones" (161). Market Niche Innovations "build on established 
technical competence, and improve its applicability in ... emerging market segments" 
(64). Regular Innovations involve "change that builds on established technical and 
production competence... the effect o f these changes is to entrench existing skills and 
resources" (65-66). Revolutionary Innovations render "established technical and 
production competences obsolete, yet [are] applied to existing markets and customers" 
(66). The authors found support for this framework through a qualitative study of the 
history of the automobile. An important implication was that firms and industries can 
alter their courses by pursuing specific types of innovations that suit their strategic 
goals, and can even "de-mature." Another important contribution was the emphasis on 
competences. However, though the key constructs have gained widespread acceptance, 
most researchers have preferred to express them, and those like them, in cyclical 
frameworks.
Burgelman, Kosnik, and van den Poel (1988), for example, have posited that the 
popular A.D. Little (1981) categorization of technologies can be roughly framed as a 
sequence, or evolution. In Stage I, technology is characterized as "Emerging," which 
means that the technology's potential to alter the existing basis of competition has not 
yet been demonstrated. According to Goodman and Lawless, Emerging technologies
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"need only be monitored through a variety of literature review and scientific meeting 
attendance activities" (131). In Stage II, technology is characterized as "Pacing": here, 
the potential for competitive advantage has been demonstrated. Investment here 
"needs to be done on a selective basis. The firm needs to have some hands-on 
experience with the core elements of such technologies in order to reduce technological 
uncertainties in anticipation of more effective deployment in a systematic development 
effort when the pacing technologies achieve key technology status" (131). In Stage III, 
technology is characterized as "Key," which means that it constitutes the present basis 
for competitive advantage. In other words, Key technologies are those which are 
already embedded in existing products and processes, and have a major impact on 
performance issues such as cost, quality, and functional performance. "Systematic 
investment in next-generation technology includes main products, complementary 
products, distribution strategies, and coordination with major customers" (130-1). In 
Stage IV, a "Base" technology is that which has become commodity-like and is 
commonly available to all competitors. "Here the focus is normally on small 
improvements in performance capability and continual recruitment to replace technical 
personnel when they move on" (130). Whether Little's categorization scheme is left as 
just that ~  a cross-sectional categorization scheme -  or interrelated as stages in a 
cycle, the implication is that technological evolution and/or change is highly dynamic. 
Within any reasonably complex product, constituent technologies are likely to vary in 
some basic characteristics.
In 1986, Tushman and Anderson articulated a view of technology cycles which 
emphasized the discontinuity phenomenon, a view which Anderson and Tushman 
extended in 1990. In the earlier article, they hypothesized that there are two 
fundamentally different types of discontinuities: competence-enhancing and 
competence-destroying. Competence-enhancing discontinuities represent "orders of
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magnitude improvements in price/performance that build on existing know-how within 
a product class," while competence-destroying discontinuities are ones where "mastery 
of new technology fundamentally alters the set o f relevant competences within a 
product class" (442). Importantly, they also hypothesized that competence-destroying 
discontinuities are most commonly made by new industry entrants, whereas 
enhancements are made by incumbents. In the latter article, they proposed that a 
discontinuity is usually followed by an era of ferment -  a period where old products are 
experimentally replaced in the marketplace by new ones -- resulting in a trial-and-error 
design competition that culminates in the emergence of a dominant design, followed by 
a renewed period of incremental change. Here, they maintained that incumbents 
usually make competence-enhancing product discontinuities and competence- 
destroying process discontinuities, while new entrants are usually responsible for 
competence-destroying product discontinuities. The authors found support for these 
most fundamental hypotheses through a longitudinal analysis of three industries, while 
making great use of personal judgment in delineating types of discontinuities. A key 
implication of their findings was that discontinuities are enormously affected by social 
dynamics implied earlier. This view has become extraordinarily popular among 
Strategic Management scholars interested in associated issues.
In their discussion of growth curves and product or technology life cycles, 
Howard and Guile (1992) reported that "technologies and industries do tend to evolve 
in consistent patterns that, if perceived even dimly, can help a manager chart a course 
in the use o f technology. Management consultants, technical professionals in industry, 
and scholars o f technical change and diffusion have done substantial work in 
understanding patterns by which industries and technologies evolve together... While 
there is no widely accepted formal model, there seems to be agreement -- if  only tacit -  
that important and pervasive patterns do exist" (11).
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They also proposed a three-phase technology life cycle. The Emergence phase 
is "characterized (1) by genuine technical novelty; or (2) by the use of a previously 
developed technology in a new market application" (1992: 11). In the Diffusion and 
Development phase a dominant design "speeds up the pace of diffusion... price 
competition becomes more important... and the pure economics of production and 
deliveiy dominate competition" (14). In the Maturity phase, the pace o f technological 
change is slow, and technologies become endangered by the prospect o f replacement.
Betz (1993) was more careful than most to note that there are different levels of 
technological cyclicality, and that each is relevant to a specific level o f organization. 
Product Life Cycles mainly affect divisions, Product Line Life Cycles affect firms, 
Technology Life Cycles affect industries, and Kondratieff Cycles affect nations and 
entire economies. Since the view of Strategic Management is principally concerned 
with how firms compete in industrial settings (Porter, 1990), the middle two types of 
cycles are most salient to this study. "Although products are obsoleted by technology, 
cost, safety features, packaging or fashion, product lines are obsoleted by technology or 
safety... substitution will begin for the applications that demand the higher 
performance of the new-generation product line that justifies the price premium" (Betz, 
1993:282-3).
He next noted that "the technological obsolescence of product lines can cause 
whole industrial sectors to die or be restructured" (283). His ensuing discussion of 
industrial technology life cycles was consistent with the views presented above, while 
making the greatest use o f Abernathy and Utterback (1978) and Ford and Ryan (1981). 
However, he concluded by pointing out several limitations of the technology cycle 
concept: (a) it is oversimplified; (b) several product standards, or dominant designs, can 
emerge; (c) markets fragment rapidly to complicate any analysis; and (d) many products
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are composed of several technologies which often experience different rates of 
development.
In sum, the process of technological innovation and change is complex, and 
technology cycles capture but a general subset of all possible events. This discussion of 
Technology Cycles has been oriented towards several of the issues that are most 
important to Strategic Management researchers. Here, the general consensus is strong 
(Fairtlough, 1994; Freeman, 1994; Lissoni & Metcalfe, 1994; Utterback, 1994) and 
holds that: (a) technological innovation happens both continuously (incrementally) and 
discontinuously (radically); (b) because they "enhance" existing competences and build 
on sunk investments, existing firms (incumbents) are prone to make incremental 
technological innovations; (c) because they "destroy" existing competences and force 
massive reinvestments, new (usually small and young) entrants are prone to make 
radical technological innovations; (d) faced with competencc-destruction, incumbents 
fight back; and (e) radical new technologies are most competitively disadvantaged 
early-on, when their performance and price characteristics are most relatively inferior 
to the performance and price characteristics of mature technologies, if known.
At this point, it is important to highlight that the discussion has honed its focus 
to product innovations in the manufactured/assembled product subsector of an overall 
product/service economy. This is prudent for three reasons. First the research cited 
above has generally indicated the leading impact that product innovations have had on 
the "creative destruction" phenomenon (Fairtlough, 1994; Hobday, 1994). That is, 
product discontinuities usually inaugurate new technology cycles, whereas process 
innovations generally provide the impetus towards equilibration within individual 
cycles. Second, though the general model is highly applicable to the non-assembled 
product sector, there the main constructs are less conceptually distinct (Utterback,
1994). Third, research of the main issues in the service sector is apparently much less
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rich (Miles, 1994). In an effort to maintain maximum clarity, therefore, all subsequent 
discussions will maintain a focus on assembled/manufactured products.
Technological Forecasting and Morphological Analysis
Frederick Betz has observed that
In historical hindsight, it is easy to pick out why and even when a 
new technology substituted for an old technology... the problem in 
forecasting and planning technology is to anticipate the change...
Initially, a substituting new technology will likely perform a given 
function less well than an existing technology. Its potential for 
substitution lies in a natural advantage in the nature o f its 
phenomenological base compared with the older phenomenological base 
[italics added.] (1993:392-95).
Key to improving the ability to foresee (or at least explain non-superficially) 
discontinuities, then, is an understanding of a product or product line in terms of the 
scientific/engineering phenomena being exploited and embodied into the products in 
question. This need begs for a forecasting tool which has a phenomenological focus.
Of the techniques currently available, Morphological Analysis (MA) has exactly this 
focus.
The morphological method, developed in a series of obscure papers written in 
the 1940s by Swedish astronomer Fritz Zwicky, is now practiced by virtually every 
R&D organization in the U.S. (Betz, 1993). The idea initially languished. Jantsch 
(1967) noted "it is astonishing... that the only technique yet developed for systematic 
[technological forecasting] has not received very wide attention so far" (175). By 
"systematic," he inferred that the morphological method was far less biased by present 
conditions and business pressures than methods like trend extrapolation and contextual 
mapping, yet far more structured and disciplined than intuitive thinking. "The practical 
application of the morphological method is conceivable over a wide spectrum ranging 
from a mere conscious or unconscious attitude to the careful construction of parameter
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matrices and their evaluation" (179). Jantsch quoted Zwicky's steps, which have been 
reproduced often in the literature:
1. An exact statement is made of the problem which is to be
solved ...
2. The exact statement... will reveal automatically the important
characteristic parameters on which the solution of the
problem depends...
3. Each parameter "p" will be found to possess a number o f "k"
different independent values "pk" [sic]...
4. The determination of the performance values of all the desired
solutions represents the fourth major step ...
5. The final step involves the choice o f particularly desirable
special solutions and their realizations (176)...
The sum and substance o f this technique is this: complex products are 
principally expressed as combinations of natural phenomena. Each phenomenon is a 
parameter (p) which must take form via one option (k) or another. A morphological 
matrix (Table 2.1 provides an example) lists all required natural phenomena that must 
occur for the product function to happen, and then lists all known or foreseeable 
options which suggest how each phenomenon might be embodied. Since each option 
has its own inherent natural potential, and since some potentials are inherently more 
opportune than others, a morphological matrix can directly indicate which 
configurations are inherently higher performing than others.
In Table 2.1, for example, consider a morph of jet engines defined by a 
combination of all the parameter options listed in the first "Option" column. In this 
example, note that the first propellant parameter option is "gas" -  here is a morph of jet 
engines that all run on gaseous fuel, such as gaseous hydrogen. But suppose safety is a 
crucial performance parameter, in which case the volatility o f the fuel is a key 
performance measure. Gaseous hydrogen (and for the sake of argument, other gaseous 
fuels) have inherently low and therefore relatively unsafe ignition temperatures. If no 
gaseous fuel has the inherent ability to meet safety requirements, regardless of any
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Table 2.1. Zwicky's Morphological Matrix of Jet Engines (Jantsch, 1967).
Parameter Option Option Option Option
Energy Source Intrinsic Extrinsic
Generation Internal External
Augmentation (1) Intrinsic Extrinsic
Augmentation (2) Internal External
Jet Positive Negative
Conversion TBD TBD TBD TBD
Medium Vacuum Air Water Earth
Motion Transitory Rotatory Oscillatory None
Propellant (1) Gas Liquid Solid
Propellant (2) Self-igniting Non-self-igniting
Operation Continuous Intermittent
possible incremental improvements to gaseous fuel technology(ies), then a 
discontinuity is in order. A switch in je t engine technology(ies) must be made to those 
which employ liquid or solid fuels, those which inherently possess higher (safer) 
ignition temperatures.
Ayres' (1969) contribution greatly enhanced the technique's overall usefulness; 
his view and terminology are important to this study and will be carefully explained. In 
any morphological matrix, one can identify all the configurations that exist or have 
already been tried. Ayres referred to this as the "occupied territory" o f the matrix:
Research and Development is primarily devoted to the systematic 
and detailed investigation of the known territory on the 'map,' with the 
objective of improving upon the performance characteristics of existing 
devices. On the other hand, a small but significant fraction o f the total 
research effort goes into exploration of the adjacent 'terra incognita'... 
exploration usually tends to proceed from the known part of the 
morphological map only into the nearby territory. In other words, it is 
normal and natural to vary the parameters of the initial configurations one 
at a time (79.)
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At this point, terminology becomes important. Most important is the concept 
Ayres called Morphological Distance, which will be abbreviated here as MD. Ayres 
defined MD as "the number of parameters wherein... two configurations differ from 
one another... each time a new configuration becomes realizable [i.e., each time MD is 
traversed,] a technological breakthrough may be said to have been achieved... 
refinements and improvements to a known configuration — however valuable -- would 
not be characterized as breakthroughs... the probability of a breakthrough in a 
technological area, per unit time, is a decreasing function of its morphological distance 
from existing art, other things being equal" (81).
Ayres used this structure to explain the s-shaped progress in any field. When a 
truly original product is invented, it is the first configuration and the only existing 
morph. As a result of entrepreneurial energy and inventive genius, different 
configurations (usually differing in only one parameter, or o f "MD 1") appear and are 
tried in the marketplace. (In the earlier example, a switch from gaseous to liquid OR 
solid fuel is an axample of an MD I change, as only the first propellant parameter was 
switched.) Each of these tries, whether commercially successful or not, diffuses 
technological know-how. As such, each serves as a point o f departure for subsequent 
new configurations (also usually of MD 1), so the growth pattern is exponential. 
However, since only so many configurations are possible on a given matrix or map, this 
growth eventually inverts, flattens out, and approaches exhaustion. Visualizing multi- 
parametric expansion and collapse is difficult, but the aggregate effect is an s-shaped 
curve of the innovation activity in a given type o f product. Morphological Analysis, 
and especially Ayres' manner o f expression, is therefore a window of opportunity for 
gaining an improved understanding of technology cycles.
It is interesting to note that in this view, each phenomenon/parameter is a 
possible locus o f innovation. In Table 2.1, an MD 1 innovation might occur as the
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result of switching "energy source" options, or o f switching "generation" options, or of 
switching any o f the other seven phenomena/parameters. It could be said that in this 
particular matrix, there are nine different Phenomenological Types (PTs) of MD 1 
innovations. Though Ayres did not point this out so precisely, it is inherent in his 
overall understanding. As will become evident in subsequent chapters, it is important 
to appreciate that a morphological matrix can be used to describe both the MD and the 
PT of any particular innovation.
Amfield (1969) appreciated the potential that morphological analysis has not 
only towards mapping out technological possibilities and charting developments, but 
also towards optimizing relevant R&D investment decisions. His discussion 
emphasized morphological analysis as being the fourth step in an elaborate eight-step 
process. "It is a method which considers every known alternative to a problem in order 
to find a 'best' overall [solution]... It is the examination of the fundamentals of a 
[technology] in this manner that creates favorable circumstances for radical innovations 
to occur, not necessarily as a direct result of rigorous analysis, but possibly sparked off 
by well-disciplined thought" (230).
Bright and Schoeman (1973) concurred with the growing body of advocates, but 
emphasized a known irony: "The main difficulty o f morphological analysis lies in its 
great richness... we quickly arrive at tens of thousands of solutions." As a help, the 
authors adopted a view virtually identical to Ayres'; they recognized the likelihood that 
"nearby" innovations are the ones most likely to occur. "If two different solutions differ 
only by one single parameter value, they are spaced by one; if  they differ by two values, 
the distance will be two and so o n ... [However,] abstract distance can aid in studying 
[morphological] results but only if  this is not too systematized. It may be that some 
solutions differing by one will be as distant as solutions differing by four or five and the 
reverse" (448). So MD is a useful idea, but its precision as a measure is limited.
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Since then morphological analysis has exploded in popularity, though its 
conceptual development has slowed. Taylor and Sprakes (1977) noted that "The 
rigorous analysis and fresh orientation on existing technologies that a morphological 
analysis provides is a most valuable instrument, acclaimed by R&D managers and 
scientists" (85). Jones and Twiss (1978) agreed while providing diverse and convincing 
examples, and stressed the need to prune any analysis o f unfeasible configurations. 
There are many other mentions o f both its conceptual appeal and practical utility 
(Garde & Patel, 1985; Fahey & Narayanan, 1986; Foray & Gruber, 1990; Majaro, 1978; 
Raudsepp, 1982; Sands, 1979; Wissema, 1982).
As the beginning of this section implied, Betz (1993) was particularly adamant 
about the unique and critical potential that morphological analysis has towards 
developing a technology strategy, but he stipulated:
In technology, function and morphology are mappings, 
correspondences ~  not mathematical derivations of one from the other...
Physical structure, morphology, can be correlated with function, but 
neither morphology nor function can be derived from the other... The 
fundamental reason for trying to correlate morphology with functionally 
defined properties is the same as the reason behind invention: technology 
as the purposeful manipulation o f nature (153). ,
Betz' subsequent discussion was not unlike Amfield's, in that the morphological 
perspective was adopted as an essential ~  indeed pivotal -- part of a larger decision­
making process. Whereas Amfield's view was more of the scientist, though, Betz' was 
more of the engineer.
Thus morphological analysis is a structured and correct tool for use in many 
modes o f technological forecasting. The literature suggests many other related uses as 
well. It is a technique that provides structure to an understanding of technology that is 
more "real" than many other views, in that it deals with ultimate natural phenomena and 
potential product functionality. Its main disadvantage lies in the inherent imprecision
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of any map or analogy; a morphological matrix is not an empirically derived taxonomy, 
must be developed with care and insight, and must be understood before use. Its main 
advantage is its ability to map technology in-depth, in terms that are initially 
unobfuscated by any socioeconomic concern. A morphological matrix is a highly 
objective baseline from which to first assess the underlying natural limitations and 
opportunities for technological change, en route to assessing other complications. 
Institutional Theory
The literature reviewed above consistently suggests that factors other than 
improved technical performance shape the assimilation of technological innovations 
into the marketplace. Pure "technology push" strategies -- those which rely on 
inventive genius without giving due attention to achieving functionality in the mind of 
the consumer -- are painfully vulnerable to the complexities of competitive dynamics 
and consumer demand. On the other hand, the literature also suggests that pure "market 
pull" strategies -  those which dutifully follow present consumer demand -- are 
themselves dangerously vulnerable to the abilities o f the inventors, innovators, and 
entrepreneurs who do not share the general consumer myopia o f what "could be"
(Littler, 1994). Rather, it is usually suggested that strategists consider both approaches 
simultaneously (Coombs, 1994; Imperato & Harari, 1995; Leonard-Barton, 1995; 
N adleretal., 1995; Rothwell, 1994.).
However, the Technology Cycles literature (Tushmna & Anderson, 1986; 
Utterback, 1994) also indicates that when the destruction of competences is at stake, 
the struggle takes on an additional dimension. That is, incumbents and new entrants 
fight not only for technological superiority and market acceptance, but also fight to 
protect and/or further develop their organizational competences. Optimizing these 
three considerations (superior performance, markets, and competence) poses some 
strategic conundrums. For example, a radical innovation (in its very early stage of
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development) might well be highly technologically opportune (in terms o f performance 
potential), and highly competence-destroying (potentially), yet least demanded by the 
general consumer. For example, when George Westinghouse introduced his AC 
system, it was immediately and demonstrably superior to Edison’s DC system in terms 
of its potential to efficiently transmit elecricity over long distances. Yet AC did not 
clearly dominate the electric utility industry until several decades later because of the 
lead, or customer base, that Edison had established (Butts & Grimm, 1994.) At points 
of potential technological discontinuity, then, competing for "share o f mind" (Prahalad 
& Hamel, 1994) would seem to be a truly important but subtle thing (Salancik &
Pfeffer, 1988; Van de Ven, 1988). Here Institutional Theory has some appealing 
explanatory potential.
Institutions are meaning systems (Berger & Luckman, 1967; Scott & Meyer, 
1994). Institutions can be defined and observed in terms of existing social norms and 
cognitive states, and the form and level of formalization of institutions can vary 
enormously. O f importance here, a key assertion of Institutional Theory is that society's 
norms and cognitive expectations powerfully affect organizational survival and hence 
shape the evolution of entire populations of organizations (Meyer & Rowan, 1977).
Institutional Theory can be applied to many levels of analysis, but the most 
popular is the "field" level (Scott & Meyer, 1994). As defined by DiMaggio & Powell 
(1983), an organizational field is a recognizable/observable pattern o f suppliers, 
consumers, regulatory agencies, and organizations that deliver products or services. As 
this list is strikingly similar to those found in popular models of industry structure 
(Marceau, 1994; Porter, 1980), the direct implication is that industry dynamics are 
shaped by institutional as well as economic/market forces.
In particular, it has become common to assert that an organization's chances for 
survival are affected by its "legitimacy" (Hannan & Freeman, 1989; Kelman &
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Hamilton, 1989; McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978; Tilly, 1975; Zucker, 1983). Legitimacy is a broad but long-established construct 
(Parsons, 1960; Selznick, 1957; Weber, 1947) that generally refers to the degree of 
correctness society ascribes to an organization (Scott, 1992). The literature suggests 
that a degree of legitimacy is acquired through relatively uncontrollable organizational 
characterisitcs such as size and age (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Hannan & Freeman, 
1984). The literature also suggests that legitimacy might also be acquired less 
passively, through the imitation of various characteristics o f other established and 
successful organizations (Haveman, 1993; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983). Finally, the 
literature suggests that legitimacy can be pro-actively acquired and managed through 
actions such as the establishment o f interorganizational relationships and regulatory 
approvals (Baum & Oliver, 1991; Singh, House & Tucker, 1986), and even through 
such simple actions as making charitable contributions (Galaskiewicz & Burt, 1991; 
Galaskiewicz & Wasserman, 1989). In short, legitimacy is an important institutional 
and industrial dynamic, and has been successfully interpreted and operationalized in a 
variety of ways (Scott, 1995; Suchman, 1995.)
Recently, legitimacy and legitimation processes have been noted as being 
important factors in the probability of success of technology-based new business 
ventures (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Rao, 1995). The argument is that organization-wide 
legitimacy can be used as both an offensive and defensive weapon in the promotion of 
products and ideas which are yet to be established in the marketplace: "Skillful... 
operatives seeking to legitimate their projects may draw on wider institutional logics to 
show that their innovation is cognitvely cogent and morally defensible" (Rao, 1995:
31). More specifically, Aldrich & Fiol (1994) argued that incumbents not only can, but 
often do exploit their organizational legitimacy while defending their entrenched 
technologies from the encroachments of potential new entrants. They borrowed the
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term "cognitive legitimacy" to describe in simple terms the absolute level of public 
knowledge that exists concerning any particular technology. Through the manipulation 
of cognitive legitimacy, incumbents shape the terms by which other firms arc able to 
acquire desperately needed resources, and hence have the potential to prevent the 
emergence of new, potentially replacing industries. "Established industries that feel 
threatened by a newcomer may undermine a new venture's cognitive legitimacy through 
rumors and information suppression or inaccurate dissemination... competing firms 
spread rumors that a product or technology is unsafe, costly, or o f inferior quality" 
(Aldrich & Fiol, 1994:656-7). For example, in the battle between DC and AC, Edison 
and his followers attacked safety concerns of AC technologies by publicly electrocuting 
animals with AC, by making it well-known that New York State electrocuted criminals 
with AC, and by making premature announcements of upcoming developments in DC 
technologies (Butts & Grimm, 1994.)
In short, existing firms in mature industries enjoy legitimacy, and their 
legitimacy is communicable to the technologies they use (Carlsson, 1994; Cooke & 
Marceau, 1994; Morgan, 1994; Shaw, 1994; Steinmueller, 1994). Legitimacy is 
resistant to change, and in fact an existing product-technology legitimacy will be 
actively defended by incumbents, especially when threatened (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994). 
Summary
This literature review has juxtaposed four main, highly related points:
First, technology, and particularly technological change, is a critical 
consideration in Strategic Management. Defining technology as both organizational 
competence and functional performance allows it to be considered comfortably in the 
growing Resource/Competence-based perspective. There is a very similar and highly 
complementary thrust growing in the Management o f Technology field.
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Second, Technology Cycles frameworks have substantial explanatory ability. S- 
curves are their bedrock. S-curves depict technological change as incremental and 
discontinuous shifts in performance. Discontinuities have the potential to "enhance" or 
"destroy" competences. The implications for industrial evolution and Strategic 
Management are profound, though prediction has proved difficult.
Third, Morphological Analysis is a common tool that has the ability to both 
describe and forecast technological change. It focuses on phenomenological potential 
while delving deeply and objectively into underlying natural realities and parameters. 
The technique adds an important level of detail, though by analogy, to relatively 
abstract descriptions of incremental and discontinuous technological change.
Fourth, it is clear that technological change is not always a technically rational, 
linear series of choices that all opt for performance maximization. There are common 
situations where performance maximization, organization stability, and short-term 
buyer appeal are conflicting goals. Some strategic battles are fought on Institutional 
fields, and deserve empirical investigation.
CHAPTER 3: PROPOSITIONS
Recall that Ayres (1969) used the morphological perspective to describe two 
types of innovation activity: development of the "occupied territory" of a morphological 
matrix (or map), and exploration of the "terra incognita." He observed that most 
industry R&D focuses on the first type, while the second depicts "breakthroughs" that, 
by his definition, traverse some morphological distance.
This view is very similar to what s-curves have been purported to represent. In 
Ayres' definition, developing the "occupied territory," or making innovations that 
traverse no morphological distance (MD 0), means making incremental improvements 
to known configurations. This means that MD 0 innovations are those which result in 
upward movement along the s-curve in one (or several) of the known "pk" options. (For 
example, Edison's painstaking experiments that substituted light bulb filament materials 
were incremental, MD 0 improvements. The basic configuration of light bulbs was not 
changed, and underlying phenomena (such as incandescence and DC) were the same in 
every experiement). Making a "breakthrough" of MD 1 means enacting one specific 
parameter through a different technological option, or switching a "k" in a manner 
where the overall result is an original configuration. When a "k" is switched, then, this 
is also a switch from the s-curve of one technology to the s-curve of another, which is 
the accepted definition of a technological discontinuity. (For example, Westinghouse's 
choice to use the then-lesser-known AC phenomenon, rather than the much simpler and 
well-understood DC, was an MD 1 technological discontinuity).
At first glance, it might seem that the greater the number o f technologies 
changed (the higher the MD), the greater the discontinuity. (For example, it seems 
reasonable to assert that a switch from DC to AC, AND a switch from incandescence to 
flourescence, is a greater discontinuity than either change, individually). While this is 
probably true in many cases, however, the R&D literature warns against cavalier use of
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the "distance" analogy. The exact number o f "k" options switched defines the exact 
morphological distance, but there is no tight correspondence between the magnitude of 
MD and the magnitude of the overall discontinuity. At the present point of conceptual 
development, one can comfortably say only that MD 0 innovations are incremental 
improvements, and MD>0 innovations are inherently discontinuous. MD 0-MD>0 is a 
sound way to dichotomize incremental and discontinuous innovations, but assumptions 
of any greater measurement rigor (e.g., using MD as an ordinal measure) would be 
highly speculative.
Ayres' view also serves the idea that s-curves aggregate into entire cycles at 
higher levels o f analysis. Recall that he observed that innovation activity at any point in 
time is a function of the number of existing different configurations in the occupied 
territory. MD 1 innovations occur at a slow rate early because the number of known 
configurations is small, but growth is exponential. This eventually inverts and flattens 
out because the number of permutations in any matrix is finite. In two dimensions, the 
cumulative growth in activity plots as an s-shaped curve. However, in order to 
conclude that an s-shaped pattern o f cumulative activity (Ayres' view) corresponds to an 
s-curve of improved performance (s-curves and cycles), one must assume that inventors 
and innovators consciously pursue improved performance, not just random 
experimentation for its own sake. Another way of saying this is that invention is 
pursued with successful innovation -  i.e., marketplace acceptance -  as its goal. The 
literature supports this assumption: "The inventor, innovating entrepreneur, and the 
working force have, for two centuries, always been a team -- harmonious, despite 
frictions, if innovation was to succeed... the composition of the stream of invention and 
innovation is substantially determined by profit incentives." (Rostow, 1993:457-463). 
Thus exploration of the terra incognita has the general effect o f improving 
performance, as well as the specific effect of simply trying the untried. That being the
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case, one would assume that as the exploration of a matrix neared exhaustion (Lissoni 
& Metcalfe, 1994), the concomitant decrease in the growth rate of performance would 
inspire the transition of innovation effort to an entirely new map — a discontinuity of 
even higher order than "mere" MD changes within a matrix. This is one useful 
explanation of why the relatively simple s-curve of an individual technology is the 
foundation of much more complex patterns, like cycles.
In sum, s-curves have been used to explain the fundamentals o f technological 
progress at many, different levels o f analysis (e.g., better organophosphate insecticides 
(Becker & Speltz, 1983) at the "low" end, to economic long waves at the "high" end 
(Betz, 1987)), and (b) at any level of analysis, s-curve dynamics can be explained in 
multidimensional detail using the morphological perspective (e.g., morphological 
analysis has been used to improve understandings of technological progress from the 
refinement of clay bricks (Taylor & Sparkes, 1977) to the overall socioeconomic 
structure of transportation systems (Ayres, 1969). The morphological view can be 
applied at any level of analysis -  the only concern is that the problem be precisely 
stated and maintained.
It is also important that Ayres' description was not purely technical. He noted 
that MD>0 innovations are rare not only because they are technically difficult; they are 
rare because they incur risk and investment in new and unfamiliar technologies. In the 
"technology is competence" view, this is the same as saying that any MD>0 innovation 
requires renewed learning. More specifically, it requires relearning at the most 
fundamental level, as far as technologists are concerned -  at the level of basic 
phenomenological expertise. Therefore, a morphological matrix is not only a map of 
phenomena and options. It is also a map of competences. Innovations o f MD 0 build 
on and enhance existing competences. Innovations of MD>0 are competence- 
destroying at least to some extent because the choice o f a different "k" simultaneously
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and necessarily chooses new/different phenomenological expertise. The MD 0-MD>0 
dichotomy is analogous to both the competence enhancement-v.-destruction dichotomy 
and the incremental-v.-discontinuity dichotomy.
However, this view differs from that found in the literature, which identified 
some discontinuities as competence-enhancing (i.e., not all discontinuities were found 
to be competence-destroying) (Anderson & Tushman, 1990; Tushman & Anderson, 
1986; Utterback, 1994). The explanation lies in whether one is considering 
discontinuities ex ante or ex post. Morphological Analysis is principally a forecasting 
technique and the premise of examination is ex ante. As described above, in this view 
all discontinuities have some degree of competence-destroying potential, whereas all 
incremental improvements are competence-enhancing. In contrast, discontinuities 
described in the literature as being either competence-enhancing or destroying were 
observed ex post, along with the unmistakable impression that socioeconomic factors, 
not only technical/technological rationality, shaped their development. Since the 
present intent o f using Morphological Analysis is to provide an objective map of 
phenomenological reality, for forecasting purposes, at least initially unobfuscated by 
socioeconomic complications, it is impossible in the abstract to differentiate which 
MD>0 innovations will enhance or destroy existing industry competences. It is wise to 
postpone this assessment until after an objective morphological analysis has been made.
However, as introduced briefly in the previous chapter, MD is not the only 
useful dimension suggested by the morphological view. Other fundamental, qualitative 
differences among the technologies in any matrix suggest that phenomenological 
parameters are themselves categorical predictors of overall patterns of innovation 
activity. An explanation follows.
In the A.D. Little (1981) view the present state o f a technology's maturity 
defines it as being base, pacing, key, or emerging. This rough but popular
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categorization scheme classifies a technology as to its ability to to alter the present 
basis of competition, with strong allusions to its state of maturity (Burgelman, Kosnik,
& van den Poel, 1988; Goodman & Lawless, 1994). Unless these qualities are 
randomly distributed in a morphological matrix, it is unlikely that patterns of 
innovation will be invariant across all phenomenological parameters. For example, 
assume that the "k" option in a particular parameter in an industry's dominant design is 
near the top of its s-curve (and is "base,") while several o f the other options in that 
parameter are technologies that are on the steep parts o f their s-curves (i.e., they are 
"key" or "pacing.") There should be a large amount o f MD>0 innovation activity here. 
At the other extreme, assume that there is still much room for improvement in the 
dominant design (i.e., the same pk is "key") while all other options o f that parameter are 
either "emerging" or "base." Most innovation activity here would likely be of MD 0.
Overall, improvements and changes in some phenomena are very likely to be 
more opportune than improvements and changes in others, based only on s-curve 
characteristics that exist at any point in time. Some Phenomenological Types (PT) of 
innovation are more likely to occur than others. As will be more fully explained below, 
PT will be used to identify and classify an MD>0 innovation according to which 
parameter is switched. In the earlier jet engine example, the propellant parameter of 
concern could arbitrarily be designated parameter number nine, simply because it 
appears ninth from the top in the morphological matrix. A switch from gaseous to 
liquid or solid fuel could be called an MD 1, PT 9 discontinuity. When this happens, a 
small number o f phenomena will be observed as natural windows of strategic 
opportunity. However, as explained in the ensuing discussion, it is also unlikely that 




In short, the manifold conceptual appeal of morphological analysis is 
augmented by its ability to dimensionalize innovations in terms of "Morphological 
Distance" and "Phenomenological Type." This compels an empirical examination of 
these two dimensions. It is appropriate to start by examining one of the strongest 
contentions of the relevant literature (Abernathy & Clark, 1985; Anderson & Tushman, 
1990; Betz, 1993; Fairtlough, 1994; Granstrand & Sjolander, 1994; Tushman & 
Anderson, 1986; Utterback, 1994):
P I: Industry incumbents make competence-enhancing innovations; industry 
non-incumbents make competence-destroying innovations.
Again, it has been suggested that MD 0 innovations are competence-enhancing, 
and that MD>0 innovations are competence destroying at least in their potential. From 
this point forward the unwieldy "in their potential" qualification will be dropped, and 
all MD>0 innovations will be considered competence-destroying based purely on the 
technical logic outlined earlier.
Also, thus far the baseline of comparison has been described as the "occupied 
territory" (Ayres, 1969), operationalized as the collection of known/existing 
configurations. The Management of Technology literature strongly asserts that in the 
latter stages o f technology life cycles, a very small number o f dominant designs 
(typically one) is usually self-evident (Abernathy & Utterback, 1988; Anderson & 
Tushman, 1990; Betz, 1993; Goodman & Lawless, 1994; Utterback, 1994). As this is 
the condition of keenest interest here, MD 0 will be operationalized as the 
configuration defined by the dominant design. In a sense, this opens up the "once 
occupied but since abandoned" territory to renewed exploration, but this does not inject 
any new problems because the enhancement and/or destruction ofpresent competences 
is the only concern. For example, AC is certainly part o f the existing dominant design
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in the electric utility industry. It replaced DC (which is inherently safer) because it 
could be transmitted over long distances, which allowed industry concentration. Yet 
recent advancements in technologies such as superconductivity, coupled with some 
deconcentration of the industry as individual homeowners and small communities 
install (solar or wind-powered) systems independent o f larger power grids, suggests that 
Edison's DC fundamantals be reconsidered.
Therefore, one can hypothesize that the Morphological Distance (MD 0 or 
MD>0) of an innovation from the dominant design is related to the incumbency of the 
innovating firm:
HI a: Industry incumbents make MD 0 innovations; industry non-incumbents 
make MD>0 innovations.
Again, however, some situations will encourage or practically mandate some 
incumbent adventurousness (Abernathy & Clark, 1988; Burgelman, Kosnick, & van den 
Poel, 1988; Goodman & Lawless, 1994; Little, 1981). One such scenario was described 
earlier -- where a dominant design is mature (at least in part) and alternative options 
seem to be presently opportune. Such a condition invites intense incumbent activity. 
While some non-incumbents might also identify such situations as vulnerabilities and 
move to exploit them, however, it is not necessarily true that their collective reactions 
will mirror the relatively focused incumbent pattern.
In fact, it is reasonable to assert that the while the aggregate pattern of 
incumbent innovation activity will be phenomenologically focused, the non-incumbent 
pattern is likely to be relatively diverse. In the first place, non-incumbents might feel it 
unwise to compete in an area where incumbents seem strong and determined to succeed 
-  for that matter, they are not obliged to compete at all (Coombs, 1994; Grandstrand & 
Sjolander, 1994), Thus a mature industry tuned to a dominant design might be focused 
on a single "core" phenomenon/competence, while the core competences of all
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imaginable new entrants are likely to be much more diverse. Second, it is conceivable 
that a group of non-incumbents, all from one specific industry with its own different 
core phenomenological competence, might move collectively and establish itself as a 
new group in the original industry in question (Hamel & Prahalad, 1994). Furthermore, 
new entrants are not necessarily new/young firms -- they might have "deep pockets" that 
can afford to subsidize long-term commitments to promising, but as yet emerging, 
technologies (Pavitt, 1994; Rothwell, 1994).
In short, there are several reasons to suspect that non-incumbent-initiated 
discontinuities will form a pattern that is different than that of incumbent-initiated 
discontinuities. Many combinations o f factors can be envisioned, but in general, the 
distribution of (incumbent v. non-incumbent) innovation activity across 
phenomenological types o f innovations is not likely to be random. This leads to the 
assertion that PT is also a categorical predictor o f incumbency. However, in the 
abstract this reasoning can only be applied to MD 1 innovations; categorizing an MD>1 
innovation as any specific PT is very unwieldy. In other words, groupings are difficult 
to assess: an MD 2 innovation that changed PT 1 and 2 should not automatically be 
assumed to be the same as an MD 2 innovation that changed PT 1 and 3, and so on. In 
the earlier jet engine example, an MD 2 discontinuity that changed PT1 (energy source) 
and PT 2 (generation) is not the same as an MD 2 discontinuity that chaged PT 1 and 
PT 3 (augmentation). However, once a matrix is explicated so clearly, it might be 
appropriate to group all MD2/PT1/PT2 discontinuities together as one category, and to 
group all MD2/PT1/PT3 discontinuities together as another category. Therefore, at the 
simplest level and pending a more specific analysis,
Hlb: For MD 1 innovations, incumbents make different phenomenological 
types (PTs) of discontinuities than non-incumbents.
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Next* the literature makes it clear that existing industry players should be 
expected to take strategic actions that reflect the implications of competence 
enhancement and destruction (Abernathy & Clark, 1985; Anderson & Tushman, 1990; 
Tushman & Anderson, 1986; Utterback, 1994). More specifically, incumbents should 
be expected to act both defensively and offensively when protecting their investments.
In the morphological view, this means that they will defend MD 0 innovations and 
attack the MD>0 innovations made by others. Their own explorations o f MD>0, of 
course, they will also defend, but these efforts should only occur selectively at certain 
technologies (PTs).
It is reasonable to assume that incumbents often have the ability to appreciate 
the fundamental mechanics of technology cycles, despite the fact that their apparent 
strategies usually indicate reluctance to make radical changes (Foster, 1986; Utterback, 
1994). In certain scenarios, they should recognize that the remaining potential to 
improve the performance of the dominant design -- or at least some of its constituent 
technologies -  is rather limited. At least they should recognize decelerating 
performance growth. At the same time, they should be aware that the present 
performance o f the dominant design is impressively better than the present performance 
of possible MD>0 substitutes. An astute incumbent should also realize that the 
phenomenological potential o f some substitutes is greater than the upper limits of the 
dominant design, and that their slow performance growth is quite possibly a temporary 
condition.
Focusing on only these essentials, incumbents determined to defend themselves 
(which is more likely than voluntary self-destruction, except for important and modest 
MD 1 exceptions) should be expected to take several rather obvious courses o f action 
(whether or not they are wise). One, they should defend the short-term performance 
advantages of innovations in the dominant design vis-a-vis the unproven and theoretical
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future performance advantages o f competence-destroying innovations. Two, they 
should attack the short-term performance disadvantages of these alternatives, while 
downplaying the probable long-term performance disadvantages o f innovations in the 
dominant design.
When doing so, incumbents should be expected to use any available resources, 
especially those where they hold an advantage. As suggested in the literature, one vital 
advantage incumbents hold vis-a-vis competence-destroying new entrants is the 
legitimacy of their technologies (Carlsson, 1994; Cooke & Morgan, 1994; Freeman, 
1994; Marceau, 1994; Shaw, 1994; Steinmueller, 1994). Conversely, one would 
assume that radically different technologies would suffer a lack of legitimacy and that 
this lack is a serious vulnerability. Indeed, Suchman (1995) suggested that new entrants 
are well-advised to heed this disadvantage and take much effort to overcome it. On the 
whole, incumbents should be expected to use the legitimacy (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; 
Haveman, 1993; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983) of existing technologies as both an offensive 
and defensive weapon, and new entrants should be expected to try to establish 
legitimacy. Early on, the legitimacy advantage clearly belongs to incumbents.
Aldrich & Fiol (1994) made a similar argument about incumbents and new 
ventures, even asserting that incumbents commonly embark on smear campaigns. In 
the same argument, they identified the news media as a good up-to-date source of 
information. On the other hand, they noted that media depictions are sometimes 
inaccurate or distorted because reporters are not always fully familiar with all important 
and/or pertinent details. One would assume that this is no less true concerning 
advanced technological matters where the average journalist probably lacks the time 
and other resources it takes to discern, understand and represent with perfect objectivity 
issues that are controversial, ambiguous, and difficult to translate for average media 
consumers.
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This suggests that it is possible for incumbents to actively influence the 
reporting of developments in technology; that the public media is both part of, and 
affected by, a complex milieu of institutional activity. More to the point, it is likely 
that the media does not merely observe technological change and associated business 
strategies; they likely participate (wittingly or unwittingly) in the strategic responses 
that incumbents make to competence-destroying threats. In subtle contrast to Aldrich 
& Fiol's implications, it is more accurate to say that when observing media activity one 
is observing (first-hand) the actual cognitive legitimation of industrial activity, rather 
than just observing (second-hand) the activities per se.
Stated differently, it is not automatically safe to assume that absolute amounts 
of media activity accurately reflect the absolute amounts of innovation activity actually 
occurring in various industry sectors, even in the most general sense. The true 
aggregate amount of non-incumbent activity (e.g., "basement" entrepreneurism, and/or 
other low profile or "proprietary" efforts, and/or work done outside the U.S.) might 
actually be greater than the true aggregate amount of incumbent activity; yet due to the 
momentum of a technology's existing cognitive legitimacy, the absolute amount of 
media coverage might be greater concerning the latter. It is not plain that an overall 
level of media coverage always represents an actual level o f activity. All that can be 
confidently asserted is that what is communicated through the media is a pattern of 
cognitive legitimation.
In sum, mature technologies are cognitively legitimate (Haveman, 1993; Tolbert 
& Zucker, 1983) and this legitimacy is an initial competitive advantage (Carlsson,
1994, Freeman, 1994; Marceau, 1994) in the battle for mind share (Hamel & Prahalad, 
1994; Salancik & Pfeffer, 1988, van de Ven, 1988) waged in information campaigns 
(Aldrich & Fiol, 1994, Rao, 1995). The dominant design should enjoy the highest 
degree of cognitive legitimacy (Anderson & Tushman, 1990; Tushman & Anderson,
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1986; Utterback* 1994), so if information campaigns are successful, competence- 
enhancing innovations should (I) attract relatively large amounts of media attention 
and (2) be ascribed the existing legitimacy of the dominant technology(ies).
Conversely, if information campaigns are successful, competence-destroying 
innovations should (I) attract lesser amounts of attention, and (2) be easily denigrated. 
Where legitimation effects are particularly powerful -- i.e., where incumbent attempts 
to manipulate mind share are successful -- this should be true even in instances where 
MD 0 innovations are relatively trivial and unrepresentative of any real change, and 
where MD>0 innovations are important, potentially revolutionary, and newsworthy.
As such, where proactive legitimation (Baum & Oliver, 1991; Galaskiewicz & 
Burt, 1991; Galaskiewicz & Wasserman, 1989; Singh, House & Tucker, 1986) is 
successfully used as part of the defense o f existing competences, the advantages of 
incumbents' innovations will be presented more frequently in the public media than 
non-incumbents' innovations (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994). At the industry level,
P2: The short-term performance advantages of competence-enhancing 
innovations are presented in public media channels more frequently than the long-term 
performance advantages of competence-destroying innovations.
Parallelling the logic presented in the first set o f hypotheses,
H2a: Public media channels present the short-term performance superiority of 
MD 0 innovations more frequently than the long-term performance superiority of 
MD>0 innovations.
H2b: For MD 1 innovations, public media channels present the long-term 
performance superiority of some Phenomenological Types (PTs) of innovations more 
frequently than others.
The other half of the argument is equally important:
P3: The long-term performance disadvantages of competence-enhancing 
innovations are presented in public media channels less frequently than the short-term 
performance disadvantages of competence-destroying innovations.
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H3a: Public media channels present the long-term performance inferiority of 
MD 0 innovations less frequently than the short-term performance inferiority o f MD>0 
innovations.
H3b: For MD 1 innovations, public media channels present the short-term 
performance inferiority of some Phenomenological Types (PTs) of innovations less 
frequently than others.
Next, while there is little doubt that the substitution of one technology for 
another primarily depends on relative performance (Foster, 1986), the literature also 
makes clear that the relationship among performance and price is critical (Utterback, 
1994). That is, though performance is the driving parameter, the mass-market 
substitutability of one technology for another becomes more and more certain as 
price/performance ratios become more and more similar (Porter, 1980).
Here, the price advantages and disadvantages of competence enhancing and 
destroying innovations follow a veiy similar pattern as outlined concerning 
performance alone. In the short run, incumbent (dominant design) technologies enjoy 
"base technology" characteristics that are beneficent to cost: strong scale and learning 
effects, amortization over large sales volumes, commodity pricing of raw materials, etc. 
(Burgelman, Koznick, & van den Poel, 1988; Goodman & Lawless, 1994; Little, 1981) 
Cost of production is low and this enables a strong price/performance barrier.
However, as with performance, the potential to make substantial further improvements 
in these factors is limited. Conversely, non-incumbent (competence-destroying) 
technologies are much more likely to be characteristically "emerging," and 
comparatively expensive because of the initial absence of significant scale, learning, 
volume, and commodity pricing conditions. However, the potential for improvement is 
veiy large, and there is no a priori theoretical reason to expect that relative future prices 
will not achieve rough parity, if not unequivocal superiority.
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In short, incumbents enjoy at least short-term price/performance advantages 
because of cost drivers (Utterback, 1994). However, over time this advantage will 
almost certainly deteriorate, but only to the extent that newcomers are successful 
(Foster, 1986). Therefore in order to defend their competences in a manner consistent 
with the propositions discussed above, incumbents should be expected to defend the 
price advantages of innovations in the dominant design, and attack the price 
disadvantages o f competence-destroying innovations. Here, the public media is no less 
opportune (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Rao, 1995) as a means of influencing cognitive 
legitimacy (Scott & Meyer, 1994). Again, at the industry level,
P4: The short-term price advantages of competence-enhancing innovations are 
presented in public media channels more frequently than the long-term price 
advantages of competence-destroying innovations.
H4a: Public media channels present the short-term price superiority of MD 0 
innovations more frequently than the long-term price superiority of MD>0 innovations.
H4b: For MD 1 innovations, public media channels present the long-term price 
superiority of some Phenomenological Types (PTs) of innovations more frequently than 
others.
and
P5: The long-term price disadvantages of competence-enhancing innovations 
are presented in public media channels less frequently than the short-term price 
disadvantages of competence-destroying innovations.
H5a: Public media channels present the long-term price inferiority of MD 0 
innovations less frequently than the short-term price inferiority of MD>0 innovations.
H5b: For MD 1 innovations, public media channels present the short-term price 
inferiority of some Phenomenological Types (PTs) of innovations less frequently than 
others.
Summary
The argument is summarized as follows. Ex ante, developing the known 
territory of a morphological map, or making MD 0 innovations (Ayres, 1969; Bright &
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Scoeman, 1973), is to make incremental improvements (Betz, 1993; Foster, 1986) to 
known technologies and as such is inherently competence enhancing (Goodman & 
Lawless, 1994, Tushman & Anderson, 1986). Exploring the terra incognita, or making 
MD>0 innovations, is to make discontinuous changes in technologies and as such is 
potentially competence-destroying. Since competence enhancement and competence 
destruction have been found to be very strongly related to a firm’s incumbency 
(Anderson & Tushman, 1990; Fairtlough, 1994; Utterback, 1994), the MD of an 
innovation should be related to the incumbency of the innovating firm (HI a). .
However, this relationship should not be perfect. Under opportune, 
phenomenologically-defmable conditions, some incumbents will attempt MD>0 
innovations (Abernathy & Clark, 1988; Burgelman, Kosnik, & van den Poel, 1988; 
Goodman & Lawless, 1994). Non-incumbents, however, will not respond identically to 
the incumbents. Incumbents will attempt Phenomenological Types of innovations that 
are different from the Phenomenological Types of non-incumbent innovations. PT is 
related to the incumbency of the innovating firm (Hlb).
Incumbents will defend their competences from destruction (and/or their 
preferred modes of discontinuous innovation) by engaging in proactive information 
campaigns (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Haveman, 1993; Rao, 1995; Tolbert & Zucker,
1983). They will exploit the competitive advantage they hold in the legitimacy of their 
technologies (Carlsson, 1994; Freeman, 1994; Marceau, 1994) by influencing media 
representations of the inherent phenomenological advantages and disadvantages of their 
own innovations and those of non-incumbents (H2a through H5b).
As each Morphological Analysis will be idiosyncratic to the specific research 
scenario, the above argument is general. However, if the overall approach is valid, its 
focus on unobfuscated natural phenomena portends important generalizability.
CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH DESIGN
The hypotheses developed in the previous chapter will be tested as follows: first, 
a morphological analysis will be conducted of the crucial technological bottleneck in 
the electric vehicle industry, culminating in the development of a morphological matrix 
(Appendix I, Table A.l). This matrix will serve as the basis for measuring the 
Morphological Distance and Phenomenological Types of the product technology 
innovations that will be identified through a structured content analysis o f public media 
items (Bailey, 1982) collected continuously over a period of two years. The structured 
content analysis will also collect data that are designed to assess the incumbency of 
manufacturers and the legitimacy of the different kinds of innovations. Each 
hypothesis will be tested through a chi-squared analysis of a contingency table.
Sample and Data
Raw data for the structured content analysis portion of this study will consist of 
about 2000 public media items collected over a period of two years, April 1993 to 
March 1995. These items were collected through a formal in-house effort performed 
at the General Motors Electric Vehicles Division. General Motors is a key player in the 
automobile industry past, present and future. As electric vehicle developments have 
been unfolding, it has been in the best interest o f General Motors to keep its executives 
well-informed. One way it has done this is by operating its own "clipping service" 
tasked to professionally and systematically review domestic and international 
newspapers, magazines Journals, press releases, syndicated newswire releases, 
government reports, trade association and activist group publications, and transcripts of 
television and radio telecasts/broadcasts for any article, editorial, advertisement, or in a 
word, item, containing information pertinent to the electric vehicle industry. This effort 
has published and distributed for internal executive use a semi-monthly report which 
presents these items to the reader in their raw form. Though the clipping service has
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done a minor amount of organizing these items into logical groupings, there is no 
apparent editing or defacing of any of them. Since each item is public knowledge, each 
will be considered in this study.
It is important to note a few characteristics o f the time period assessed. First, as 
of this writing April 1993-March 1995 is very recent, and encompasses the time period 
of available data. This allows a "real-time" study of the dynamics of the electric 
vehicle industry that is blind to the shape and structure that the industry will have in the 
future, if indeed the industry successfully develops. At the moment it is very difficult 
to predict what the important "breakthrough" in technology will be, if  it occurs.
Second, it is important to note that while the period under consideration was 
one o f technological excitement, it was otherwise reasonably stable. The California 
statutes "shocked" the automobile industry, but this happened in 1990. Since then, 
political resolve on this issue at the state level has wavered little in the face of turmoil 
at the national level. First, the U.S. Presidency changed hands in 1992. The Clinton 
administration inaugurated a federally-funded "supercar" project designed to restore 
U.S. competitiveness through the development of, among other technologies, very 
efficient engines. However, even a super-efficient automobile can never be (for 
phenomenological reasons) a zero-emissions vehicle, and despite the Administration's 
leadership the EV movement has only spread from California to other states. Second, 
the political power held in the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives changed 
parties during the period of this study (November, 1994). Despite some changes in both 
elected and non-elected government officials, however, there has been no "sea change" 
in the Federal Government's position regarding states' rights to impose zero-emissions 
laws on the automobile industiy. Finally, since the 1998 deadline is about as far into 
the future as the imposition of the California zero-emissions mandate is in the past, this 
study is positioned to observe the temporal center, In short, at present there is no
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political movement afoot or deadline pending that would seriously distort the context of 
the time period April 93-March 95. Though the market for electric vehicles was 
"mandated" by legislative action, this context has been stable and has allowed 
businesses to pursue industry development in reasonably normal, or at least consistent, 
terms.
Measures
The measures that will be used in this study will be discussed in the order that 
the associated variables appeared in the hypotheses developed in the previous chapter.
Competence enhancement and competence destruction: These variables will be 
measured through the use of two morphologically-defined dimensions: Morphological 
Distance (MD) and Phenomenological Type (PT). The theoretical rationale for each 
dimension was explained as the propositions were developed. The more specific 
explanations that follow are based on the morphological analysis developed in this 
chapter, and corroborated by experts in appropriate fields (see Appendix 1).
Morphological Distance will be expressed as a dichotomy: MD 0 or MD>0. As 
explained, when considering a mature industry it is reasonable to operationalize MD 0 
as the prevailing dominant design. In the case of electrochemical cells intended for use 
in electric vehicles, there is no question that the lead-acid secondary battery is the 
dominant design (Brant, 1994; Hackleman et. al., 1994). Using the morphological 





Temperature No Control 
Regeneration Feasible/present
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Any device that is different in one or more of the above options will be 
considered MD>0.
Again, in this study only MD 1 innovations will be categorized by
Phenomenological Type. The following scheme will be used:





Ordinarily, assessing both the MD and PT of an innovation from a 
morphological matrix would require familiarity with the product. Fortunately, battery 
and fuel cell nomenclatures are very expressive and the matrix developed for this 
particular study is quite transparent. For example, most battery nomenclatures 
automatically identify the option chosen for PT 1: lead-acid, nickel-cadmium, and so 
forth. On the other hand, in the raw data batteries will probably be expressed in terms 
that vary slightly: Lead-Acid, Pb-Acid, and PbSCh are slightly different ways of 
expressing the same PT 1 option, for example, as are Nickel-Cadmium and NiCad. The 
morphological matrix will be used to determine how these slight variations in 
terminology will be collapsed into phenomenologically identical morphs. Ambiguous 
or unidentifiable cases (where MD can not be assessed per the described dichotomy, 
and/or PT can not be identified) will be discarded. As it is impossible to predict with 
certainty all possible terms, a full elaboration of these judgements can not be offered 
until data has been coded.
Table 4.1 presents a composite of the many types of electrochemical devices 
that are either under development or are being considered for development for electric 
vehicles (Brant, 1994; "Electric vehicles and batteries," 1994; "Energizing...," 1993; 
"Fuel cell update," 1994; Hackleman, 1992; Hackleman, 1993; Henrickson, et. al. 1994;
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Table 4.1. Electrochemical Devices and Morphological Measures. 
Nomenclature MD PT
Batteries
Aluminum Air 3 •
Lead-Acid 0 0
Lithium Carbon 2 -
Lithium Iron (Di)Sulfide 2 • -
Lithium Polymer 2 -
Lithium Vanadium 2 -
Nickel-Cadmium 1 1
Nickel-Iron 1 1
Nickel Hydrogen 2 -
Nickel-Metal-Hydride 1 1
Nickel-Zinc 1 1
Sealed Bi-Polar Lead Acid 1 2
Sodium Metal Chloride 2 -
Sodium-Sulfur 2 -
Zinc Air 2 -
Zinc Bromine(ide) 1 1
Zinc Chloride 1 1
Fuel Cells 
Alkaline Potassium Hydroxide 3
Molten Carbonates 3 -
Phosphoric Acid 3 -
Solid Oxides 4 -
Solid Polymer (non-regenerative) 3 1
Solid Polymer (regenerative) 1 1
"The fuel cell solution," 1994; Winter & Brandes, 1994). The great amount of overlap 
among these sources suggests that the table is virtually exhaustive. Based on available 
technical descriptions, the MD and PT of each device has been evaluated and is also 
presented. This table will serve as a "boilerplate" for coding the MD and PT of the 
innovations identified in the media items. Any additional innovation that is discovered 
while coding the data will be added to the table with an appropriate technical 
assessment o f its MD and PT.
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Industry Incumbency: Measuring industry incumbency is not a straightforward 
task because neither "industry" nor "incumbency" have clear definitions and 
unambiguous boundaries, particularly when the diffusion of technology(ies) becomes 
an important issue (Bettis & Hitt, 1995). In an attempt to maintain consistency with the 
theoretical point of view presented in earlier chapters, the literature was canvassed for a 
precedent. There, measures of both industry and incumbency were usually made 
arbitrarily and/or qualitatively. Often, industry was associated with Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) Codes, then assuaged by judgement; incumbency was often 
tailored to be consistent with the intent of a study's hypotheses.
As such, for the present study the Standard industrial classification manual.
1987 (the most recent edition) was consulted, and the following logic emerged. SIC 
3711 is "Motor vehicles and passenger car bodies," and specifically includes both 
internal combustion engine and electric passenger vehicles intended for highway use. 
SIC 3714 is "Motor vehicle parts and accessories." No electric power source is 
specifically listed under this heading, but there is a verbal reference to SIC 3691, 
"Storage batteries." (In contrast, there is no reference to SIC 3692, "Primary 
Batteries.") SIC 3691 is described as "Establishments primarily engaged in 
manufacturing storage batteries," under which is listed "Alkaline cell storage batteries; 
Batteries, rechargeable; Lead -Acid batteries (storage batteries); Nickel Cadmium 
batteries; Storage batteries" (1987; 232).
Thus according to prevailing industry logic, all electric power sources for 
automobiles come from the storage battery industiy; on the other hand, it is not true that 
the automobile industry is the only customer o f the storage battery industry. In fact, 
some storage battery manufacturers are probably more closely associated with other 
industries which produce products like laptop computers, camcorders, and other 
portable electric accessories. Thus using SIC 3691 to delimit the boundaries of the
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"industTy" relevant to the present research question and scenario seems to invite a 
degree of confounding. However, this concern only serves to point out that an ex post 
evaluation of industry structure will frequently be different than that developed from a 
morphological perspective -  there is no phenomenological reason to eliminate non­
lead-acid storage batteries from consideration. Any battery capable of deep discharge 
and regeneration (a storage battery) is phenomenologically consistent with the general 
performance demands of an electric vehicle. Other than lead-acid, they are not 
frequently used in automobiles only because their present performance is inferior. SIC 
3691 adequately defines the "industry" o f present interest.
In an effort to make the most objective assessment of which firms are 
incumbent to this industry, several popular business directories were consulted, 
compared, and contrasted (ABI Inform, Compact Disclosure, Directory of Corporate 
Affiliations, Dun & Bradstreet's Million Dollar Directory, Moody's Industrial Manual, 
Standard & Poor’s, and Ward's Business Directory). Of these, only Ward's Business 
Directory (1994) has no criteria for inclusion (such as public ownership, or minimum 
number of employees, sales, net worth, or fee) that would unnecessarily eliminate 
viable candidates from consideration, other than the exclusion of non-U.S. businesses. 
(But considering the political and geographic context of the present scenario, 
eliminating non-U.S. firms is not unreasonable; in fact, it could be argued as being 
preferable). Furthermore, Ward's data collection approach is consistent with an 
academic researcher's preferences -- the Directory lists 142,000 public and private 
companies "culled from more than 4,000 business publications,... annual reports, trade 
associations, government documents, and telephone interviews" (viii).
Table 4.2 presents the names of those firms included in Ward's directory whose 
primary SIC is 3691, in alphabetical order. Though the storage battery industry is to be 
highly concentrated (the top two firms commanded almost 37% of industry sales; the
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Table 4.2 Industry Incumbents.
Acme Battery Mfg. Co. 
Alexander Battery Corp. 
AMP King Battery Inc. 
Aristo-Craft
Electruk Battery Co. 




Gates Energy Inc. 
GNB Battery Inc. 
Great Batch
Norton Battery Co.
Ovonic Battery Co., Inc. 
Palos Verdes Building Co. 
Power battery Co.
Power Conversion, Inc. 
Power-Sonic Corp.
Quick Cable Inc.
Ramcar battery, Inc. 
Rayovac
Sanyo Energy USA Corp. 





Battery Engineering, Inc. 
Battery Technology, Inc. 
Charter Power Systems 
Continental Mfg Corp.
Crown Battery Mfg. Corp. Green Mfg Co.
Daniel Battery Mfg. Co. Howard Eldon, Ltd.
Douglas Battery Mfg. Co. K.W. Battery Co.
Duracell Linwood Mfg
Eagle-Picher Industries Inc. Marathon Technologies 
East Penn Mfg Co. Mixon, Inc.
Edwards Battery Inc. New Castle Mfg. Inc.
top eight commanded 94%; the bottom 35 firms combined commanded about 6%), it is 
important at the outset o f this study to not consider concentration (and by association, 
firm size) as an important consideration as to whether firms will resist competence- 
destruction. Aside from the simple intuition that suggests that the destruction of a 
firm's technologies/competences will be resisted "no matter what," the following 
discussion elaborates why.
It is known that industry concentration is related to high capital/output ratios, 
though the reason(s) for the relationship is(are) not well-understood (Tirole, 1990). 
Regardless, the relationship suggests that in concentrated industries, the Minimum 
Efficient Scale (MES) and the percentage of assets that are highly specialized (asset 
specificity) are also both high (Carlton & Perloff, 1990). In simpler terms, it is likely 
that the storage battery industry is capital-intensive and that the flexibility of the capital 
is severely limited, in terms o f possible product variety. Intuitively, this aspect o f the 
industry's overall "structure" does suggest that firms will resist the kind of changes that
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would be brought by a true technological discontinuity ~  the massive costs of industry­
wide recapitalization would be prohibitive.
But one might be tempted to infer within-industry variance in innovation among 
SIC 3691 firms, since there are such large differences in the sizes of the firms 
(assuming that sales volume is at least a partial/proxy measure of firm size). However, 
the enormous amount of research done on the relationship^) between innovation and 
firm size has failed to generate unequivocal conclusions (Angelmar, 1985; Hambrick, 
MacMillan & Barabrosa, 1983; Lunn & Morton, 1986; Rosenberg, 1976; Tassey, 1983). 
It is NOT clear that large firms are non-innovative and that small firms are innovative 
(Sharp, 1994); what IS more clear is that differences in firm size confer different types 
of advantages to innovation (Rothwell & Dodgson, 1994). In general, while large firms 
have material advantages, small firms have behavioral advantages (Rothwell & 
Dodgson, 1994.) (Audretsch (1995), for example, found that small firms survive in 
high-MES industries by making more efficient and dynamic use of labor than large 
firms, as a partial offset to inefficiencies of low scale). On the whole, firms within an 
industry complement each other, acting as specialized units o f one huge rent-generating 
mechanism integrated by market rather than administrative mechanisms (Hobday,
1994). Firms of different sizes engage in a very wide variety of collaborative 
relationships and over time (and especially in mature industries), pursue similar 
technological trajectories.
Stated differently, the greatest firm-size differences in innovation have been 
found to exist between sectors (industries), not within them. Rothwell & Dodgson 
(1994), for example, found significant differences among twenty-four industries in the 
firm-size differential (the arithmetic difference of the averages between large and small 
firms) in their rates of innovation (measured as the number of innovations per thousand 
employees). In the storage batteiy industry, the differential (.96) was fourth closest to
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zero (the range across all industries in the study was -7.90 to 8.46). In the storage 
battery industry, therefore, there is no conclusive theoretical reason or empirical 
evidence to support the speculation that firm size is related to innovation in terms that 
are meaningful to the present research question. For the purposes of this study, firm 
size does not differentiate incumbency, and all firms listed in Table 4.2 will be 
considered industry incumbents; all other firms will be considered industry non­
incumbents.
Legitimacy: as explained in the previous chapter, the legitimacy of an 
innovation will be assessed in terms of the public's awareness o f its present and future, 
performance and price, relative superiority or inferiority. Data will be collected 
through a structured content analysis o f the media items described earlier. Instructions 
for coding and an example coding sheet are found in Appendix 2.
As the instructions describe, each media item will be read for any of the "key" 
expressions (and similar) found in Table 4.1 (a replica of the table will be attached to 
the instructions). Each time one of these expressions is identified, it will be recorded 
on the coding sheet along with other essential descriptive data and some 
control/bookkeeping data. Table 4.1 will also be used as a reference for coding the MD 
and PT of each innovation. The incumbency of the innovating firm will be assessed 
against the list of industry incumbents (described above). Incumbents will be coded 
"1," and non-incumbents will be coded "0."
The instructions direct the reader to look for answers to eight questions. Each 
question investigates one o f the eight aspects o f legitimacy expressed in the hypotheses 
developed previously. To help avoid fatigue, the reader is not asked to assert "yes" or 
"no" to each and every question for each and every innovation, but to merely read each 
article attentively for descriptions o f an innovation's relative performance and price 
characteristics, and to then categorize the article's descriptions under the appropriate
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column headings. A subsequent section of this chapter discusses validation of this
technique in greater detail
Design
Kerlinger (1986) observed that "there are times when, in the judgement of the 
researcher, it is necessary to treat a continuous variable as a nominal variable. For 
example, it may be possible to measure a potentially continuous variable only in a 
crude way, say, having an observer judge whether or not objects possess or do not 
possess an attribute" (149).
While it might be possible that competence enhancement and destruction, 
incumbency, and legitimacy are all inherently continuous variables, in this study each 
has been developed as a categorical variable. This choice, though prudent considering 
the exploratory nature of this dissertation, limits options concerning statistical 
methodology. Assessing the relationships among categorical variables is accomplished 
non-parametrically through the analysis of frequencies, or contingency analysis. The 
following design adheres to the most general and conservative suggestions of Kerlinger 
(1986), Lapin (1981), and Reynolds (1977 a/b).
Hypothesis la  will be tested by constructing a two-dimensional, 2x2 frequency 
table (Table 4.3). Since Morphological Analysis is a forecasting technique and 
forecasting is conceptually the same as prediction, the MD0-MD>0 dichotomy will be 
presented along the vertical (independent) dimension, and the incumbent/non­
incumbent dichotomy will be presented along the horizontal (dependent) dimension. In 
each quadrant, the frequencies o f the respective intersections of the two variables will 
be tabulated from the coded data; the quadrant corresponding to competence- 
enhancement and incumbency will be tabulated as the number o f cases where MD was 
coded as 0 and MFRINC was coded as 1, and so forth for the other quadrants. These 
tabulations represent actual frequencies (Fa).
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Table 4.3. Contingency Table for Hypothesis la.
Incumbent (MFRINC 1) Non-Incumbent (MFRINC 0)
MDO Fa (MDO,MFRINC 1) Fa (MD 0, MFRINC 0)
MD>0 Fa (MD>0, MFRINC 1) Fa (MD.0, MFRINC 0)
Next, the expected frequency (Fc) of each quadrant will be calculated per Lapin 
(1981) by the formula
Row Total x Column Total
Fc =  ----------------------------------------------------------------
n
and then chi-squared will be calculated as
(Fa -F c)2
x 2 = £  --------------------------------------- [sic]
F„
A test for independence, or examination that the actual frequencies in the table 
are significantly different than the frequencies that would be expected by chance, will 
be conducted by comparing the calculated chi-squared to standard table values at alpha 
.10, .05, and .01 where degrees o f freedom (df) is calculated as
df = (Rows -1 )(Columns -1)
The measure of associati on (strength o f the relation) will then be assessed by 
calculating the Coefficient of Contingency, C:
x 2
C = / ---------------------------
x2 + N
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The remaining hypotheses will be tested similarly. Hypothesis lb  (as well as 
the remaining "b" hypotheses) will be tested by constructing a two-dimensional table, 
but here the predictor variable (PT) will have four categories, as there are four 
phenomenologically distinct types of possible MD 1 innovations.
The table for Hypothesis 2a (Table 4.4) will be constructed showing MD 0- 
MD>0 along the vertical dimension, and another dichotomy will be presented along the 
horizontal dimension: whether or not the media items reported the range advantage 
(future v. present, as appropriate) of the innovation. The upper left quadrant will be 
calculated as the frequency o f cases where the MD was coded 0 and NOWBETR was 
coded 1; the upper right quadrant will be calculated as the frequency of cases where the 
MD of the innovation was coded 0 and NOWBETR was left blank (defaulted to 0), and 
so forth. In this way the table is crafted to represent the precise assertion of the 
hypothesis; that in aggregate, the public is more aware that lead-acid batteries are 
performing better in electric vehicles than it is aware that competence-destroying 
options will perform better in the future.
Table 4.4. Contingency Table for Hypothesis 2a.
Advantage Reported Advantage Not Reported
MDO F„ (MDO,NOWBETR 1) F„ (MD 0, NOWBETR 0)
MD>0 F„ (MD>0, THENBETR 1) Fa (MD> 0,THENBETR 0)
This assertion might seem to be a trivial or even obvious one, but again, 
hypotheses 2a through 5b are each intended to investigate one aspect of an overall 
pattern of cogntive legitimation and/or its obstruction, assuming nothing about the 
proportionality o f media coverage and actual industry activity. In this regard, the
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statistical evaluation of each hypothesis will contribute to an ensuing discussion of the 
overall pattern.
As well, technical data regarding the present performance and theoretical 
limitations o f many electrochemical devices is available. This and other technical data 
will help provide the basis for an additional, albeit qualitative, analysis of the industry. 
This analysis and discussion should be illuminating and, depending on the results of 
hypothesis testing, could be quite extensive.
Validity and Reliability
Validity and reliability are serious concerns in any study. The following 
discussion adopts the terminology of, and addresses the concerns expressed in, Cook 
and Campbell's (1979) Quasi-Experimentation: Design and analysis issues for Field 
settings.
Construct validity addresses the concern that operationalizations might be 
underrepresented or contain surplus irrelevancies. That is, measures might not fully 
capture the intended meaning of the referent constructs, and/or they might partially 
capture other constructs in ways that make interpretation difficult or even specious. 
Earlier discussions indicate at length some of the precautions taken in this regard; 
specifically, preoperational explication has been both careful and conservative. A full 
morphological analysis o f the present research (and hence, functional and 
technological) problem was completed before continuing with the study in order to gain 
confidence, by example, that operationalizations of competence enhancement and 
destruction make sense. Explication of industry incumbency (SIC) was accomplished 
in accordance with the strongest precedent in the Management of Technology literature, 
which is most relevant to the main issues. Measures of legitimacy are highly specific to 
the present research question, but highly-tailored legitimacy measures are common to 
research in institutional theory.
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Employing multiple measures o f constructs is an important way to gain 
confidence in the validity o f a construct. In this study, eight specific measures of 
legitimacy are included in as many hypotheses; similarly, these hypotheses 
morphologically dimensionalize competence enhancement and destruction in two 
different ways. However, industry incumbency is measured in only one way. Though 
this is well-precedented and adequate at the present stage of development, intuition 
suggests that the construct is multidimensional, especially where the enhancement 
and/or destruction of competences/technologies is at issue. Should initial tests fail 
and/or prove difficult to interpret, it might be wise in subsequent phases of analysis to 
revisit this issue.
Using nominal measures to operationalize constructs invites the inclusion of 
surplus irrelevancies. However, considering the present state o f theoretical 
development, more rigorous operationalizations are unnecessary and possibly 
inappropriate. The basic research question is exploratory in nature and fundamental 
patterns are of first interest.
Statistical conclusion validity is another main concern, which considers whether 
or not it is reasonable to presume that test results reflect true covariation. Here, the 
power o f the test is important. Fortunately, in this study the determinants of power are 
not problematic; the sample size is large, the effects are theoretically strong, and alpha 
levels are standard choices.
It is important to consider possible violations of test assumptions. Assuming the 
adequacy o f using nominal variables, frequency/contingency analysis and the goodness- 
of-fit chi-square is the most commonly accepted and rigorous method/statistic available 
by which to ascertain statistical covariation. The measure o f association (C), on the 
other hand, was deemed best of about ten choices (Reynolds, 1977a/b) because its 
assumptions best match this study while its limitations are either manageable or
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avoided: it addresses the main concern (attenuating chi-square for sample size); it is 
slightly more accurate; it is not hypersensitive to table dimensions; it avoids 
mathematical complications that are irrelevant to the present design; it does not 
mandate an iterative procedure that would mandate initial judgements about 
association; and importantly, it is not limited to two-dimensional, two-by-two tables.
Since the method o f inquiry used in this study is roughly analogous to obtaining 
questionnaire data from media participants, random heterogeneities of respondents is a 
possible threat to statistical conclusion validity. For example, success of the electric 
vehicle industry as a whole will almost certainly cause a migration of jobs from the 
U.S. midwest (especially Michigan) to the west coast (especially California), while a 
primary concern in the population centers o f the northeast is not the exportation of jobs, 
but the exportation o f pollution from the automobile tailpipe to the smokestacks of 
coal-burning electric utilities. Geographical locale o f respondents might moderate 
media patterns, as might media type (e.g., newspaper v. trade journal), and so forth. 
Initial test results and an acquired familiarity with the raw data will indicate the 
advisability of subsequent analyses of this type.
O f course, reliability is a crucial element of statistical conclusion validity. The 
above ameliorations to the most important threats are likewise ameliorations to many 
reliability concerns, but the following observation is particularly salient now. The 
morphological analysis and matrix (Appendix) was developed by an experienced 
engineer in strict accordance with the rules o f the technique, and then iteratively 
corroborated over a period of several months with (a) a full professor of industrial 
engineering, IEEE fellow, and college dean, and (b) a full professor of chemistry with 
special expertise in electrochemistry.
Of greater concern is the reliability of the coding instrument and general 
method. Here, a trial run will first be conducted with a doctoral candidate, who will
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code ten articles for the purpose o f identifying general ambiguities and points of 
confusion. After necessary adjustments are made, five doctoral students will each 
independently code 25 articles, of which 10 will be common to each coder. These ten 
will constitute a data base by which to asses the reliability o f the instrument among the 
coders, and the other 75 articles (the 15 peculiar to each of the five coders) will 
constitute a data base by which to assess the reliability o f the instrument between the 
coders and the author. If in both cases a reliability of .7 (Nunnaly, 1977) is not 
achieved the instrument will be improved and the above technique will be iterated until 
reliability is achieved.
Internal and external validity are not main concerns in this study. Internal 
validity is not a main concern because only statistical association, not causality, is 
assumed. External validity is not a main concern because it is well-known in the 
Management of Technology literature that research of this type is idiosyncratic; that is, 
though technology cycles are sound general frameworks, detailed findings are likely to 
differ across research settings, especially across major sectors such as assembled 
products v. non-assembled products v. services. The analysis of this issue will 
undoubtedly be rich but presumptions about generalizability will be modest.
Summary
It is important to note that research in technology cycles is almost always 
retrospective or historiographical. The literature's main strength lies in its penetrating 
richness, not in its methodological rigor. In this light, the present study has two 
methodological strengths. One, while maintaining the opportunity for almost unlimited 
richness, it is oriented towards the future, or at worst a real-time understanding of an 
extremely important contemporary dynamic. Two, the research design is a modest 
increment, not decrement, in rigor. Contingency analysis o f nominal variables is not a
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sophisticated technique, but it is an objective way of ascertaining fundamental patterns 
in data that can then be assessed, with reasonable confidence, in more qualitative detail.
The analysis and discussion presented above, while not conducted at a level of 
sophistication that is beyond the grasp o f most business strategists, is technically 
accurate and is representative o f the fundamental premise o f this dissertation: that the 
structure of technology, or technological know-how, is a "real" structure that influences 
industry evolution within, and transitions between, overlaying socioeconomic 
structures.
This view is not predominant in the Strategic Management literature, though it 
is a common inference in the Management of Technology literature. Assessing the 
interface between these fields is a growing concern and this dissertation hopes to add 
value to that dialogue. The variables, measures, and tests described in this chapter are 
coarse-grained and hope to assess basic relationships among constructs which have not 
been empirically examined in the combination proposed.
CHAPTER 5: ANALYSIS
This chapter is divided into two sections. First, the results o f the instrument 
validation process are presented. The results indicated that the technique and coding 
instruments were reliable. Second, the results o f testing each hypothesis are presented 
which, on the whole, varied ̂ greatly in terms of statistical strength and fundamental 
interpretability.
Instrument Validation
Validating the reliability of the measuring instrument (coding sheet) and 
associated materials (instructions and tables) was conducted in two phases. First, a dry 
run was made with a doctoral candidate. About thirty minutes were initially taken to 
explain theoretical essentials as well as the research scenario and design, though 
specific propositions were not divulged. The coder then coded ten articles.
Afterwards, the coder was asked to explain the reasoning behind each coding decision. 
Without exception the coder verbalized decision-making algorithms that precisely 
adhered to instructions. The coder then offered suggestions on how to improve the 
materials, which resulted in cleaning up the list of incumbents, rearranging the table of 
devices and morphological measures so as to not confuse the basic idea that lead-acid 
batteries were being compared to anything/eveiything else and vice versa, and 
rearranging parts of the coding i nstructions in the same vein. The Appendix exhibits 
the improved, final coding instructions.
In the second phase each of five doctoral students coded 25 articles. As in the 
first phase, each student was first trained for about thirty minutes. No student had any 
significant problems during the subsequent coding process and each completed the task 
within ninety minutes.
Ten articles were common to each coder's package (not the same articles used 
during the first phase), affording the opportunity to calculate/estimate their interrater
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reliability. Here, Nunally (1978) was adamant in asserting that in the development of 
any new instrument, coefficient alpha (Cronbach's Alpha) should be calculated and 
reported as the foundation of an assessment of reliability, but that at least one other 
method should also be employed as a double-check. In the following analysis the 
following statistics are reported: alpha (and standardized alpha), the correlation 
between forms of a ^plit-half calculation, and the estimated reliability (and unbiased 
estimate) of parallel forms.
For the entire data base o f the ten articles commonly coded (n = 74), alpha was 
.9980 (standardized alpha was the same); the correlation between forms was .9967; and 
the parallel forms estimate was .9980 (the unbiased estimate was .9981). The main 
reason for these remarkably high figures became apparent affer conducting a superficial 
examination of the results of coding Morphological Distance (MD), Phenomenological 
Type (PT), and manufacturer incumbency (INC). Agreement among all five coders on 
all three measures was 100%, except for one occasion where one coder inferred 
(probably) too much information from an obscure description of a fuel cell and coded 
an MD and a PT where the other four coders could not make any specific 
determination.
Subsequently, these three measures were temporarily removed from 
consideration and the same procedure was performed considering only the eight 
measures of legitimacy (n = 58). Here, alpha was .8510 (standardized alpha was 
.8582); the correlation between forms was .8072; and the parallel forms estimate was 
.8510 (the unbiased estimate was .8562).
The hurdle was raised one more time by considering only those articles that 
were controversial. That is, three articles that described various power types, but where 
every coder answered "no" to each of the eight legitimacy questions, were temporarily 
removed from consideration. This level of scrutiny was beyond the requirements of
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this study, because non-controversial (noncomparative) descriptions of power types do 
provide data that are meaningful in terms of the propositions and hypotheses under 
present consideration. Nevertheless, in this strict test (n = 51) alpha was .8455 
(standardized alpha was .8526); the correlation between forms was .7995; and the 
parallel forms estimate was .8455 (the unbiased estimate was (.8517).
As an additional check, the author coded the same ten articles independently 
and the analysis was repeated using the data from all six coders. Results of coding MD, 
PT and INC were the same as described above. Analysis of only the legitimacy 
measures (n = 58) yielded an alpha of .8932 (standardized alpha was .8954); the 
correlation between forms was .8535; and the parallel forms estimate was .8932 (the 
unbiased estimate was .8970). When considering only the controversial articles, alpha 
was .8892 (standardized alpha was .8912); the correlation between forms was .8479; 
and the parallel forms estimate was .8892 (the unbiased estimate was .8937). Here, it 
was also gratifying to note that the author had not overlooked any item that any other 
coder had found; in other words, in no instance was the author the cause of missing 
data.
The fifteen articles singularly coded by each coder constituted a data base of 75 
articles, against which reliability could be calculated/estimated between the five coders 
(as a group) and the author (n = 649). Results were highly consistent with the above 
discussion. Considering all measures, alpha was .9968 (standardized alpha was the 
same); the correlation between forms was .9937; and the parallel forms estimate was 
.9968 (the unbiased estimate was the same). Temporarily removing MD, PT and INC 
from consideration (n = 523), alpha was .9097 (standardized alpha was .9101); the 
correlation between forms was .8349; and the parallel forms estimate was .9097 (the 
unbiased estimate was .9100), More straightforward correlations were calculated as 
well. For legitimacy measures only, the Pearson and Spearman coefficients were both
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.8349, noticeably equal to the correlation between forms. After removing five non- 
controversial articles from consideration (n = 379), alpha was .9034 (standardized alpha 
was .9037); the correlation between forms, Spearman Coefficient, and Pearson 
Coefficient were all .8244; and the parallel forms estimate was .9024 (the unbiased 
estimate was .9039).
Finally, when only two coders are being considered, coefficient Kappa is an 
appropriate measure of reliability (Brennan & Prediger, 1981). Coefficient Kappa was 
therefore calculated considering the author and the other five coders, as a group. For 
the data base of 75 articles, Kappa was .9273; when only the legitimacy measures were 
considered, Kappa was .8339; when the five non-controversial articles were removed, 
Kappa was .8233.
Nunally (1978) stated "What a satisfactory level of reliability is depends on how 
a measure is being used. In the early stages of research on predictor tests or 
hypothesized measures of a construct... reliability of .70 will suffice... For basic 
research, it can be argued that increasing reliabilities much beyond .80 is often wasteful 
o f time and funds" (245). Though using time and funds efficiently is not a main issue 
in the successful completion of a dissertation, Nunally's statement otherwise applies 
here. Even overly-strict examinations of the most suspect portion of the instrument 
indicated that reliability was comfortably above both .70 and .80.
Nevertheless, it was important to pursue explanations for the coding 
disagreements, which upon cursory examination seemed to occur within certain 
articles. Here, it became very useful to the analysis that during their training session, 
the coders had been implored to liberally mark up their copies o f articles as they read 
them; these markings clearly indicated what triggered many coding decisions. It was a 
simple task to isolate the analysis of disagreements to not only individual articles, but to 
individual sentences. For example, in the December 20, 1993 edition of Automotive
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News, an article reported "Delco Remy and W.R. Grace also have contracts to explore 
lithium polymer, which the USABC sees as the best long-term hope for an inexpensive 
battery offering gasoline-like performance." Here the inference (perhaps) is that 
lithium polymer batteries will be cheaper than lead-acid batteries will be in the future 
(THENCHEP=1), but the performance comparison is nil-to-confusing (THENBETR=?) 
unless one knows that any battery that approaches gasoline-like performance will still 
be a huge improvement over lead-acid batteries (assuming, also, that "gasoline-like 
performance" infers range.)
On a few occasions articles contained internal contradictions when indicating 
the timing of an innovation. In the Dec 14,1994 Christian Science Monitor, for 
example, an article read "100 m iles... that's all you'll get from the lead acid batteries 
used in most o f today's electric-vehicle prototypes... Some breakthrough may be on the 
way, though... [several paragraphs later]... a NiMH cell has about twice the 'energy 
density' of Impact's lead-acid battery pack.. That translates into ranges of as far as 200 
miles". One reader might interpret this passage as saying that a superior NiMH cell is 
presently available or sufficiently imminent to be considered available 
(NOWBETR=l), while another might interpret the present-tense verbiage as alluding 
only to its phenomenological potential, and assess the innovation's availability as still 
not so imminent (THENBETR=1). (In truth, as o f this writing no known electric 
vehicle can travel nearly 200 miles on one charge under realistic conditions). Most 
disagreements could be traced to verbiage such as the above, though of course there 
were occasional oversights as well (though again, never by the author).
In short, media descriptions were sometimes noisy, and the instrument did not 
possess the fidelity by which all sources of noise could be removed. However, it was 
deemed unlikely that these types o f noise would systematically bias the results of the 
present study, especially since coding disagreements were mostly isolated and relatively
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few. Though the propositions developed in this dissertation assert that biases exist in 
the public media, one must concede that a certain level of journalistic imprecision 
(ambiguous terminology, unintended contradictions, syntactical anomalies, etc.) is a 
source of random error (hence self-correcting, especially in a large sample), not 
systematic error.
To summarize, calculations/estimates of the reliability of the instrument as a 
whole were highly acceptable, and harsher examinations focusing on the most suspect 
portion of the instrument indicated acceptable instrument reliability, even when taken 
to a level of scrutiny that was beyond the intent of this study. Delving into the sources 
of coding disagreements suggested that while the instrument is imperfect, much error is 
inherent in the nature of the data, and will probably be random. The conclusion drawn 
from the instrument validation process was that the technique and instruments were 
sufficiently reliable to allow continuation of the study.
Test Results
Hypothesis la . Again, Proposition 1 reiterated one of the strongest contentions 
of the Technology Cycles literature: that industry incumbents make competence- 
enhancing innovations, and that industry non-incumbents make competence-destroying 
innovations. Hypothesis la tested this by operationalizing industry incumbency as 
those firms with 3691 as their primary SIC; competence-enhancement -v.- destruction 
was operationalized as the MD 0/MD>0 dichotomy.
Table 5.1 presents the data which was used to test HI a. In the media items, it 
was found that three MD 0 innovations were being pursued by industry incumbents, 
each by a different incumbent (Exide, Gates, and GNB). Twenty-one MD>0 
innovations were being pursued by incumbents; eight manufacturers (Duracell, Eagle- 
Picher, Eveready, Exide, GNB, Gates, Ovonic, and Sanyo) accounted for all 21. (In 
other words, the frequency presented in this cell denotes the total number o f unique
Table 5.1. Data for HI a.
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MFGINC = 1 MFGINC = 0
MDO 3 24
MD>0 21 101
combinations of manufacturer and specific innovation. Exide, for example, was 
pursuing Sodium Sulfur, Nickel-Metal Hydride, and Nickel-Iron batteries, accounting 
for three of the 21 combinations indicated). Twenty-four MD 0 innovations were being 
pursued by as many non-incumbents (Table 5.2). One-hundred and one MD>0 
innovations were being pursued by 68 different non-incumbents (Table 5.3).
Altogether, 88 firms were reported.
Test statistics for this and all subsequent tables were calculated in both their raw 
(e.g., Table 5.1) and standardized forms. Standardizing frequency tables is 
accomplished by assuming that each marginal (row) n = 100, and then transforming the 
raw data in each cell into a percentage. (In Table 5.1, for example, the marginal n for 
the top row is 27 (3+24). The 3 was transformed into 12.5 since 3 is 12.5% of 27, and 
so forth). From there, test statistics are calculated in the same way as they are for raw 
data. This procedure helps ameliorate distortions in the measure of association (C) 
caused by skewed distributions, and facilitates comparisons among tables with different 
N's (Reynolds, 1977 a/b).
The test statistics for HI a corroborated what seemed apparent from merely 
observing the raw data: the pattern of innovation being pursued by incumbents was not 
significantly different than the pattern of innovation being pursued by non-incumbents; 
i.e., there was no statistical association between MD (0 or >0) and MFGINC. For the 
raw data, chi-square was .61 (C = .06), well under the thresholds needed to reject the 
null at alphas .01, .05, or .1 (at d f = 1, these thresholds were 6.635,3.841, and 2.706,
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respectively). Standardizing the data yielded a chi-square of 1.48 (C = .08), still well 
below all three thresholds.
Since the literature so strongly (practically unanimously) supported proposition 
1 and HI a, this surprising result begged further examination before continuing with the 
analysis. One possible reason the test failed was poor operationalization of variables. 
Here, the morphological distinction still seemed rather obvious; lead-acid batteries 
(which defined MD 0) were most certainly the automotive paradigm's dominant design 
for providing electric power in all types of automobiles. If industry incumbency were 
operationalized poorly, though, some of the firms designated incumbents should have
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Table 5.3. Non-incumbents Pursuing MD>0 Innovations.
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been designated non-incumbents, and vice versa -- especially where the lower left and 
upper right quadrants of Table 5.1 were concerned. Concerning the lower left quadrant, 
it was perhaps the case that any or all of Duracell, Eagle-Picher, Eveready, Ovonic, and 
Sanyo (the five incumbents not also pursuing MD 0 innovations) were not incumbent to 
the production of lead-acid batteries, compared to firms more traditionally tied to the 
extant automotive paradigm.
To gain a better understanding of this possibility, these Firms were researched 
further, by referring to the business references cited earlier. Some descriptions of 
Duracell, Eagle-Picher, Eveready, and Ovonic seemed to lean towards the specialty, 
consumer market for storage batteries (typically non-lead-acid batteries), but this 
assessment was subjective and no information clearly suggested that automotive
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products were beyond their ken or present efforts. Sanyo was clearly indicated as being 
attentive to the automotive market. Pending additional theoretical development and a 
detailed, individual assessment o f firms, analyzing this subset o f manufacturers did not 
make obvious any within-SIC distinction of which should not be considered incumbent.
Also, after additionally researching and examining the non-incumbents pursuing 
lead-acid innovations (Table 5.2), it was difficult to discern a consistent pattern (in 
their SICs or nationalities) that suggested a better definition of industry incumbency 
than that which was used. (One mistake did become apparent. In Standard & Poor’s 
industrial manual. Trojan's primary SIC was discovered as being 3691, so this firm 
probably should have been considered to be an incumbent. However, this oversight did 
not affect the conclusions and interpretations in any of the following discussions). If 
anything, this group seemed extremely diverse. Furthermore, twelve of these firms 
(asterisked in the table) were pursuing MD>0 innovations as well as MD 0 innovations, 
which would weaken the argument that even firms like GM and Delco should have 
been considered incumbent. Finally, on the speculation that the non-U.S. firms were 
primarily manufacturers of storage batteries (the original list of industry incumbents, 
taken from Ward's directory, included only U.S. firms), the Directory of foreign 
manufacturers in the United States (Arpan & Ricks, 1993) was consulted; there was no 
overlap between the directory's list of 3691 manufacturers and Table 5.2. In sum, it 
did not become apparent that the operationalization of industry incumbency was 
incorrect.
Rather than pursue operationalizations further, it seemed much more urgent to 
pursue the observation that o f the 45 firms incumbent to SIC 3691, only 8 appeared at 
all in several thousand media items concerning electric vehicles, a scenario which was 
unquestionably opportune for manufacturers of storage batteries in general, simply 
because of the direct link from phenomenological function to user functionality. In
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other words, it became important to speculate as to the representativeness of the 
reported eight incumbents.
In an earlier discussion, it was conceded that some efforts at innovation might 
go unnoticed by the public media for any of several reasons. In the case o f storage 
battery industry incumbents, who on the whole could be expected to attract media 
attention if it was desired, especially in an important industrial scenario where their 
product-type was the most acute technological bottleneck, unreported breakthroughs in- 
the-making would likely be those cloaked in secrecy (i.e., proprietary programs). 
However, on the strength of the Technology Cycles literature, it was at least as likely 
that the reason why many incumbents' activities went unreported was because they 
weren't very newsworthy (i.e., incremental improvements to existing products or no real 
innovative activity at all).
In this light, H la was re-examined making assumptions about the activities of 
the 37 unreported incumbents. A calculation was made to see how the innovation 
activities o f these firms would have to be distributed in order for the hypothesis to have 
passed at alpha = .05. (This procedure was conceptually identical to solving the "file 
drawer" problem in meta-analysis (Hunter, Schmidt, & Jackson, 1982), where the 
researcher is advised to calculate how many unpublished, non-significant findings of a 
presumed relationship between variables would have to be "still out there" (unreported 
publicly), in order to change the conclusion inferred by the data that was actually on- 
hand.) Through trial-and-error, it was calculated that if only 17 of the 37 unreported 
incumbents were each pursuing one MD 0 innovation (on the generous assumption that 
they were all attempting to innovate somehow) and had been reported, and that if each 
o f the other 20 were pursuing one MD>0 innovation and had been reported (hence 
adding these numbers to the appropriate cell frequencies in the first column in Table
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5.2), then the null hypothesis would have been rejected at alpha = .05 (chi-square =
4.20, C = . 15).
Of course, a devil's advocate might also have speculated about the possible 
number and distribution of unreported, non-incumbent activities, but the population of 
non-incumbents was infinite for all practical purposes. Suffice it to say that the 
statistical impact o f unreported incumbent activity could have been either offset or 
exacerbated by the impact of unreported non-incumbent activity. Either way, the 
statistical conclusions o f the tests o f HI a were arguable. Intuition and the above 
calculation suggested that reported incumbent activity was not representative of the 
total population of incumbents.
Summarizing the analysis of HI a, there was no statistical association between 
whether an innovation was competence enhancing or competence-destroying, and 
industry incumbency. However, the test statistic became suspect when considering the 
representativeness of the small number of incumbents reported. In an earlier chapter it 
was asserted that it is more accurate to say that observing media activity is to observe a 
pattern of legitimation first-hand, than it is to say that observing media activity is to 
observe actual industry activity second-hand. What might seemed to have been a fine 
research distinction at the time might be an understatement in some scenarios. The 
statistical tests of HI a might have failed, ironically, because o f an understandable 
selection bias in the media -- a bias towards newsworthiness.
Hypothesis lb. H lb asserted that the pattern of competence-destroying 
innovation being pursued by incumbents would be different than the pattern being 
pursued by non-incumbents, operationalizing discontinuities in the most abstract sense 
and for the most general case: by holding MD constant at 1 (the literature asserted that 
most discontinuous innovation would occur at the morphological frontier) and testing
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the pattern of innovation activities across the four phenomenological parameters 
(Phenomenological Types).
Table 5.4 presents the data used to test this hypothesis. It was immediately 
apparent that the marginal (row) frequencies were highly skewed. There were 38 PT1 
innovations, 2 PT2 innovations, and no PT 3 or PT 4 innovations. At face value, some 
inferences could be drawn from this table. First, it highlighted the enormous 
importance of the ReDox phenomenon in the development of an electric vehicle power 
source; perhaps this was the "core competence" o f concern, the technology that 
demanded deep and hopefully firm-specific expertise needed to sustain competitive 
advantage and/or technological leadership. As such, it was also suggestive of a key 
technological bottleneck, corroborated by the observation that every innovation of 
MD>1 was defined by a change in ReDox plus a change in at least one other parameter. 
A third, perhaps weaker inference was that during the period of time in question, it was 
commonly known or at least taken for granted that a lead-acid ReDox did not possess 
the theoretical and/or practical phenomenological potential to really solve the electric 
vehicle range problem -- at least in the long-term. Only two other firms (one incumbent 
and one non-incumbent) were pursuing a PT2 innovation, which differed from the 
dominant design only in the commonality of the electrodes and the reactant materials (a 
Sealed, Bi-polar Lead-Acid battery).
On the other hand, the skewness of the data did much to injure the 
interpretability o f statistical tests. More specifically, it is a rule of thumb in the analysis 
of nominal data that when expected frequencies are below five, the probability o f Type 
II error (accepting the null hypothesis when it is false) increases because the 
contribution to the total chi-square by such low frequencies is small, and more than 
offset by the concomitant degree of freedom incurred by the presence of the row, which 
raises the threshold which must be surpassed in order to reject the null (Reynolds, 1977
Table 5,4. Data for Hlb.
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MFGINC = 1 MFGINC = 0
PT1 (ReDox) 10 28
PT2 (Commonality) 1 1
PT3 (Temperature) 0 0
PT4 (Regeneration) 0 0
a/b). When such occasions arise, the researcher is advised to (a) collapse categories, or 
(b) interpret the low frequency rows as "outliers", remove them from consideration, and 
proceed normally, or (c) accept the increased likelihood of Type II error (since it is the 
more conservative type) and make appropriately judicious interpretations of test results.
However, in Table 5.4 six of eight expected frequencies were below five, and it 
became apparent that all of H2b, H3b, H4b, and H5b would suffer similarly. None of 
the above options would enable any meaningful chi-square test. Therefore, it was 
evident that in order to pursue all "b" hypotheses beyond face value interpretations like 
the one above, a different approach to the concept o f Phenomenological Type had to be 
considered.
Again, holding MD constant at 1 and testing across individual parameters was 
developed as the most fundamental and rudimentary approach to testing patterns across 
Phenomenological Types. While this was appropriate when developing propositions 
because it described the most general case and theoretically probable scenario, it was 
also argued during proposition development that once a morphological matrix was fully 
explicated, it would also be appropriate to consider all devices o f identical 
combinations o f phenomenological options as being the same Phenomenological Type. 
For example, all MD2/PT1/PT2 innovations would be the same Phenomenological 
Type, as would be all MD2/PT1/PT4 innovations, and so forth. The reason it would not
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be wise to operationalize Phenomenological Type this way ex ante is because in any 
matrix of any appreciable size, the number of permutations is large and unwieldy. Ex 
posit after a matrix is developed and realistic permutations are assessed, 
operationalizing Phenomenological Type this way becomes not only manageable, but 
preferable because o f its improved precision and inclusion of all plausible morphs.
Towards that end, once coding of all articles was completed, and once the data 
was reviewed, it became apparent that no electrochemical innovations were being 
pursued that had not been previously identifed and morphologically explicated. At that 
point, it became appropriate to re-operationalize Phenomenological Type according to 
the following categories, which represent groupings of identical combinations of 
options. In order to avoid confusion with the prior operationalization, Types were 
designated alphabetically instead of numerically. Also, in order to make subsequent 
discussions much less cryptic, nomenclatures were arbitrarily created.
PTA (MD 0): "Lead Acid Batteries;" the dominant design.
PTB (MD1/PT1): "Other ReDox Batteries." This PT depicts devices which 
differed from the dominant design only by the choice of ReDox materials: reports were 
found of Nickel-Cadmium, Nickel-Iron, Nickel-Metal Hydride, Nickel-Zinc, Zinc 
Bromide, and Zinc Chloride batteries.
PTC (MD1/PT2): "SBLA." The only reported device of this type was the 
Sealed, Bi-Polar Lead-Acid Battery, a lead-acid battery where the electrodes and the 
reactant materials are not one-and-the-same.
PTD (MD2/PT1/PT3): "Hot Batteries." This PT depicts devices that, because of 
the choice o f ReDox materials and associated electrolyte, also require a thermal control 
system in order to maintain an important material in a molten state: there were many 
reports o f Lithium Carbon, Lithium Polymer, Lithium Iron (Di)Sulfide, Lithium 
Vanadium, Nickel Hydrogen, Sodium Metal Chloride, and Sodium Sulfur batteries.
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PTE (MD2/PT1/PT4): "Zinc Air." This PT depicts devices that contain a 
ReDox material that can not be electrically regenerated, at least not practically at the 
vehicle. Instead of "plugging in" the vehicle to "refuel", the operator must stop at a 
store (equivalent to the present filling station concept) and exchange cassettes, or 
modules, of reactant materials. The only device of this type reported was a Zinc-Air 
Battery.
PTF (MD2/PT1/PT2): "Regenerative Fuel Cells." This PT depicts devices 
where the ReDox is not lead-acid, and electrodes are not the reactant materials. The 
nomenclature does not actually delimit the PT to fuel cells; it merely reflects the fact 
that only the Regenerative Solid Polymer Fuel Cell was reported.
PTG (MD3/PT1/PT2/PT3): "Aluminum-Air." This PT depicts devices where 
ReDox is not lead-acid, electrodes are not the reactant materials, and a thermal control 
system is necessary. The Aluminum-Air battery was the only device of this type that 
was reported.
PTH(MD3/PT1/PT2/PT4): "Common Fuel Cells." This PT depicts devices 
where the ReDox is not lead-acid, electrodes are not the reactants, and reactants can not 
be electrically regenerated (at least not at the vehicle). All reported devices of this type 
fit the most pedestrian term for fuel cells; hence the nomenclature. Reported devices 
were the Alkaline Potassium Hydroxide, Phosphoric Acid, and Non-Regenerative Solid 
Polymer fuel cells.
PTI (MD4): "Hot Fuel Cells." This PT depicts the most morphologically distant 
type of device in the present scenario: non-regenerative fuel cells that require thermal 
control. Devices reported were the Molten Carbonate and Solid Oxide fuel cells.
It must be reiterated that the above nomenclatures are completely arbitrary and 
reflect, ex post, the specific findings of this study and were chosen only to lubricate
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subsequent discussions; theoretically, the number of possible devices in each category 
is essentially infinite.
The obvious danger of reoperationalizing Phenomenological Type in the above 
manner was the possibility that expected frequencies would only decrease, as raw 
frequencies should be expected to only be diluted among more rows. However, as 
subsequent discussions will make clear, this danger was generally more than offset by 
the ability to consider all MD>0 innovations, not just those o f MD1. Doing so not only 
increased frequencies greatly, but allowed consideration of the entire range of devices 
pertinent to the study, by including devices of MDs 2 ,3 , and 4.
Thus, a new column was added to the data base, and all POWRTYPEs were 
assigned an alphabetical Phenomenological Type. From that point forward numerical 
PTs were abandoned. Table 5.5 presents the revised view of Hlb. Note that since the 
hypothesis was only concerned with the pattern o f competence-destroying (MD>0) 
innovations, PTA was not considered. (An attentive reader might have noticed that the 
sum of the numbers in the first column is 20, while in Table 5.1,21 MD>0, MFGINC=1 
innovations were indicated. This and most other counting anomalies were accounted 
for by the fact that during the coding process, it was sometimes possible to conclude 
that a device was certainly MD>0, without being able to classify it more specifically 
(by PT) than that. This and other types of counting anomalies, some of which might 
have been attributable to human error, appeared to inject about 1% deviation among 
some tables, which did not affect results). Marginal frequencies immediately made 
clear that most attempts at competence-destroying innovation were focused on Other 
ReDox (PTB) and Hot Batteries (PTD), and Common Fuel Cells (PTH). In particular,
19 of 20 incumbent innovations were o f these types, as were 85 of the 95 non- 
incumbent innovations. The non-incumbent pattern seemed to be much more diverse 
and, as would make sense, all but one fuel cell innovation (PTs F, H and I) was
Table 5.5. Raw Data for HIb, Revised View.
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being pursued by non-incumbents to the storage battery industry. It was also interesting 
that the ratio o f incumbent-to-non-incumbent PTB activity was about 1:3, while the 
same ratio of PTD activity was less than 1:5, supportive of the general contention that 
when being adventurous, incumbents would be more likely to explore the "frontier" o f a 
morphological map (PTB innovations were of MD1) than they would be to make 
"distant" leaps (PTD innovations were of MD2.) Furthermore, only one incumbent was 
pursuing an MD 3 (PTG) innovation, and no incumbents were pursuing an MD 4 (PTI) 
innovation. Conversely, there were thirteen unique combinations of non-incumbent 
MD 3 (PTH) innovations reported, and 2 unique combinations of non-incumbent MD4 
(PTI) innovations were reported.
Unfortunately, test results were not emphatically supportive of these 
observations. The chi-square o f the entire table was 6.34 (C = .23), below the 
thresholds for alphas .01, .05, and .1 (at df = 7, alphas were 18.475,14.067, and 12.017, 
respectively). On the other hand, because of many low expected frequencies, the 
possibility of TYPE II error here should be appreciated. Subsequently, rows containing
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cells with fo^  expected frequencies were removed: only PTB and PTD remained in a 
2x2 table, where the chi-square was 1.37 (C = . 12), which also failed to reject the null. 
After standardizing the 2x2 table, chi-square was 3.02 (C = .12), which did reject the 
null at alpha = .1.
Collapsing PTs into MDs 1 ,2 ,3 , and 4 was considered as a means of improving 
the likelihood of rejecting the null, but doing so would have obfuscated the meaning of 
PT to such a degree that statistical results would have had dubious interpretability, and 
probably would have been merely artifactual.
On the whole, then, the statistical association between Phenomenological Type 
and incumbency was marginal, at best. Also, unlike the analysis of HI a, where 
assumptions about unreported incumbents shed a different light on the initial findings, 
similar logic did not pertain here. Unreported incumbent activity would most likely 
have been of PTA, which was not considered in Hlb. Though a subjective analysis of 
Table 5.5 found a pattern supportive o f the hypothetical contention, statistical tests 
were unable to verify those observations in a convincing way.
Hypothesis 2a. Proposition 2 asserted that the short-term performance 
advantage of competence-enhancing innovations would be reported in the public media 
more frequently than the long-term performance advantage of competence-destroying 
innovations. In H2a, reports of the short-term performance advantage of competence- 
enhancing innovations was operationalized as the number of times an MD 0 innovation 
was coded NOWBETR=l, and reports o f the long-term performance advantage of 
competence-destroying innovations was operationalized as the number of times an 
MD>0 innovation was coded THENBETR=1.
Table 5.6 presents the results. The short-term performance advantage of 
competence-enhancing innovations was reported less than half the number of times 
than the future performance advantage of competence-destroying innovations. But
Table 5.6. Data for H2a.
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M D0 NOWBETR=l: 75 NOWBETR=0: 222
MD>0 THENBETR=1: 165 THENBETR=0: 518
obviously, this was largely attributable to the much larger number o f reports o f all 
MD>0 innovations; hence the need to assess proportionality, and the right-hand column 
of the table.
Chi-square for the table was .13 (C = .01), well below the thresholds needed to 
reject the null. When the table was standardized, chi-square and C both dropped to 
zero. Without a doubt, there was no statistical association between whether an 
innovation was competence-enhancing or competence-destroying, and the rate at which 
its respective performance advantage was reported. The hypothesis was clearly refuted.
Hypothesis 2b. H2b asserted that the public media would report the long-term 
performance advantage of some Phenomenological Types of competence-destroying 
innovations less frequently than others. Table 5.7 presents the results. As was 
discovered in the analysis of HI a, most media attention was focused on Other ReDox 
(PTB) and Hot Batteries (PTD), though Zinc Air (PTE) and Common Fuel Cells (PTH) 
garnered what seemed to be non-trivial amounts of attention as well. In both absolute 
and proportional terms, PTD seemed to fare better than PTB.
Statistical tests supported these observations. The chi-square for Table 5.7 was 
20.05 (C = . 18), which rejected the null at alpha = .01. Once rows containing low 
expected frequencies were removed, only PTs B, D and E remained; the chi-square for 
the resulting 2x3 (df = 2) table was 12.32 (C = .15), which also rejected the null at 
.01 .When this table was standardized, chi-square was 5.08 (C = .12), which was slightly 
under the threshold for rejecting the null at alpha = .05.











On the whole, then, results indicated that there was a statistical association 
between the Phenomenological Type of a competence-destroying innovation, and rate 
at which its long-term performance advantage was reported. Specifically, the future 
performance advantage of Hot Batteries was reported more frequently (75 reports) than 
Other ReDox Batteries (58 reports), which were both reported much more frequently 
than any other type. Proportionately, Hot Batteries fared about twice as well as Other 
ReDox Batteries.
In terms of the overall assertion of Proposition 2, results of testing H2a and H2b 
indicated that in absolute terms, competence-destroying innovations got more publicity 
than competence-enhancing innovations, but that article-for-article they received 
equitable treatment in terms of the reporting of their respective performance 
advantages; and that among competence-destroying innovations, firms pursuing Other 
ReDox and Hot Batteries received a very large portion of the publicity, with Hot 
Batteries faring best in both absolute and proportional terms.
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Hypothesis 3a. Proposition 3 asserted that the long-term performance 
disadvantage of competence-enhancing innovations would be reported in the public 
media less frequently than the short-term performance disadvantage of competence- 
destroying innovations. In H3a, reports of the long-term performance disadvantage of 
competence-enhancing innovations was operationalized as the number of times an MD 
0 innovation was coded THENWORS=1, and reports of the short-term performance 
disadvantage of competence-destroying innovations was operationalized as the number 
of times an MD>0 innovation was coded NOWWORS=l.
Table 5.8 presents the results. The long-term performance disadvantage of 
competence-enhancing innovations was reported about half as many times as the short­
term performance disadvantages of competence-destroying innovations. But again, 
there were many more total reports o f competence-destroying innovations, and 
proportionality was important to consider.
Table 5.8. Data for H3a.
MD 0 THENWORS=l: 30 THENWORS=0: 264
MD>0 NOWWORS=l: 62 NOWWORS=0: 623
Chi-square for the table was .31 (C = .02), too low to reject the null. When the 
table was standardized, chi-square was .06 (C = .00). Mirroring the results of testing 
H2a, there was no statistical association between whether an innovation was 
competence-enhancing or competence-destroying, and the rate at which its performance 
disadvantage was reported. On this measure, competence-enhancing and competence- 
destroying innovations fared about the same. The hypothesis was clearly refuted.
Hypothesis 3b. H3b asserted that the public media would report the short-term 
performance disadvantage of some Phenomenological Types of competence-destroying 
innovations less frequently than others. Table 5,9 presents the results. Similar to the
93
analysis concerning H2b, most media attention was focused on Other ReDox (PTB) and 
Hot (PTD) Batteries, and Common Fuel Cells (PTH.) Whereas in H2b there had been 
seven reports of the future performance superiority o f Zinc-Air Batteries 
(PTE),however, there were no reports that it was presently inferior to Lead Acid- 
Batteries. Also, whereas in H2b Common Fuel Cells were reported for their future 
performance advantage four times (resulting in a low expected frequency), here they 
were reported as being inferior in the short-term seven times (resulting in an adequate 
expected frequency.) Finally, whereas in H2b Hot Batteries were so clearly favored in 
both absolute and proportional terms, here the comparison to Other ReDox batteries 
seemed much less revealing.
The chi-square for Table 5.9 was 18.30 (C = . 18), which rejected the null at 
alpha = .05. Once rows containing low expected frequencies were removed, leaving 
only PTs B, D, and H, chi-square was 13.18 (C = .15), which rejected the null at alpha = 
.01. When the table was standardized, chi-square was 19.48 (C = .25), rejecting the 
null at alpha = .001.
On the whole, then, results indicated that there was a statistical association 
between the Phenomenological Type of a competence-destroying innovation and the 
rate at which its short-term performance disadvantage was reported, though this 
association was largely determined by the way Common Fuel Cells were reported. 
Otherwise, the contrast between Other ReDox and Hot Batteries, which was so clear in 
the analysis of H2b, was not so evident here.
In terms of the overall assertion of Proposition 3, results of testing H3a and H3b 
indicated that in absolute terms, competence-destroying innovations got more publicity 
than competence-enhancing innovations, but that article-for-article they received 
equitable treatment in terms of the reporting of their respective performance 
disadvantages; and that among competence-destroying innovations, firms pursuing











Other ReDox, Hot, and Zinc-Air Batteries, as well as Common Fuel Cells, received a 
very large portion o f the publicity. Other ReDox and Hot Batteries were reported most 
often for their short-term performance disadvantage but proportionately, Common Fuel 
Cells fared the worst.
Hypothesis 4a. In Propositions 4 and 5, the argument was parallel to that 
presented in Propositions 2 and 3, but here the dimension of concern was price, not 
performance. Proposition 4 asserted that the short-term price advantage of 
competence-enhancing innovations would be reported more frequently than the long­
term price advantage of competence-destroying innovations. In H4a, reports o f the 
short-term price advantage of competence-enhancing innovations was operationalized 
as the number of times an MD 0 innovation was coded NOWCHEAP=l; reports of the 
price advantage of competence-destroying innovations was operationalized as the 
number o f times an MD>0 innovation was coded THENCHEP=1.
Table 5.10 presents the results. The number of times respective price 
advantages were reported was about the same. However, proportions were obviously
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very different. Chi-square for the table was 23.00 (C = .15), which rejected the null at 
not only alpha = .01, but also at .001. When the table was standardized, chi-square was 
5.10 (C = .16), which rejected the null at alpha = ,05. There appeared to be a statistical 
association between whether an innovation was competence-enhancing or competence- 
destroying, and the rate at which its respective price advantage was reported.
Table 5.10. Data for H4a.
MD 0 NOWCHEAP=l: 47 NOWCHEAP=0: 247
MD>0 THENCHEP=1: 43 THENCHEP=0: 639
This result stood in stark contrast to the results o f H2a, which differed from H4a 
in the consideration of performance rather than price. The standardized chi-square for 
the tests o f H2a were zero; in H4a, chi-square was large enough to reject the null at 
alpha = .05.
Hypothesis 4b. H4b asserted that the public media would report the long-term 
price advantage of some Phenomenological Types o f competence-destroying 
innovations more than others. Table 5.11 presents the results. Again, Other ReDox 
(PTB), Hot (PTD) and Zinc-Air (PTE) Batteries, as well as Common Fuel Cells (PTH) 
dominated. The number of reports of the long-term price advantage of Other ReDox 
and Hot Batteries was about the same.
Chi-square for the table was 12.41 (C = .14), which rejected the null at alpha =
. 1. Once rows containing low expected frequencies were removed, leaving only PTs B 
and D, chi-square was .18 (C = .02), too low to reject the null. When this table was 
standardized, chi-square was .08 (C = .02), only lower. There appeared to be no 
statistical association between the Phenomenological Type of a competence-destroying 
innovation and the rate at which its long-term price advantage was reported.











In terms of the overall assertion of Proposition 4, results of testing H4a and H4b 
indicated that in absolute terms, competence-destroying innovations got more publicity 
than competence-enhancing innovations, but that article-for-article, competence- 
enhancing innovations fared much better in terms of the reporting of their short-term 
price advantage. Among competence-destroying innovations, Other ReDox, Hot, and 
Zinc Air Batteries, as well as Common Fuel Cells dominated media attention, but 
article-for-article they fared about the same in terms of the reporting of their long-term 
price advantage.
Hypothesis 5a. Proposition 5 asserted that the long-term price disadvantage of 
competence-enhancing innovations would be reported in the media less frequently than 
the short-term price disadvantage of competence-destroying innovations. In H5a, 
reports of the long-term price disadvantage of competence-enhancing innovations was 
operationalized as the number o f times an MD 0 innovation was coded THENEXP=1; 
reports of the short-term price disadvantage of competence-destroying innovations was 
operationalized as the number o f times an MD>0 innovation was coded NOWEXP=l,
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Table 5.12 presents the results. There was obviously a huge disparity in the 
number of times that MD 0 (lead-acid) innovations were reported as not maintaining 
their price advantage in the long term, versus the number o f times all MD>0 
innovations were reported as being more expensive than lead-acid in the short term.
The disparity also seemed huge on a proportional basis.
Table 5.12. Data for H5a.
MD 0 THENEXP=1: 4 THENEXP=0: 290
MD>0 NOWEXP=l: 92 NOWEXP=0: 592
Test statistics confirmed these observations. Chi-square of the table was 33.94 
(C = . 18), high enough to reject the null at alpha = .001. When the table was 
standardized, chi-square was 11.06 (C = .05), still marginally high enough to reject the 
null at alpha = .01. Clearly, there was a statistical association between whether an 
innovation was competence-enhancing or competence-destroying, and the reporting of 
its respective price disadvantage.
Hypothesis 5b. Finally, H5b asserted that the public media would report the 
short-term price disadvantage o f some Phenomenological Types of competence- 
destroying innovations less frequently than others. Table 5.13 presents the results.
Once more, most media attention was focused on Other ReDox (PTB), Hot (PTD), and 
Zinc-Air (PTE) Batteries, and Common Fuel Cells (PTH). The most glaring 
observation was that for the first and only time in any test of a "b" hypothesis, a number 
in the left-hand side of the table was larger than the number on the right-hand side (at 
the same PT). Specifically, it was more common to read in a report about a Common 
Fuel Cell that its short-term price would be prohibitive compared to that o f Lead-Acid 
Batteries, than it was to find no comment at all about the present price. Otherwise, the 
number o f times Other ReDox Batteries were reported as being more expensive than











Lead-Acid Batteries was noticeably larger than the number of similar reports of Hot 
Batteries, which implied a different proportion of these reports as well.
Largely on account of the impact of Common Fuel Cells, the chi-square for this 
table was 38.02 (C = .25), which rejected the null at alpha = .001. After removing rows 
with cells containing low expected frequencies PTB and PTD remained; chi-square was 
.42 (C = .03). After standardizing the table, chi-square w as. 18 (C = 0). In other words, 
except for the extraordinary impact of the way Common Fuel Cells were reported, there 
appeared to be no statistical association between the Phenomenological Type of a 
competence-destroying innovation and the reporting of its short-term price 
disadvantage.
In terms of the overall assertion of Proposition 5, H5a and H5b indicated that in 
both absolute and proportional terms, competence-destroying innovations fared far 
worse than competence-enhancing innovations in terms of the reporting of their 
respective price disadvantages. Among competence-destroying innovations, Common
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Fuel Cells fared the worst o f all on a proportional basis, in fact being the only PT 
notedmore often as being presently expensive, than not.
Summary
Overall, it is easy to compare and contrast these results, since most test statistics 
either clearly supported or refuted individual hypotheses.
There were three main issues underlying Propositions 1 through 5. First was the 
relationship between industry incumbency and competence-enhancement -v.- 
destruction. The second was the pattern of reports of innovations' performance 
characteristics, considering the morphological dimensions. Third was the pattern of 
reports of innovations' cost/price characteristics, considering the morphological 
dimensions.
There was no statistical association between industry incumbency and whether 
an innovation was competence-enhancing or competence-destroying. However, the 
storage battery industry seemed very under-represented in the media items, and the 
probable reason seemed, ironically, to reverse the interpretation of the test. At face 
value there seemed to be an association between incumbency and the PT of a 
competence-destroying innovation, but statistical tests were inconclusive (though these 
latter tests contained a Type II bias.)
The public media was dominated by reports concerning Lead Acid Batteries, 
Other ReDox Batteries, Hot Batteries, ZincAir Batteries, and Common Fuel Cells. All 
other Phenomenological Types of innovations were reported, but in numbers that were 
generally too low to contribute to the analysis. *
Clearly, there was no statistical association between whether an innovation was 
competence-enhancing or competence-destroying, and rates at which respective 
performance advantages (H2a) and disadvantages (H3a) were reported. However, there 
was a statistical association between the Phenomenological Type of a
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competence-destroying innovation and the rate at which both its performance advantage 
(H2b) and performance disadvantage (H3b) were reported.
Surprisingly, the pattern concerning reports of price advantages and 
disadvantages was essentially the opposite. Here, there was a clear statistical 
association between whether an innovation was competence-enhancing or competence- 
destroying, and the rate at which its respective price advantage (H4a) and price 
disadvantage (H5a) was reported. Competence-enhancing innovations fared better in 
H4a, and better still in H5a.
On the other hand, there was generally a lack of a clear statistical association 
between the Phenomenological Type of a competence-destroying innovation and the 
rate at which its price advantage (H4b) and price disadvantage (H5b) were reported.
The one very significant exception was that Common Fuel Cells were reported more 
often for their short-term price disadvantage more often than they were not.
Succinctly, the general pattern did not favor the dominant design for its short­
term performance advantage or disfavor it for its long-term performance disadvantage; 
but it did favor the dominant design for its short-term price advantage, and disfavored 
its alternatives for their long-term price disadvantages. Looking at the non-dominant 
design alternatives, the general pattern did favor some Phenomenological Types more 
than others for their long-term performance advantage and disfavor some Types more 
than others for their short-term performance disadvantage; the only certainty 
concerning price was the near-term disfavorability of Common Fuel Cells.
CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION
Probably the most surprising aspect of the analysis presented in the previous 
chapter was that the overall pattern seemed so clear. First, it was clear that industry 
incumbents were, for the most part, not aggressively engaged in the development o f a 
viable electrochemical power source for electric vehicles. The U.S.-based industry did 
not even provide the impetus behind developing improved Lead-Acid Batteries; only 
three of the 27 reported MD 0 innovations were being developed by SIC 3691 
manufacturers. Second, reports of the relative performance advantages and 
disadvantages of MD 0 and MD>0 innovations clearly occurred at almost identical 
rates, while reports of the performance advantages and disadvantages of the different 
Phenomenological Types of competence-destroying innovations clearly occurred at 
very different rates. Third, reports o f the relative price advantages and disadvantages of 
MD 0 and MD>0 innovations clearly occurred at very different rates, while reports of 
the price disadvantages and disadvantages of the different Phenomenological Types of 
competence-destroying innovations clearly occurred at very similar rates, except for 
one PT.
This pattern was so clear because while about half o f the statistical tests passed 
by wide margins, the other half failed by wide margins. However, it would be 
simplistic to point at the bipolarities in the test results and quickly conclude that the 
media was biased. Rather, it seemed necessary to first develop an assessment o f actual 
industry activity, the technological reality in the prime dimesions of concern, and use it 
as a comprehensive point of reference. The first three sections of this chapter develop 
this backdrop, through a relatively qualitative triangulation of three sources o f 
materials, en route to interpreting the pattern of legitimacy presented in the previous 





When H la was tested and analyzed in the previous chapter, the possibility that 
the operationalization of industry incumbency was incorrect was considered and, 
though examining the lists of firms participating in the "comers" of the test failed to 
clearly indicate a better operationalization, the issue was not definitively resolved.
When H lb was subsequently tested and analyzed in its original form, however, 
additional insight became available. There, it became overwhelmingly apparent that 
PT1 (ReDox) was the key to developing a viable electrochemical device for electric 
vehicles. Virtually all MD1 innovations were defined by the switch of PT1 options, and 
every MD>1 innovation included at least the switch of PT1 options. At that time it was 
argued that ReDox should be considered the core technology, or core competence, of 
concern. Since the main issue was the enhancement and/or destruction of competences, 
and since the Lead-Acid ReDox was so clearly part of the dominant design, a stricter 
but still appropriate (since it was still morphologically and phenomenologically 
determined) definition of industry incumbency became, at this point of the study, 
"Manufacturers of electrochemical devices based on the Lead-Acid ReDox".
Theoretically, this definition still invited fuel cells and primary batteries (SIC 
3692 as well as SIC 3691) into consideration, but after weighing several practical 
matters, both fuel cells and primary batteries did become excluded. First, there simply 
were no Lead-Acid fuel cells. Second, it was argued in the morphological analysis in 
Appendix 1 that regenerability was always the PT4 option o f choice, when it was 
phenomenologically possible to make that choice. To be consistent with that analysis, 
and because the inherent phenomenological potential of the Lead-Acid ReDox was low 
enough to make a primary Lead-Acid Battery an inherently foolish idea (discussed 
below), SIC 3692 firms were also excluded from consideration. Thus the revised, and
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in this study final definition of industry incumbency became "SIC 3691 firms primarily 
engaged in the manufacturing o f Lead-Acid Batteries".
Thus each firm previously identified as an incumbent was researched in major 
business references, for information indicating whether or not it was primarily engaged 
in the manufacturing of Lead-Acid storage batteries. The following thirteen firms were 
specifically and uniquely described as being primarily engaged in manufacturing Lead- 
Acid storage batteries: Charter Power Systems, East Penn, Encore, Exide, GNB, Green, 
Mixon, New Castle, Palos Verdes, Power Battery, Ramcar, Sanyo, and Standard 
Industries. Abstract decriptions o f other firms did not necessarily mean, o f course, that 
they were not manufacturing Lead-Acid storage batteries at all, but the immediate 
purpose was to isolate a set of firms that would most intently be concerned about the 
fortunes of the Lead-Acid ReDox, and thus the fate o f their core technological and 
phenomenological competence.
In the raw data, only three of these firms were reported at all: Exide, GNB, and 
Sanyo. As would be expected, Exide and GNB were both pursuing an MD 0 
innovation. However, Exide was also pursuing three MD>0 innovations (Nickel-Metal 
Hydride, Nickel-Zinc, and Sodium Sulfur), GNB was pursuing one (Sealed, Bi-Polar 
Lead Acid), and Sanyo was pursuing five (Lithium-based, Nickel-Cadmium, Nickel- 
Metal Hydride, Nickel Hydrogen, and a Phosphoric Acid Fuel Cell). In other words, 
while ten of the thirteen firms which seemed intently concentrated on manufacturing 
Lead-Acid storage batteries were not reported at all in the public media, the three that 
were reported were all pursuing innovations that would possibly destroy their own core 
competence. This finding supplements previous discussions with the view from a 
narrower, more phenomenologically distinct focus; it does not contradict or replace 
them.
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Of course, this sub-population of thirteen did not constitute the basis of a 
meaningful statistical test. The point of the above effort was to re-emphasize that the 
prevailing mental structure of what an "industry" is and where its "boundaries" are is 
inherently problemmatic, especially when the destruction and/or recreation of those 
boundaries is at issue. A morphological approach to defining what an industry really is 
by relating technological function, user functionality and the equation technology = 
competence was both logical and useful, in the sense that the above small-scale 
exercise yielded plain and understandable results.
Performance
Additional Tests. Next, in order to help develop an accurate interpretation of 
how the various technologies were being legitimated in the public media, it was prudent 
to estimate how, in fact, the relevant technologies were actually evolving during the 
period of time in question. Up to this point, it was assumed that the relevant 
technologies were following a pattern that could be represented as clearly as the pattern 
depicted in Figure 2.1, and that during the time of the study, performance and price 
characteristics were at points o f great disparity (that lead-acid technology was veiy 
mature and that everything else was very immature). It was important to gain at least a 
rough understanding of the accuracy o f these assumptions, before interpreting the 
various rates at which advantages and disadvantages were reported.
The actual characteristics o f the technologies in question were estimated in 
three ways, the results of which are integrated in the following discussion. First, 
frequency tables were reorganized and tested assuming nothing about probable states of 
evolution, and retreating from the assumption that the media was significantly biased. 
Second, published technical data was consulted and third, the proceedings of the 12th 
annual International Electric Vehicle Symposium (held in Anaheim, California during 
December 5-7,1994) were consulted.
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Tables 6.1 and 6.2 present frequency data in tables that more clearly assess 
whether or not, according to media reports, the performance differential between 
competence-enhancing and competence-destroying innovations (as entire families of s- 
curves) actually conformed to the expectations discussed during the development of 
propositions. These tables differed importantly from tables previously presented and 
analyzed in that they considered possibilities heretofore dismissed because of their 
theoretical unlikelihood; for example, that competence-destroying innovations might 
have already been outperforming competence-enhancing innovations, and that 
competence-enhancing innovations might have possessed the phenomenological 
potential to sustain the performance superiority of the dominant design well into the 
long-term.








Chi-square for Table 6,1 was 55.84 (C = .35), which rejected the null at alpha = 
.001. (The table essentially tested the hypothesis that competence-enhancing 
innovations actually performed better than competence-destroying innovations, and that 
competence-destroying innovations will actually perform better in the future. This was 
not the same as asserting that known performance advantages would be reported at
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dissimilar rates.) When this table was standardized, chi-square was 39.28 (C = .41), 
still high enough to reject the null at alpha = ,001. For Table 6.2, chi-square was 9.43 
(C = .24), which marginally rejected the null at alpha = .01; when this table was 
standardized, chi-square was 13,26 (C = .25), which rejected the null at alpha = .001. 
Together, these results supported the expectation that competence-enhancing 
innovations actually did and would continue to perform the best in the short-term, but 
that it was a virtual certainty that their overall performance would be surpassed in the 
long-term by at least one competence-destroying innovation.
On the other hand and despite the strength of these statistics, it was intuitively 
bothersome that there were 104 reports o f an MD>0 innovation that had already 
achieved performance that was superior to the dominant design, and that reports of the 
near-term inferiority of MD 0 innovations were actually more numerous (47) than 
reports of their long-term inferiority (30). This implied that although the performance 
s-curve depicting the family of competence-enhancing innovations, when graphed 
alongside the performance s-curve depicting the family of competence-destroying 
innovations, might have looked much like Figure 2.1, graphs of s-curves at a lower 
level of analysis might not have differentiated MD 0 from MD>0 innovations so 
clearly. In fact it implied that there was probably some overlap among them.
Tables 6.3 and 6.4 present data that was suggestive of the relative positions of 
the families of technology s-curves defined by Phenomenological Type. The Tables 
showed that all reports that competence-destroying innovations were already superior to 
the dominant design were restricted to PTs B, D and E (Other ReDox, Hot, and Zinc- 
Air Batteries, respectively). Proportionately, reports o f the performance superiority of 
Other ReDox Batteries were distributed about evenly between the two time frames; for 
Hot Batteries, reports were skewed towards the long-term; for Zinc-Air Batteries, they 
were skewed towards the short-term. Zinc-Air Batteries were never reported as having
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inferior performance at ail, but this was not the case for Other ReDox and Hot 
Batteries, especially concerning the short-term. The number o f times that Hot Batteries 
were reported as being inferior in the short-term was about the same number of times 
that they were reported as being superior in the short-term. Other ReDox Batteries, on 
the other hand, were reported many more times as being superior in the short-term than 
they were reported as being inferior in the short-term. Other ReDox Batteries were 
reported eight times as being inferior in the long-term, while innovations of other PTs 
were seldom reported as such.
Chi-square for Table 6.3 was 24.63 (C = .30), which rejected the null at alpha = 
.001; when rows containing low expected frequencies were removed, PTs B, D and E 
remained, and chi-square was 19.81 (C = .27), which rejected the null at alpha = .001; 
when this table was standardized, chi-square was 34.6 (C = ,32), which rejected the null 
at alpha = .001. For Table 6.4, chi-square was 17.24 (C = ,45), which rejected the null 
at alpha = .05. Subsequent tests of this table were uninterpretable because of the 
presence of too many low expected frequencies.
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Guided by the areas o f statistical significance and the proportionality of 
frequencies, this pattern suggested that the performance s-curve of Zinc-Air Batteries 
was already above the performance s-curve of Lead-Acid Batteries and that it would 
probably stay above it in the future. The performance s-curve of Other ReDox 
Batteries, as a family, seemed to be proximate to the performance o f Lead-Acid 
Batteries, but the performance growth of Other ReDox Batteries seemed to be faster, 
growing towards a higher phenomenological potential. The s-curve of Hot Batteries 
seemed to be not quite so proximate to (not as high as) the Lead-Acid Battery s-curve at 
the time, but again performance growth o f Hot Batteries seemed to be faster, growing 
towards a phenomenological potential that was probably even higher than that of other 
ReDox Batteries.
Technical Data. Fortunately, contemporaneuous technical data was available 
which helped evaluate these speculations in greater detail. Table 6.5 presents 
information that was consolidated from articles published by/in the Society of 
Automotive Engineers (Brant, 1994), the Journal of the Electrochemical Society
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("Electric vehicles and batteries", 1994), and Chemtech (Henrickson, DeLuca & Vissers, 
1994). First, it was apparent that the theoretical specific energy (column 2) o f various 
batteries was commonly known, at least to expert technologists in the field; these were 
the phenomenological upper limits of their respective performance s-curves, derived 
from knowledge of the properties of the respective electrochemical couples. Thus the 
straightforward engineering problem was to develop batteries as far up-and-along these 
s-curves as possible, other things held equal; or, in other words, to develop batteries 
with practical specific energies (column 3) that were as close as possible to their 
theoretical potentials. At the time, of course, devices existed at different stages of 
development (column 4). In order from the most marketable to the most primitive, 
stages of development were categorized Commercial, Prototype, Module, Stack, and 
Cell.
It is important to note that Table 6.5 was compiled by listing batteries in 
increasing order of their phenomenological potentials; it became apparent only 
secondarily that this order of ascendance also paralleled ascending MD and PT. 
Specifically, though there were some large within-PT differences in theoretical 
specific energy, there was no overlap between the ranges of the specific energies of any 
two PTs: for PTA, specific energy was 175.7 Wh/lb; for PTB, it ranged from 185.9 to 
429.8; for PTD, it ranged from 548.5 to 763.6; for PTE, it was 1316.1. Of course, and 
as will be explained, Table 6.5 presented only a fraction of the huge number of 
theoretically-possible electrochemical couples. By implication, many of the others 
probably did not constitute sound bases for batteries because of poor 
phenomenological potentials, as well as being infeasible for any of a myriad o f other 
reasons. But as it stood, the data in the table did support the overall validity of the 
morphological analysis developed in this dissertation in terms that mattered most. The 
morphological analysis developed in Appendix 1 was driven by a
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Table 6.5. Composite of Battery Specifications








Stage o f  
Development
A: Lead-Acid 175.7 25-40 Commercial
B: Nickel-Metal Hydride 185.9 50-80 Module
B: Nickel-Cadmium 219.0 50-60 Commercial
B: Nickel-Iron 268.3 50-60 Prototype
B:Nickel-Zinc 342.6 n/a n/a
B: Zinc-Bromine 429.8 80 Prototype
D: Lithium Polymer 548.5 100-200 Cell
D: Lithium Iron DiSulfide 652.0 130-200 Stack
D: Sodium-Sulfur 763.6 75-80 Prototype
D: Sodium Nickel Chloride 795.6 80-100 Prototype
E: Zinc-Air 1316.1 75-100 Prototype
technological/engineering problem that was defined by the challenge o f increasing the 
specific energy of an electrochemical device. As it turned out, according to the best 
available Research and Development data, the categories derived from the 
morphological analysis were distinctly different not in appearance or mechanical 
operation (because devices within each PT were not always identical in appearance or 
operation), but in their theoretical specific energies. At any rate, data in column 2 
corroborated the previous speculation, based mostly on the results of testing the 
frequencies of THENBETR and THENWORS, that the phenomenological potentials of 
PTs A, B, and D increased in that order, and that the potential of PTE was higher not 
only than PTA, but everything else as well.
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Next, columns 3 and 4 together enabled an evaluation of the previous 
speculation, based mostly on the results of testing the frequencies o f NOWBETR and 
NOWWORS, of how proximate the s-curves of different devices, and therefore 
Phenomenological Types, of competence-destroying innovations were to each other 
during the period of time under study. In other words, the practical specific energy of 
each battery indicated the actual performance of each device "NOW", while their stages 
of development gave a good relative indication of how truly imminent each device was 
to being available "NOW".
Only two batteries were noted as being in the Commercial stage of 
development. Technically, according to the strict logic used during the development of 
propositions, these were the only devices that should have their practical performance 
considered as existing "NOW" — other practical specific energies should be categorized 
as materializing at some point in the future, or "THEN", although some non­
commercial stages of development were certainly more imminent than others. This 
observation was made only to highlight the importance of considering how promised 
(laboratory) performance might be legitimated as practical (Commercial) performance. 
In R&D terms, even prototypes can still be years away from commercialization, and 
not necessarily representative o f the performance characteristics of an eventual 
Commercial version. A Commercial version might turn out to be superior to a 
laboratory version because intermediate efforts could result in further movement along 
an s-curve; or conversely, a Commercial version might be inferior to a laboratory 
version because of innumerable practical differences between a lab and the 
marketplace.
Anyway, one would think that after a century or so of commercial development, 
Lead-Acid Batteries would be far up their s-curves -  yet according to the table, there 
still seemed to be a great deal o f untapped potential between Lead-Acid's practical and
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theoretical specific energies. Perhaps this reflected a lack of a truly serious challenge 
over its lifetime, but also it probably reflected the simple difficulty of translating 
scientific knowledge into technological functionality, which is the engineer's chore 
(Betz, 1993). At any rate, it indicated a significant opportunity for a "sailing ship 
phenomenon" to occur, where investments in an old technology can sometimes reap 
quick but short-term rewards and deceive some into believing that obsolescence is still 
far from imminent (Foster, 1986).
The other battery in the Commercial stage was Nickel Cadmium, which seemed 
to be about as far up its s-curve (by comparing practical to theoretical specific energies) 
as Lead-Acid was on its s-curve, despite a much shorter history. Yet its practical 
specific energy was superior. Considering the other, Other ReDox Batteries (PTB), two 
(Nickel Iron and Zinc Bromine) were in the prototype stage, and both were promising 
practical performance that was superior to that of Lead-Acid. The promised practical 
performance of Nickel-Metal Hydride was already similar to that of the other PTB 
innovations, despite being in an even earlier stage of development. On the whole, this 
corroborated the previous speculation that the performance s-curve of Other ReDox 
Batteries was proximate to the s-curve of the dominant design, and growing towards a 
higher phenomenological potential.
Concerning Hot Batteries (PTD), it was interesting that the two Sodium-based 
innovations, both in the prototype stage, were already promising practical performance 
superior to the performance of the dominant design, with most potential yet to be 
tapped. In other words, relative to PTB innovations, they still seemed to be near or on 
the bottom (flat part) of their s-curves. Of the PTD innovations, the two Lithium-based 
innovations were promising the best practical performance, and were already much 
farther towards exploiting their full potentials, yet they were in the most primitive 
stages of development. On the whole, this information corroborated the previous
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observation that the performance s-curve of Hot Batteries was not yet as proximate to 
the s-curve of the dominant design as was the s-curve of Other ReDox Batteries, but 
only because they were farther away from commercialization, not because their 
practical specific energies were lower.
The characteristics of Zinc-Air Batteries (PTE) seemed to be fairly clear. Their 
performance potential was much higher than any of the other types, and promised 
practical performance was superior to every other innovation except the two Lithium- 
based batteries. At any rate, the performance s-curve of Zinc-Air technology clearly 
seemed to be above that of Lead-Acid, which corroborated previous speculations.
Figure 6.1 graphically summarizes the essentials o f this discussion. When 
viewing this figure the limitations of the available data should be appreciated; the 
figure is only intended to illustrate the relative positions of a few batteries and their s- 
curves. They are not empirically derived plots. The dashed portions crudely depict 
periods of time before commercialization, and phenomenological upper limits are not 
strict predictors of ultimately attainable practical performance. It is also important to 
point out that the data used was exemplary, and was not necessarily collectively 
representative of the activites o f each player in the entire industry. The ultimate source 
of the information presented in Table 6.5, to be more exact, was the United States 
Advanced Battery Consortium (USABC), and reflected its important -- perhaps central - 
- subset of concerns.
The USABC was formed in 1991 as a partnership among the Department of 
Energy, the Electric Power Research Institute, GM, Ford, and Chrysler, and directed 
(non-Lead-Acid) battery Research and Development. The USABC was an important 
player during the period of time under study because it identified mid-and-long-term 
battery performance goals, conducted research itself (especially through Argonne 































Figure 6.1. Approximate S-curves o f Several Competitive Innovations.
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firms such as Ovonic (Nickel-Metal Hydride), Grace, Johnson Controls, SRI, SAFT, 
Delco and EIC Labs (Lithium compounds), Valence Technologies (Lithium Vanadium), 
Silent Power (Sodium-Sulfur), and 3M and Hydro-Quebec (Lithium-Polymer) -- all 
PTB and PTD innovations.
In other words, the USABC probably participated in the legitimation of some 
battery technologies, as additionally evidenced by the conspicuous absence o f some 
electrochemical devices in Table 6.5 -- especially Fuel Cells. However, there was no 
reason to suspect that the USABC had any legitimation agenda other than a broad-based 
advocacy of the most technically feasible battery technologies, in the larger context of 
the debate as to whether electric vehicles were a wise socio-technological pursuit at all. 
All things considered, there was absolutely no shortage of active, vocal, and very 
disparate organizations (including other technical consortia) taking strong positions on 
the overall electric vehicle issue and specific sub-issues. The USABC was only one of 
them, and was probably one of the more rational from a technological point of view 
(Sutula & Venkateswaren, 1994).
EVS-12. The 12th annual International Electric Vehicle Symposium (Dec,
1994) was contemporaneous to, and happened towards the end of, the period of time 
under study; perfectly positioned to facilitate a broader evaluation of EV activities than 
those that were being specifically championed by the USABC. The proceedings o f the 
symposium contained several dozen technical articles specifically addressing the status 
of almost as many technologies, embedded in over 1200 pages of other pertinent 
information, all written by technologists directly involved in enacting this new industry. 
Because of the nature of and purposes behind symposia, trade shows, and professional 
conferences, it was felt that this large record was probably representative of industry­
wide, advanced developments. By the same token, however, it was also felt that many 
of the authors were at least partly motivated by the desire to promote (hence legitimate)
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certain technologies, organizations, or at least the emergence of the industry in general. 
Therefore, though no statistical test is forthcoming in the following discussion, there 
was probably a "file drawer" full of uninteresting or frustrated developments elsewhere 
in the industry. The following discussion pertains most accurately to the aggressively 
innovating elite.
Even the most superficial glance at the symposium proceedings gave an 
impression that the electric vehicle movement was not indigenous to the U.S., but was 
happening globally in different ways and for different reasons. Of the more than 30 
articles that addressed electrochemical technologies, most authors and co-authors 
represented non-U.S. organizations. Six articles were written by authors representing 
U.S.-based organizations (details appear in the following discussion). Eight were 
written by authors representing Japanese organizations, five were German, four were 
French, and two were British. Other authors and co-authors were apparently from 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia [sic], Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, and 
South Korea. In short, and as had become impressionistically but strongly apparent in 
the public media, the electric vehicle movement was conspicuously afoot throughout 
the U.S.-Japan-Europe triad plus a few developing countries. The 1990 California 
mandate to develop electric vehicles triggered a natural experiment, a relatively sound 
and consistent political-legal context within which a pattern depicting the struggle for 
technological breakthroughs, of a specific type in an identifiable industry, was 
observable. Yet it became clear that this natural experiment, especially since the most 
important underlying issue was the reconstruction of boundaries, was not clearly 
divorced from the larger context in which it was embedded.
Some general impressions were voiced consistently throughout the symposium 
proceedings, such as the following assertion made by a representative from 
Sonnenschein, a German battery manufacturer: "The electric vehicles business is
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becoming more professional. The time for 'hobby-business' is gone. Small serious 
production starts are at all major car manufacturers all over the world. Optimal 
conditions for the motive power battery and service are near-term problems [sic]" 
(Hanauer, 1994:564). If this observation was correct (and there was no conflicting 
statement to be found), it identified, in strategic terms, where the industry (EV, or EV 
power source) was poised in its life cycle. It seemed to be at a nexus, a transition point 
of overall activity from an era of pilot or small-scale, highly individualistic and 
entrepreneurial, and sometimes technologically "crackpot" activities, to an era o f much 
relatively larger scale production, more professional management, and less 
technologically uncertain trajectories. This transition period would indeed seem to be a 
junction when legitimacy had the potential for serious leverage one way or the other, 
not only for individual firms and technologies but for the entire new industry.
Yet the most prevailing technological certainty, ironically, was technological 
uncertainty. "There will be no wonder battery. It is a law of nature that the practical 
energy density of electrochemical batteries [as opposed to mechanical batteries, or 
flywheels] is approximately 1/100 of that of conventional fuels... [but] It is possible to 
have the electric automobile even today. Quantum leaps are not needed to decide 
whether or not there is a market for the electric automobile. Continued political 
pressures and public acceptance are needed for the introduction of electric vehicles... It 
remains that there will not be a single 'right' battery for all electric automobiles, but a 
number o f battery systems which will complement one another" (Kruger, 1994:202-3).
The reason for this expected technological complexity was also a humble 
reminder o f the simplicity of the focus of this study. The only performance parameter 
considered was specific energy, or vehicle range. The most superior (practical or 
theoretical) and/or cognitively legitimate specific energy emerging at the time of this 
study was not necessarily destined to become part of the future dominant design
because, aside from business complications, specific energy was phenomenologically 
interactive with other performance parameters such as specific power (acceleration), 
recharging time, the number of possible recharging cycles, battery "memory", and 
operating environment extremes. However, this reminder did not discount the validity 
of the views developed previously and maintained to this point. The observation only 
emphasized that though range was the most critical performance parameter, the one that 
was the most serious bottleneck in terms of consumer acceptability, no single 
technology was yet in sight that would accommodate the demands of all automobile 
consumers, at least in terms of the way automobiles were expected to perform 
generally. In strategic terms, the short-term was expected to be technologically 
fragmented, but this accorded with theoretical concepts like Anderson & Tushman's 
(1990) "period o f ferment", the exciting period between a technological discontinuity 
and the emergence o f a dominant design. Theory still suggested that in the long-term, 
eventually a dominant design would emerge, a design that constituted a collection of 
sub-technologies that together would deliver satisfactory performance to most 
consumers (Utterback, 1994).
In the short-term, however, much was indeed still very uncertain. At EVS-12, 
there was a diverse contingent o f participants who felt that improvements to Lead-Acid 
technology would, at the very least, be the best short-term solution to even the range 
problem. Interestingly, this contingent had no U.S. voice; rather, articles came from 
Germany (Hanauer, 1994), Great Britain (Merz & Stevensen, 1994), Japan (Nakayama 
& Hijo, 1994; Wakasa, 1994), and South Korea (Song, Kim & Oh, 1994). Within this 
group, the phenomenological limitations of the Lead-Acid ReDox were well-known.
The fact that so much of the technology's potential was still untapped was equally 
recognized, however. Hence activities aimed at incrementally improving Lead-Acid
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Batteries (PTA) were intense. Whether or not these investments would prove fruitful 
was somewhat a matter of perspective.
It seemed certain that Lead-Acid improvements would be competitive during 
the crucial early years, when the new industry (EV or EV power source) as a whole was 
most vulnerable to failure. In theoretical terms, it seemed that Lead-Acid advocates 
and some others were cognizant of the "sailing ship" phenomenon (Foster, 1986) 
described earlier, and knew that the performance of Lead-Acid technology would 
flatten again after an impressive rejuvenation, only to inevitably be overtaken by a 
different technology. Strategically, to some this seemed to be the best way to buy time, 
to buy into the new industry on the ground floor, and to be agents o f change. Whether 
or not the Lead-Acid advocates represented organizations that planned to eventually 
make the leap to a non-Lead-Acid technology was not clear, however, which was the 
substance of Proposition 1.
In other words, it is safe to say that everybody who participated in EVS-12 knew 
that it would be difficult -  and probably impossible -  to meet the California mandate 
with the permanent solution as early as 1998, but there were disagreements as to 
whether Lead-Acid should be pursued as a shrewd short-term, interim solution. The 
conundrum causing the furor was highly relevant to this study. Some experienced 
players, scarred by previous, failed EV movements (such as the spurts of interest that 
occurred during oil embargo panics) felt that the best way to ruin the present movement 
was to introduce marginal/mediocre technologies too early and cause irreparable, 
further damage to the image that already plagued electric vehicles: that they were only 
glorified golf carts. Others felt that at least some niche markets, such as government 
and industrial fleets, the military, and environmentally-conscious and wealthy trend­
setters, should be pursued soon and vigorously as hands-on development programs in- 
and-of themselves. The resulting dilemma was how to compete in a cooperative
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fashion, or how to cooperate competitively -  how to legitimate one's technology, while 
simultaneously legitimating the whole industry full o f competing technologies.
In the main, while some players advocated achieving acceptable mass-market 
performance through achieving a series of small discontinuities, others seemed intent 
on working more patiently at the R&D phase, and then making the big hit. Lead-acid 
advocates were plainly in favor of the former point of view, firm-specific long-term 
strategies notwithstanding.
So ingenuity plus politically ordained demand were pushing many incremental 
improvements to Lead-Aacid technology. The one version that was discontinuous in 
terms developed in this study, o f course, was the Scaled, Bi-Polar Lead-Acid Battery 
(SBLA, or PTC). The histoiy o f the SBLA was relatively short and narrow. The basic 
technology was a product of the Cold War, having been invented by the Jet Propulsion 
Laboratory (Pasadena, California) as part o f the Strategic Defense Initiative ("Star 
Wars"). Since being researched and developed in the 1980s, it seemed that SBLA 
technology had since been transferred (licensed) to only a few serious organizations. 
Harbaugh (1994) reported that the Aries Rcsearch/Exidc version was promising 47 
Wh/kg, a figure that squared neatly with Table 6.5. That is, during the conceptual 
development of PTs, B and C were designated arbitrarily; they were both MD 1, PT1 
groups of innovations. Had the order been reversed (which would probably have been 
intuitively cleaner since it would have alphabetically adjoined both Lead-Acid PTs), 
Harbaugh's data would have perfectly supplemented Table 6.5, adding SBLA in a way 
that maintained the parallel ascendance of PT (alphabetically) and practical specific 
energy (numerically).
Considering Other ReDox (PTB) Batteries next, several articles concentrated on 
Nickel-Metal Hydride technology, U.S.-based Ovonic (Crujian et al„ 1994) claimed to 
be producing one such battery that was delivering 70-80 Wh/kg "to the wheels" -  i.e.,
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functioning in a commercializable vehicle. This young firm was already in the 
production mode, having delivered 10,000 such devices while also licensing the 
technology to Gates, Gold Peak, Harding, Hitachi, Matsushita, Samsung, and Varta, In 
other words, Ovonic was in fact delivering a level o f performance that the USABC only 
indicated as being in the module stage. SAFT of France (Cornu, 1994) was somewhat 
behind Ovonic, reporting a 1994 developmental project that had the attainment o f 65 
Wh/kg as its goal, and a 1996 pilot project which planned to attain 80 Wh/kg. U.S.- 
based Electro-Energy (Reisner & Klein, 1994) reported a radical cost-saving design, but 
did not specify performance.
Consistent with the USABC data, SAFT (Cornu, 1994) also claimed that Nickel 
Cadmium technology was the only alkaline couple commercially available for 
automotive applications. SAFTs Nickel Cadmium battery was delivering 56 Wh/kg, 
and the company hoped to improve it to 65 Wh/kg by 1996. An apparent joint venture 
between the Furukawa Battery Company and the Tohuko Electric Power Company, 
both of Japan (Eguru, Yabumoto, & Onozuka, 1994) claimed to have a Nickel-Iron 
Battery in "secondary development" that was promising 57 Wh/kg. Yuasa-Exide of 
Japan (Aran et al., 1994) reported that despite the high phenomenological potential of 
Nickel Zinc, the technology was also fundamentally plagued by the natural tendency for 
the zinc to form microscopic dendrite deposits that caused electric shorts. Yet PAUG 
of Germany (Warthman, Ohms & Haschler, 1994) reported a laboratory Nickel-Zinc 
cell that was promising 65 WH/kg (which would have substituted perfectly for one 
"n/a" in Table 6.5), a Nickel Hydrogen prototype that was promising 55 Wh/kg, and a 
Nickel Cadmium pilot project delivering 45 Wh/kg (below that which was otherwise 
commercially available). In sum, no performance data pertaining to PTB innovations 
found in EVS-12 proceedings seriously contradicted the USABC data, and on the whole 
added detail to that part o f the picture.
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Considering Hot Batteries (PTD), Electricite de France (Baudry, 1994) reported 
a Lithium Polymer device, still in the cell/stack stage, promising 80-100 Wh/kg -  
slightly lower than the USABC practical specific energy for the same technology.
SAFT (Broosely & Stanewicz, 1994) reported a similar Lithium device with 105 
Wh/kg, more in line with the USABC data. Most interesting was Kurematsu’s 
description of M m 's  "national project", a coordination of contributions from Japan's 
Central Research Institute of the Electric Power Industry, Hitachi, Japan Storage 
Battery, Matsushita, Nippondenso, Toshiba, and Samsung (Kurematsu, 1994). This 
group was collectively working on specific Lithium combinations otherwise never 
reported (Lithium Cobalt Oxide Ion, Lithium Nickel Oxide Ion, and Lithium 
Manganese Oxide). Their goal was to develop a module delivering 120 Wh/kg by 
1995, and 180 Wh/kg by 2001; aggressive, but consistent with USABC data. Silent 
Power of Great Britain (Auxer, 1994) reported that its Sodium Sulfur Battery then 
operational in Ford's EV testbed (named EcoStar) was delivering 80 Wh/kg, the same as 
the USABC's prototype Sodium Sulfur device. Finally, the Lawrence-Berkeley 
Laboratory (Doeff, 1994) advocated development o f "infant" Sodium Polymer 
technology, one that had a known phenomenological potential lower than that o f all 
other Hot Batteries (440 Wh/kg), but was ostensibly able to achieve a greater fraction of 
its potential energy because o f its inherently superior internal conductivity. On the 
whole, this portrait of PTD innovations was somewhat more diverse than that portrayed 
by the USABC by virtue of the inclusion of additional, exotic ReDox combinations, but 
performance frontiers stayed basically within or around the same range.
The picture concerning Zinc-Air Batteries (PTE) was different. Electric Fuel of 
Israel (Harat, Whartman, & Tiversky, 1994) boasted of being ready to start delivering 
40,000 Zinc-Air Batteries to organizations in the German telecommunications and 
postal industries, that would immediately deliver 215 Wh/kg — more than twice the
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USABC prototype. What was even more striking was that in this and other EVS-12 
data (Tomazic, 1994), range was not emphasized as being the main inherent advantage 
of Zinc-Air technology -- cost was. Also very illustrative, and as will be interpreted 
later, was that in every other EVS-12 article that contained purposive comparisons of 
EV batteries (Harbaugh, 1994; Kahlen, 1994; Kruger & Gareth, 1994; May, 1994; 
Warthman & Ohms, 1994), Zinc-Air batteries and their entire Phenomenological Type 
of innovation were completely overlooked.
Aluminum-Air batteries (PTG) did not appear in the EVS-12 proceedings at all, 
(which differed from Zinc-Air (PTE) batteries only in the additional requirement for a 
thermal control system), but Fuel Cells (PTs F, H, and I) did. Again, in terms of 
performance, Regenerative Fuel Cells (PTF) were most like ordinary batteries, in that 
the basic device-type was conceived to be a closed system except for the actual flow of 
current. Bronoel (1994) of France reported the development of "an interesting 
compromise between fuel cells and secondary cells" that was a Regenerative Fuel Cell, 
having a specific energy of 180 Wh/kg and an attainable practical potential of 300 -- if 
true, "so very higher than the best batteries" (424).
Naturally, because of the way they operated, the on-board specific energy of all 
other types (PTs H and I) of fuel cells was not so much of an obsession. Their ranges 
were limited to the size of the fuel tank, efficiency of the device, and the natural energy 
content of the fuel, as in ordinary automobiles. Thus EVS-12 articles addressing fuel 
cells were mostly concerned with other matters, especially cost (Barbir, 1994; Cornu et 
al., 1994; Howard, 1994; Swan & Arikawa, 1994). These articles were authored by 
representatives from Belgium, Canada, France, Italy, and the Netherlands.
In short, morphologically speaking, batteries and fuel cells belonged on the 
same morphological map because of their identical phenomenological underpinnings, 
But for practical purposes, features of fuel cells' operating characteristics made solving
124
the range problem mechanically different. The main engineering problem (in non- 
regenerative fuel cells) was not increasing specific energy per se, but achieving a 
configuration small enough for the average automobile -  at cost.
To summarize the EVS-12 proceedings, the "present" and expected short-term 
performance frontiers of electrochemical EV technologies were very much in line with 
the more central view of the USABC. Despite the fact that most of the organizations 
noted in this part of the discussion were not being sponsored by the USABC, and that 
most of them were not U.S.-based organizations, there were only a few inconsistencies 
between the two patterns. A few ReDox combinations heretofore unconsidered became 
apparent, an Israeli firm was boasting imminently commercial Zinc-Air performance 
that was far superior to that predicted by the USABC, and of course Fuel Cells were not 
overlooked outside the USABC. But in general, this review of EVS-12 proceedings, 
which was data that came directly from industry participants, indicated a great deal of 
consistency with both the review of available, mostly USABC technical data, and the 
revised frequency analysis discussed before that.
Price
Additional Tests. A similar method was used to help evaluate the known 
cost/price characteristics of the various categories of innovations. Tables 6.6 and 6.7 
present the data needed to evaluate how MD 0 innovations compared to MD>0 
innovations. Chi-square for Table 6.6 was 48.26 (C= .56), rejecting the null at alpha = 
.001; when the table was standardized, chi-square rose to 90.02 (C = .56). Chi-square 
for Table 6.7 was 6.78 (C = .24), rejecting the null at alpha = .01; when the table was 
standardized, chi-square was 22.14, which rejected the null at alpha = .001.
On the whole, then, there seemed to be no doubt about the relative price 
characteristics of MD 0 and MD>0 innovations. Improvements to the dominant design 
were reported as the least expensive trajectory in the short-term, but by the same token
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alternatives, on the whole, were expected to match and surpass the dominant design in 
the long-term. The only note o f equivocation was that there were only four reports that 
Lead-Acid Batteries would be more expensive than alternatives in the long-term. 
Otherwise, Tables 6.6 and 6.7 strongly supported the expectation that the Lead- 
Acid, dominant design was the cheapest, short-term alternative but that this might 
change in the long-term.
Finally, Tables 6.8 and 6.9 were constructed to help examine the known 
cost/price characteristics among the various Phenomenological Types o f competence- 
destroying innovations. Together they continued to make very clear that competence- 
destroying innovations were more expensive than competence-enhancing innovations in 
the short-term; however, reports o f their potential to become as inexpensive as Lead- 
Acid Batteries in the long-term were not as generally. Criticisms of Common Fuel 
Cells were also apparent. Here, however, a lack of statistical significance in the tables 
disallowed any speculation about relative price characteristics among the Types. Chi- 
square for Table 6.8 was 2.29 (C = .21), which did not reject the null. Chi-square for
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Table 6.9 was 2.20 (C = . 15), which also did not reject the null. Subsequent tests of 
these tables were uninterpretable.
Technical Data and EVS-12. Using the same data that was used to evaluate 
innovations' performance, it was more difficult to develop a coherent picture of the 
relative cost/price characteristics o f even the most popular and important innovations. 
Since the USABC had set mid- and long-term goals for both performance and price, 
occasional attention was paid to the dollar-per-watt-hour guidelines that this agency had 
set forth. But this dissertation focused on performance and price independently, not in 
combination. To avoid confusion, therefore, technical data and EVS-12 proceedings 
were consulted only for information pertaining to 
absolute cost drivers and/or prices of deliverable EV power systems.
It was noticeable that the USABC and manufacturers articulated very few 
numerical estimates of the absolute cost/price characteristics of electrochemical 
devices. Most assertions were either coarse, verbal comparisons or highly isolated 
descriptions. The USABC (Table 6.5), for example, merely classified the relative costs
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of each technology as being "low", "moderate", and/or "high". Articles from EVS-12 
proceedings also tended to make either general claims or describe cost-driving 
idiosyncracies in detail.
One pattern that was very clear was that Lead-Acid technology was always 
considered to be the most economical alternative in the short-term. The USABC 
labelled the cost of Lead-Acid technology as "low/moderate", as compared to other 
technologies in Table 6.5. Articles from the proceedings o f EVS-12 agreed. The 
spokesperson for one Lead-Acid innovation, for example, claimed that it had the 
"lowest cost of any available battery today" (May, 1994:128). Other articles about PTA 
innovations also made general claims about the low costs o f Lead-Acid technology 
(Kruger, 1994; Taniguchi, 1994). Perhaps the more telling trend was that Lead-Acid 
was always used as the industry's cost benchmark (Merz & Stevensen, 1994; Nakayama 
& Hijo, 1994). In other words, non-Lead-Acid Batteries seemed to be competing with 
each other for superior performance, while at the same time they were competing with 
Lead-Acid technology for acceptable cost. The apparent reasons that Lead-Acid was
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the least expensive technology were highly consistent with the theoretical 
characteristics o f a mature technology: low-cost of materials, a great deal of 
standardization of product design and manufacturing processes, established 
infrastructures for distribution and reclamation, and of very great importance to this 
study, in-depth knowledge of the underlying phenomenological character of the Lead- 
Acid ReDox.
Next, the USABC labelled the relative costs of Nickel-Metal Hydride Batteries 
(PTB) as "moderate", an issue that was addressed several times in the EVS-12 
proceedings. Writing on behalf o f Ovonic, Corrigan et al. (1994) claimed that "the 
inherent metallurgical and mechanical nature of the electrodes, and cheapness of 
materials, will ultimately lead to low-cost production" (214). Writing on behalf of 
Electro-Energy, Reisner & Klein (1994) asserted that their Nickel-Metal Hydride 
Battery, because of its construction, was "inherently cheap" (340). In other words, 
Nickel-Metal Hydride technology seemed to have moderate cost characteristics because 
of both reasonable costs of raw materials and unobstructed produciblility.
The USABC labelled the relative cost o f Nickel-Cadmium (PTB) Batteries as 
"moderate/high". There was no evidence in the EVS-12 proceedings as to why this was 
so, but elsewhere it was commonly known that Cadmium, aside from being very toxic, 
was a relatively rare element: an inherently intractable cost barrier, if not an outright 
brake. Brant (1994) roughly estimated that Nickel-Cadmium Batteries were inherently 
about four times as expensive as Lead-Acid Batteries, even in the short-term and in 
small quantities, on account of this characteristic of Cadmium alone.
The USABC labelled the relative cost o f Nickel-Iron Batteries (PTB) as 
"moderate". Again, that term was given some rough-order-of-magnitude perspective by 
Eguru, Yabumoto, & Onozuka (1994) who admitted that the Furakawa Company's 
Nickel-Iron Battery cost ten-to-twelve times as much as Lead-Acid Batteries.
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The USABC did not specifically appraise Nickel-Zinc Batteries (PTB), but part 
of Anan's (1994) discussion of one such device did include an observation of the 
relatively low cost of zinc. As partial corroboration, the USABC labelled the relative 
cost of Zinc-Bromine (PTB) Batteries as "low/moderate". Descriptions of Zinc- 
Bromine Batteries did not appear in the EVS-12 proceedings but Hackleman et al. 
(1992) made a similar observation of the low cost o f zinc.
In contrast, Brant (1994) made an important observation about Nickel, so 
essential to most of the PTB innovations. He noted that the United States owned about 
15% of the known Nickel deposits, and that only about 3% of that was economically 
extractable. In other words, despite the present price of Nickel, and regardless o f any 
economy of scale that might be achieved at plant level, a severe diseconomy of scale 
existed for any vision of an EV industry that depended on vast quantities of Nickel.
In sum, information was spotty but the cost characteristics of PTB innovations 
did not make it clear that this was the PT of choice. Besides present absolute costs, the 
simple diseconomies of depending on several critical chemical elements on a 
paradigmatic scale seemed to present problems that transcended any firm-level 
competence. Within PTB, only Zinc-Bromine seemed to escape this obstacle.
The USABC data did not address SBLA Batteries (PTC), but Harbaugh (1994) 
asserted that though his company's version cost more than (PTA) Lead-Acid 
technology, it only cost about half that of other EV technologies. Based on the above 
estimates, however, that would still mean that SBLA technology was at least twice as 
expensive as the dominant design; since materials were basically the same, construction 
and production expenses probably accounted for this.
The USABC labelled the relative cost of Lithium Polymer (PTD) and Lithium 
Iron DiSulfide (PTD) Batteries as "moderate". Appraisals in the EVS-12 proceedings 
actually seemed more severe for Lithium technologies in general. Baudry (1994)
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expressed the concern that Lithium and Fluorinated materials were the most expensive 
ones being considered for EV applications, which was quite an indictment if the above 
appraisals of Nickel and Cadmium were correct. Doeff (1994) advocated the 
development of Sodium Polymer rather than Lithium Polymer for the same reason, 
despite the need to sacrifice some theoretical specific energy when making this choice.
The USABC labelled the cost of Sodium Sulfur (PTD) technology as 
"moderate", and Sodium Iron DiSulfide (PTD) as "moderate/high". The EVS-12 
proceedings did not help clarify why, but elsewhere it was commonly known that 
despite the abundance and low cost of materials of Sodium-based technologies, 
production costs were high, coupled with the high cost o f developing a meticulously- 
controlled and safe thermal control system. This latter characteristic was no less true 
for Lithium technologies (Hackleman et al., 1992).
Summarizing the cost characteristics of PTD innovations, all were inherently 
disadvantaged by the need for a sophisticated thermal control system. The low cost of 
materials mitigated this cost somewhat for Sodium-based technologies, while the 
opposite was true for Lithium-based technologies.
The USABC labelled the relative cost of Zinc-Air (PTE) technologies as 
"low/moderate". Articles in EVS-12 supported this estimate. Tomazic (1994) stated "a 
further increase of production costs does not influence the price of lead-acid batteries 
anymore. It can be seen, too, that only the value of the material o f a Nickel-Cadmium 
Battery will be almost three times as much as the price of the zinc-flow battery 
including profit. [Numbers show] the very large influence o f mass production on the 
price of the zinc-flow battery. The zinc-flow battery therefore has the greatest potential 
for low cost of all known EV battery systems [sic]" (403). Harats, Whartman, & 
Twersky (1994) agreed in principal, completing a consistently positive picture of Zinc- 
Air technology.
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The USABC did not appraise fuel cells, but there was no doubt in EVS-12 and 
other data that each one was, at least in the short-term, "prohibitively expensive for a 
transportation application" (Swan & Arikawa, 1994:424). Other more general 
literature, while also being short on specifics, was just as certain (Brant, 1994; 
Hackleman et al., 1994; MacKenzie, 1994). While cost obstacles abounded, the most 
significant seemed to be the costs of producing very sophisticated membranes and 
electrodes.
An honest and telling observation made by Tomazic (1994) summarized this 
part o f the discussion best, with some added insight: "A cost comparison at this early 
stage of development needs the assumptions of costs as no precise data are available 
and as almost eveiy designer claims for his own system, that if it is mass-produced, the 
battery costs the 150 Dollars which are demanded by the USABC to be an EV candidate 
[sic]" (405). In other words, despite some inherent diseconomies of pursuing several 
specific ideas, manufacturers consistently claimed eventual cost-parity of their 
innovations based on plant-level economies tied to mass production. Had the USABC 
not set cost/price guidelines, which themselves reflected the Lead-Acid baseline, it is 
not certain what cost predictions would have been.
Finally, a reminder is necessary. The above analysis o f cost/price characteristics 
maintained the discipline necessary to correctly help evaluate the specific cost/price- 
related propositions and hypotheses that were developed for this study. The above 
discussion was limited to absolute costs and prices, not $/Wh, cost-effectiveness, or 
value. The price/performance ratio is a critical determinant o f the timing of the likely 
substitution of one technology for another, but this ratio was dissected in a much earlier 




The introduction to this chapter restated the overall conclusions of the previous 
chapter, which formed a general but clear pattern of how the performance and price 
advantages and disadvantages o f competence-enhancing and competence-destroying 
innovations were being legitimated in the public media, with implications as to the 
incumbency of innovative firms. Subsequent discussions established a baseline, by 
triangulating the implications o f revised frequency analysis, available technical data, 
and symposium proceedings, o f what was actually happening in the industry. This 
section synthesizes all findings and offers extended interpretations.
Industry Incumbency. Although the analysis became somewhat tortuous, the 
first proposition was finally supported. Proposition 1 asserted that competence- 
enhancing innovations would be made by industry incumbents, and that competence- 
destroying innovations would be made by industry non-incumbents. From a purely 
technical standpoint, the statistical tests of the hypotheses designed to test this 
proposition failed. But only eight incumbents were reported in the media, and it was 
argued that there was almost certainly a "file drawer" of non-reported incumbent 
activity that was so relatively non-innovative that reversal of the interpretation of the 
tests was justified, if not warranted.
In other words, the pattern of actual industrial activity in this experimental 
setting supported Technology Cycles frameworks so strongly that the (public media) 
data was ironically skewed towards making misleading statistical conclusions. Of the 
45 incumbents, 37 were innovating in ways that were not newsworthy, and it is safe to 
generally interpret non-newsworthiness as non-innovativeness. Of the eight incumbents 
that were reported, three were exclusively pursuing competence-enhancing innovations. 
Of the 80 reported non-incumbents, 68 were exclusively pursuing competence- 
destroying innovations. Of course, there was a grey area: 5 incumbents were pursuing
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competence-enhancing and competence-destroying innovations, as were 12 non­
incumbents, and another 12 non-incumbents were exclusively pursuing competence- 
enhancing innovations. But on the whole, Technology Cycles frameworks were 
supported when the light o f the "file drawer" problem was cast on the analysis o f raw 
frequencies.
This conclusion remained intact even after concessions were made in the way 
"industry incumbency" was operationalized. The second impression, in fact, is that 
industry incumbency is difficult to define and operationalize. It should be recalled that 
one o f the main arguments in a much earlier discussion was that using prevailing 
mental structures to map out radically different future space is inherently flawed 
because it is so potentially myopic (Hamel & Prahalad, 1994). Yet in the design of this 
study, the least problematic way to define the industry in question was to follow 
research precedent and use a very structured interpretation of what an industry is: 
Standard Industrial Classification. This was appropriate because the whole point was 
to assess whether or not firms deeply entrenched in a prevailing mental structure, 
representative of an industry's technological paradigm, would be agents o f change that 
would eradicate that structure or at least participate in the enactment of a new one. 
Operationalizations momentarily aside, it was certainly true that U.S.-based firms with 
a primary SIC of 3691 were not agents of change, at least not broadly speaking. This 
was so true, however, that defining the industry as SIC 3691 became suspect as a 
correct operationalization. It was as if  the "new" industry was already so different from 
the "old" industry that referring to SIC 3691 as a point of reference was moot.
In the end, however, SIC 3691 still stood as an adequate definition of the 
industry based not on the logic o f old mental maps or prevailing industry paradigms, 
but for (a) phenomenological reasons and (b) the unavoidable conceptual tie-in to 
incumbency. For many purposes, it would no doubt be appropriate to operationalize
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incumbency as any or all o f a firm's size* age, sales volume, embedded capital base, 
name recognition, etc. But the main issue in this study was the enhancement and/or 
destruction of competences, and analysis strongly implied that the "core" competence 
of this industry was expertise in the electrochemical property called reduction-oxidation 
(ReDox). In the light o f the previous analysis, firms were only as "incumbent" as they 
were expert at this technology. Anything else would be proxy, or at least contaminated 
by other organizational characteristics not o f keen interest.
On the other hand, recently it has been argued that since, in the Competence- 
based view of the firm, competences stand the chance of being competitively 
advantageous to the extent that they are inimitable, tacit, and unobservable, overly 
positivistic research is inherently limited in its potential for in-depth understanding 
(Godfrey & Hill, 1995). Ostensibly, therefore, it would have been veiy problematic, 
and possibly counterproductive, to have tried to determine which firms were "more" 
competent at the ReDox phenomenon than others. Limiting the operationalization of 
industry incumbency to those firms that were primarily engaged in the manufacturing of 
either Lead-Acid Batteries or Storage Batteries (SIC 3691) in general was imperfect, 
but appropriate: firms should be expected to defend most ardently that which they 
primarily do, not ancillary lines of business that are not their lifeblood; SIC 3691 
completely contained the key intersection of core competence and the prevailing
4
industry paradigm (dominant design); and though the core competence in SIC 3692 is 
also probably ReDox, there was no intersection of the dominant design and ReDox in 
that SIC which was not practically nonsensical for automotive applications.
In sum, the original operationalization of industry incumbency was grounded in 
theory and research precedent, though it was conceptually flawed by also being tied to 
an only-temporarily-real mental map of industry structure. After a re-evaluation from 
the phenomenological point of view, which was based in the more immutable structure
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of natural law, this operationalization was flawed because it invited all storage battery 
manufacturers into consideration, instead of rigorously isolating the subset o f deeply 
incumbent Lead-Acid experts. But "deep" incumbency in a competence is tacit and 
unobservable, so the original operationalization was sensible, and at worst contained a 
Type II bias. For example, a hypothetical SIC 3691 firm, which only ever 
manufactured alkaline storage batteries, and which was developing an alkaline battery 
for electric vehicles, would have been counted as an incumbent pursuing an MD>0 
innovation, statistically pressuring the incorrect conclusion that incumbents were 
making competence-destroying innovations. Despite this possible bias, the actual test 
found no statistical relationship one way or the other, and that was before consideration 
of the "File Drawer" problem.
It stands that 37 of the 45 incumbents, some of which might not have been truly 
"incumbent" in the Lead-Acid ReDox, were simply never reported at all. The U.S.- 
based storage battery industry was not the locus of competence-destroying innovation -  
and even more poignant, it was not generally the locus of any significant amount or 
type of innovation at all. The majority of innovation activities of all types was spread 
across a number of other, sometimes very disparate industries, and the "new" industry 
had an obvious global character.
Unfortunately, the strength of this conclusion made moot the assertion that 
patterns of legitimation would be tied to patterns of incumbency. In a sense, the 
general lack o f publicity left incumbents non-legitimated one way or the other. The 
bulk of the remaining discussion addresses the pattern of legitimacy among mostly non­
incumbents.
Performance Advantages. Proposition 2 asserted that the short-term 
performance advantages of competence-enhancing innovations would be reported in the 
public media more frequently than the long-term performance advantages of
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competence-destroying innovations. Frequency analysis of H la found that reports of 
the respective performance advantages of MD 0 and MD>0 innovations occurred at 
almost identical rates. Revised frequency analysis suggested that indeed, MD 0 
innovations would perform better in the short-term, and that MD>0 innovations would 
performance better in the long-term. The technical literature indicated that 
commercially available Nickel-Cadmium Batteries were actually performing better than 
commercially-available Lead-Acid Batteries, but no other electrochemical devices were 
commercially available. On the other hand, it clearly indicated that all MD>0 
innovations had the potential to deliver superior performance in the long-term. EVS-12 
proceedings generally suggested, amid controversy, that Lead-Acid Batteries were the 
superior short-term performance choice, though it was not clear whether this preference 
was driven by technical or tactical concerns.
So in terms o f the MD 0/MD>0 dichotomy, the respective performance 
advantage of neither broad classification of innovation was legitimated more frequently 
than the other. The public media made it opportune for the general public to be about 
as aware that Lead-Acid Batteries were the superior performance choice in the short­
term, as it made it opportune for the general public to be aware that other technologies 
with superior performance potentials would appear on the market in the long-term. (To 
streamline subsequent discussions, media-induced opportunity for public awareness and 
actual public awareness will be assumed to be the same thing). This pattern of 
awareness was generally in agreement with what seemed to be technically true.
Important exceptions were that superior Nickel-Cadmium Batteries were commercially 
available, and that superior Nickel-Metal Hydride and Zinc-Air Batteries were just 
"hitting the market". Most other innovations, despite their potentials, should not have 
been and apparently were not legitimated prematurely. In dichotomous terms, the 
general public was aware of technical "reality".
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Frequency analysis of H2b found that reports of the future performance 
advantages of the various Phenomenological Types o f competence-destroying 
innovations occurred at veiy different rates. In absolute terms, Hot Batteries fared the 
best (THENBETR=75), followed by Other ReDox Batteries (58), Zinc-Air Batteries 
(7), and Common Fuel Cells (4). Proportionately (THENBETR-1 per THENBETR=0), 
Hot Batteries still fared the best (49%), followed by Zinc-Air Batteries (35%), Other 
ReDox Batteries (24%), and Common Fuel Cells (24%). Revised frequency analysis 
indicated in relative terms when the inherent phenomenological potentials o f the 
various PTs would materialize commercially (NOWBETR or THENBETR). Basically, 
Other ReDox, Hot, and Zinc-Air Batteries were all praised for their inherent potentials 
in significant numbers. More specifically, the expected commercialization of Hot 
Batteries was skewed towards the long-term, expected commercialization of Zinc-Air 
Batteries was skewed towards the short-term, and expected commercialization of Other 
ReDox Batteries was about evenly divided. The technical literature showed that 
theoretical specific energy rose numerically as PT rose alphabetically, that Lithium 
Batteries were farthest away from commercialization, that only Lead-Acid and Nickel- 
Cadmium were commercially available at the time, and that most other contenders 
were in the prototype stage. EVS-12 proceedings generally supported this picture, 
except that there were reports of then-commercially-available and superior Nickel- 
Metal Hydride and Zinc-Air Batteries, not just Nickel-Cadmium. Almost all 
descriptions of fuel cells exhibited a preoccupation with solving technical obstacles 
other than directly improving practical specific energy.
So looking only at the future performance advantage of competence-destroying 
innovations, frequencies suggested that the future o f Hot Batteries was the most 
legitimate, followed strongly by Other ReDox Batteries, and followed weakly by Zinc- 
Air Batteries and Common Fuel Cells. The general public was barely aware of
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developments in the other PTs. Again, public awareness seemed to generally be in 
agreement with the technical truth, although the availability of superior Other ReDox 
Batteries was much more imminent than the availability o f superior Hot Batteries. The 
availability o f superior Zinc-Air and Nickel-Metal Hydride Batteries was not popularly 
known, but these developments were relatively late-breaking. Again, it seemed that 
technical accuracy and legitimacy were in general agreement, the few exceptions being 
at least partly attributable to the reasonable time lag that should be expected between 
first delivery to a customer and general public awareness.
Performance Disadvantages. Proposition 3 asserted that the long-term 
performance disadvantages of competence-enhancing innovations would be reported in 
the public media less frequently than the short-term performance disadvantages of 
competence-destroying innovations. Frequency analysis o f H3a found no statistical 
significance in the rate at which MD 0 innovations were reported as being inferior in 
the long-term, and the rate at which MD>0 innovations were reported as being inferior 
in the short-term. Revised frequency analysis suggested that indeed, MD 0 innovations 
were very likely to actually be inferior in the long-term, and that MD>0 innovations 
were generally inferior performance choices in the short-term. Technical literature 
indicated that commercially available Lead-Acid Batteries were not actually performing 
as well as commercially available Nickel-Cadmium Batteries, but that none of the other 
promising developments were commercially available yet. Conversely, the clearly 
inferior phenomenological potential o f Lead-Acid Batteries, combined with the 
commercial imminence o f several alternatives, strongly suggested that Lead-Acid 
Batteries would fare poorly in the long-term. But again, EVS-12 proceedings indicated 
that there was a combined technical and tactical controversy concerning whether MD 0 
or MD>0 innovations, as opposing groups, would be inferior in either or both the short 
and long terms.
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So in terms of the MD 0/MD>0 dichotomy, the performance disadvantage of 
neither broad classification of innovation was being legitimated (the term "de­
legitimated” will be used henceforth for greater clarity) more frequently than the other. 
General public awareness did not disfavor the dominant design for its probable long­
term performance inferiority more or less than it disfavored potential replacements for 
their short-term performance limitations. This pattern was generally consistent with the 
technical truth, with three important exceptions: the actual commercial availability of 
superior Nickel-Cadmium, Nickel-Metal Hydride, and Zinc-Air Batteries.
Frequency analysis of H3b found that reports o f the short-term performance 
inferiority of the various Phenomenological Types o f competence-destroying 
innovations occurred at very different rates. In absolute terms, Hot Batteries fared the 
worst (NOWWORSE=27), followed by Other ReDox Batteries (23) and Common Fuel 
Cells (7). Proportionately (NOWWORSE=l per NOWWORSE=0), Common Fuel 
Cells fared the worst (44%), followed by Hot Batteries (13%), and Other ReDox 
Batteries (8%). Revised frequency analysis suggested in very rough terms how long the 
various PTs would remain inferior, if  they were inferior (NOWWORSE -v.- 
THENWORS). The test was statistically uninterpretable, but a face-value 
interpretation suggested that Other ReDox Batteries would not remain inferior as long 
as Hot Batteries would remain inferior. The technical literature added important detail 
to this picture by suggesting that though Hot Batteries inherently had the potential to 
not remain inferior for a longer period of time than Other ReDox Batteries, the latter 
were generally in more advanced stages o f development; hence commercial inferiority 
o f Other ReDox Batteries would probably end sooner. Again, Nickel-Cadmium 
Batteries already were no longer inferior. EVS-12 proceedings verified this point, and 
also evidenced the commercial availability of Nickel-Metal Hydride and Zinc-Air 
Batteries that were not inferior to Lead-Acid Batteries.
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So looking only at the de-legitimation of the short-term performance 
disadvantage of competence-destroying innovations, the general public was aware that 
Hot Batteries and Common Fuel Cells would not compete well with Lead-Acid 
Batteries in the short-term, and was slightly less aware that Other ReDox Batteries 
would not compete well with Lead-Acid Batteries in the short-term. Aside from the 
above-noted exceptions, revised frequency analysis, technical literature, and EVS-12 
proceedings all suggested that public awareness was generally in accordance with the 
technical truth, when stages o f development were considered along with 
phenomenological potentials.
Performance Summary and Interpretation. In sum, though it was laborious and 
sometimes redundant, it proved fruitful to explicate reports of performance 
disadvantages as well as performance advantages. Doing so surfaced symmetries and 
asymmetries that would not have been apparent, and one-sided interpretations could 
otherwise have been a result. In absolute terms, it was much more common to observe 
a performance legitimation variable (NOWBETR or THENBETR) than it was to 
observe a de-legitimation variable (NOWWORSE or THENWORS). This asymmetiy 
was intuitively appealing because performance superiority would seem to be the more 
direct and newsworthy claim. Yet comparing the results o f testing H2a with H3a, there 
was a great deal of symmetry between the interpretations. The general public was very 
much aware of the relative performance advantages and disadvantages o f competence- 
enhancing and competence-destroying innovations (as a dichotomy). This awareness 
was an accurate reflection of the technical truth, and neither competence-enhancing nor 
competence-destroying innovators were enjoying or suffering from generally inaccurate 
media representation.
Looking more closely at competence-destroying innovations (H2b and H3b), 
symmetry was again evident. Hot Batteries got the most publicity, but this was true of
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reports of relative advantages and disadvantages. Other ReDox Batteries got the 
second-most publicity, again in reports of advantages and disadvantages. One 
reasonable explanation was that as a Phenomenological Type, Hot Batteries had a 
higher phenomenological potential than Other ReDox Batteries, which made them 
more exciting and newsworthy in that sense; but they were also somewhat farther away 
from commercialization, an equally newsworthy counterpoint.
A simpler explanation, of course, was that there were a few more Hot Batteries 
than Other ReDox Batteries under development, so there was more to report -  an 
observation that certainly explained much of the reason that other PTs were not 
reported in significant numbers. Only a few firms were pursuing SBLA Batteries 
(PTC), Zinc-Air Batteries (PTE), and Aluminum-Air Batteries (PTG).
It was not difficult to speculate as to why Zinc-Air, such an obviously superior 
candidate for EV propulsion, received so little notoriety. As implied, only a few 
organizations were involved in their development, so only so much publicity should 
reasonably be expected. But also, it is interesting to speculate that in the race for 
performance supremacy, it might have been much more natural and easy for 
technologists, journalists, etc., to compare and contrast technologies that were 
competing for leadership within the same paradigmatic vision, to the detriment of 
fringe technologies that would define different visions.
To explain, most batteries being developed for EVs ascribed to the vision that 
EVs would be fundamentally different than gasoline-engine automobiles -  but all in the 
same way. When powered by most examples of batteries, EVs would have the 
operating and maintenance characteristics o f big electronic appliances, not cars. They 
would require home recharging, for example, so range would be limited not only 
because of the state of the art of electrochemistry, but because of the absence of a 
private or public infrastructure o f away-from-home "refueling" opportunities.
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Until the emergence of a dominant design, technological choices within this 
vision would be mutually exclusive. Here, a portion of the neophyte EV industry was 
struggling to survive by retrofitting existing vehicle platforms with the best available 
electrochemical devices, but virtually all visionaries agreed that for the industry to ever 
really have a chance at achieving significant market volumes, "clean-sheet" vehicle 
designs (designs that started from scratch, without reliance on off-the-shelf 
componentry) were a collective must. However, clean-sheet electric vehicles were, and 
were expected to continue to be, very sophisticated, tightly integrated and in the short­
term, unique systems. Such high levels of systems engineering meant that for the most 
part, battery interchangability was as least as far off as the establishment of a dominant 
design. Such was the general gravity of the issue concerning electrochemical devices. 
Whole vehicles were designed around each individual choice, and the competition 
among electrochemical devices was quite possibly also the competition for which 
vehicle design would eventually dominate the revised automotive paradigm.
But Zinc-Air and Aluminum-Air Batteries, despite being more morphologically 
distant from, and in that sense more exotic than, rechargeable batteries, would help 
create an EV paradigm that would not be very much different from the present 
automotive paradigm. Because PTE and PTG batteries would require replacement of 
reactant materials, not recharging, and because it was technologically easy to design 
such devices with rapid change-out features, PTE and PTG technology was amenable to 
the fairly rapid establishment o f a "filling station" infrastructure, rather than a "plug-in" 
infrastructure that necessarily would be an elaborate extension of prevailing power 
grids. The most technologically discontinuous battery innovations, in other words, 
ironically would be least disruptive to the general psychology of how cars "are 
supposed to work" in terms o f supporting existing lifestyles. The technologies which
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supported this paradigm were two of the least legitimated, despite the apparent 
technological superiority of one.
The relative lack of publicity concerning fuel cells was also noticeable. The 
construction and architecture of Common and Hot Fuel Cells inherently enabled ranges 
that were superior to all types o f batteries, and EVS-12 proceedings reported one type 
of Non-Regenerative Fuel Cell that had a very high specific energy. Also, like Zinc-Air 
and Aluminum-Air Batteries, fuel cell-powered electric vehicles would operate much 
like ordinary gasoline automobiles. An infrastructure of filling stations -- of some sort 
of hydrogen-based liquid or gaseous fuel, most likely — would need to be created, but 
enslavement to an electric power grid would not be necessary. However, in addition to 
the above speculations about why Zinc-Air and Aluminum-Air Batteries lacked 
publicity, the general rarity of reports o f Fuel Cell performance (advantages and/or 
disadvantages) was also explained by the presence of other important, imposing and to 
some, intractable technical obstacles. But all electrochemical devices faced some 
technical obstacles other than simply increasing practical specific energy, and the fact 
remains that the general public was relatively unaware of the performance 
characteristics of fuel cells.
In sum, the cognitive legitimacy of the relative performance advantages and 
disadvantages was relatively high and symmetrical for Lead-Acid, Other ReDox, and 
Hot Batteries. The cognitive legitimacy of SBLA and Aluminum-Air Batteries, and 
Non-Regenerative and Hot Fuel Cells, was always too low to be statistically 
interpretable. The cognitive legitimacy of Zinc-Air and Common Fuel Cells was 
statistically marginal, and interpretations were idiosyncratic. Overall, the pattern of 
cognitive legitimacy was very similar to the apparent pattern of actual industry activity. 
If there was a media war, a set o f campaigns designed to inaccurately represent the 
performance advantages and disadvantages of various electrochemical innovations
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being developed for electric vehicles, they were mostly ineffectual. The general 
absence of incumbents, of course, rendered this conclusion unsurprising.
Price Advantages Proposition 4 asserted that the short-term price advantages of 
competence-enhancing innovations would be presented in the public media more 
frequently than the long-term price advantages of competence-destroying innovations. 
Frequency analysis of H4a found that reports of the relative price advantages of MD 0 
and MD>0 innovations occurred at very different rates. There was much more praise 
that Lead-Acid Batteries were inexpensive, than there was praise that alternatives 
would become as inexpensive as Lead-Acid Batteries. Revised frequency analysis 
suggested that indeed, Lead-Acid batteries were the least inexpensive, but that 
alternatives would become cost/price-competitive in the future. The technical data 
characterized the inherent costs of Lead-Acid, Zinc Bromine and Zinc-Air Batteries as 
"low/moderate"' but of these, only Lead-Acid Batteries were readily available 
commercially. EVS-12 proceedings indicated that Zinc-Air Batteries were just 
becoming commercially available, but not yet at a competitive cost/price. Sundry other 
observations supported Lead-Acid's short-term price superiority. Most comments about 
the future cost/price characteristics of its alternatives were in the form of allusions to 
firm-specific cost management skills, the inevitability of scale economies, and cost- 
effectiveness (good value despite high price). Lead-Acid Batteries were unquestionably 
the cost/price benchmark.
So in terms of the MD 0/MD>0 dichotomy, the short-term cost/price advantage 
of Lead-Acid Batteries was much more legitimate than the long-term cost/price 
advantage of its alternatives. This pattern of awareness was in general agreement with 
what seemed to be technically true. As theory predicted, Lead-Acid Batteries were by 
far the superior short-term choice in terms of cost/price, and the general public was 
aware of this. The general public was not nearly as aware (as industry players were
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confident) that alternatives to Lead-Acid Batteries would become cost/price 
competitive in the future. Theory agreed with the industry insiders, but at such an early 
stage of industry development confidence was based on entrepreneurial optimism and 
faith that technological history would once again repeat itself.
The general level of publicity concerning the price advantage of competence- 
destroying innovations was low (see above discussion), and frequency analysis of H4b 
found that reports o f the long-term price advantage of the various Phenomenological 
Types of competence-destroying innovations occurred at very similar rates, on a 
statistical basis. In absolute terms, Other ReDox Batteries fared the best 
(THENCHEP=17), followed by Hot Batteries (15), and more distantly by Zinc-Air 
Batteries (5) and Common Fuel Cells (4). Proportionately, however (THENCHEP=1 
per THENCHEP=0), results were virtually reversed; Common Fuel Cells fared the best 
(24%), followed by Zinc-Air Batteries (23%), Other ReDox Batteries (7%) and Hot 
Batteries (6%). Revised frequency analysis strongly supported that if competence- 
destroying innovations would indeed be cost/price competitive, it would be in the long­
term (NOWCHEAP -.v.- THENCHEP), but the pattern among the PTs was statistically 
uninterpretable. The technical literature and EVS-12 proceedings were consistent with 
each other in suggesting that general cost/price characteristics of various specific 
devices would be driven by factors both within and beyond the control of firm-level 
management. Categorically, only Zinc-Air Batteries (PTE) seemed to be in a truly 
advantageous position because of the low cost and ready availability o f materials, and 
because of production economies that had already been worked out in the short-term. 
SBLA Batteries (PTC) were convincingly situated as next-to-least expensive, because 
of spillover competence in the Lead-Acid ReDox and the ability to take advantage of 
existing supply and reclamation infrastructures. No other PT was categorically
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indicated as being inherently inexpensive, though Zinc-Bromine technology by itself 
was inherently inexpensive because of the low cost o f materials.
So looking only at the long-term price advantage of competence-destroying 
innovations, frequencies indicated that Other ReDox and Hot Batteries were the most 
legitimate (awareness was about evenly divided between these two PTs). Yet 
categorically, actual cost-reducing advantages of these PTs were not very convincing.
(In fact, each of these categories faced very severe cost obstacles, but disadvantages are 
the focus of H5b). Relatively speaking, for example, cost-reducing opportunities in 
SBLA (PTC) seemed unobstructed, yet the public media reported this characteristic not 
once. Categorically, cost-reducing advantages of Zinc-Air Batteries (PTE) were also 
distinct, but on the other hand this observation is idiosyncratic, as there was only one 
example (Zinc-Air) in this PT (E).
Nevertheless, in stark contrast to the consistencies which appeared in the 
evaluation o f H2b and H3b, there seemed to be an inconsistency between the pattern of 
PTs that were publicly "known" to become cost/price-competitive in the future, and the 
pattern o f PTs that technically seemed to be more inherently advantaged at achieving 
cost/price competitiveness. However, the fruitfulness o f juxtaposing the results of H2b 
and H3b suggested that interpreting the results o f H4b beyond this observation should 
be postponed until H5b could be assessed.
Price Disadvantages. Proposition 5 asserted that the long-term price 
disadvantages o f competence-enhancing innovations would be reported in the public 
media less frequently than the short-term price disadvantages of competence-destroying 
innovations. Frequency analysis of H5a found that reports of respective price 
disadvantages occurred at very different rates. There was much more criticism that 
MD>0 innovations were expensive in the short-term, than there was criticism that MD 
0 innovations would not maintain price superiority in the long-term. Revised frequency
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analysis suggested that indeed, MD>0 innovations were expensive at the time, and with 
a bit of equivocation, that MD 0 innovations would probably be about as expensive as 
its alternatives in the future. Technical data indicated that the only MD>0 innovation 
that was commercially available in the short-term (Nickel-Cadmium) was much more 
expensive than Lead-Acid Batteries.
So in terms of the MD 0/MD>0 dichotomy, competence-destroying innovations 
were much more severely de-legitimated than competence-enhancing innovations for 
their relative cost/price disadvantage. The general public was much more aware that 
MD>0 innovations were expensive, that it was aware that MD 0 innovations would not 
maintain their cost/price superiority in the long-term. In dichotomous terms, however, 
it would be an oversimplification to assess this pattern of awareness as being either in 
agreement with the technical truth, or not. There was much variation within the MD>0 
side of the dichotomy.
Frequency analysis of H5b indicated which PTs were particularly troubled by 
cost/price obstacles. In absolute terms, Other ReDox Batteries fared the worst 
(NOWEXP=41), followed by Hot Batteries (27), Common Fuel Cells (12), and Zinc-Air 
Batteries (1). Proportionately, (NOWEXP=l per NOWEXP=0), Common Fuel Cells 
were devastated (133%), followed much less severely by Other ReDox Batteries (16%), 
Hot Batteries (13%), and Zinc-Air Batteries (4%). Revised frequency analysis 
suggested the likelihood that cost obstacles might be overcome (NOWEXP -v.- 
THENEXP). Though the statistical test was uninterpretable, Common Fuel Cells and 
Zinc-Air Batteries were never reported as being expensive in the long-term, while Other 
ReDox Batteries (THENEXP=6) and Hot Batteries (THENEXP=5) were. Technical 
data did not clearly indicate categorically why there were different cost obstacles, but 
EVS-12 proceedings and other literature did. On the whole, though they were 
categorically simpler than Hot Batteries, most Other ReDox Batteries were faced with
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severe cost-of-materials obstacles, some of which only got worse with increasing scale. 
Several Hot Batteries were also faced with cost-of-materials obstacles, and they all 
were faced with the obstacle of developing sophisticated and safe thermal control 
systems. This latter obstacle, o f course, also applied categorically to Aluminum-Air 
Batteries (PTG) and Hot Fuel Cells (PTI). All fuel cells were faced with extremely 
severe cost obstacles of materials, producibility, and for practical purposes, 
miniaturization. Categorically, only SBLA and Zinc-Air batteries did not face any 
glaring short-term cost obstacles other than the obvious -- scale economies would take 
time (volume, really) to establish.
So among the Phenomenological Types o f competence-destroying innovations, 
the general public was more aware of the cost/price obstacles facing the development 
of Other ReDox Batteries and Hot Batteries than it was aware of the cost/price 
obstacles facing the development of other PTs. Specific reasons varied. On a 
proportional basis, the general public was much, much more aware of the short-term 
cost/price problems concerning Common Fuel Cells as it was aware o f similar problems 
concerning anything else.
Price Summary and Interpretation. It again proved fruitful to explicate reports 
of price disadvantages as well as price advantages. In absolute terms, it was much 
more common to observe a cost/price de-legitimation variable (NOWEXP or 
THENEXP) than it was to observe a cost/price legitimation variable (NOWCHEAP or 
THENCHEP). This asymmetry was not intuitively appealing as much as it made simple 
technical sense. After all, Lead-Acid technology had been developing decades -- 
sometimes a century — longer than most other technologies, and its cost/price 
characteristics were about as low as could ever be expected for any technology. The 
race, realistically, was to get as close to Lead-Acid's cost/price as possible; becoming 
cheaper in absolute terms was never considered to be a realistic goal.
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Comparing the results o f testing H4a and H5a, the asymmetry was striking. The 
general public was much more aware of all short-term cost/price realities than it was 
aware of long-term probabilities and/or possibilities. The general public was very 
aware that Lead-Acid Batteries were the least expensive alternative to powering electric 
vehicles, and also was very aware that collectively, alternatives were very much more 
expensive. Relatively speaking, the public was unaware that alternatives would 
probably become reasonably priced in the long-term. As assessed by the pattern of 
media reports, the general public was not aware of what theory, other technology 
histories, and industry insiders predicted would happen concerning the cost/price 
characteristics of alternatives to the present dominant design.
Comparing the results o f testing H4b and H5b, the picture became more 
complex and intriguing. First, results were generally symmetrical. The general public 
was aware the Other ReDox and Hot Batteries were expensive and that they would 
become cost/price competitive in the future compared to most other PTs. Reports of 
the cost/price characteristics of Common Fuel Cells were very asymmetrically 
disfavorable, focusing on their short-term cost/price exorbitance. All other PTs got 
very little publicity one way or the other. On the surface this seemed placid. But 
considering technical data and symposium information, the symmetries became 
disconcerting. PTs that were inherently economical received very little publicity. The 
PTs that garnered the most publicity were characterized by severe cost/price obstacles: 
here, awareness of short-term disadvantages seemed to be driven by the ability to easily 
observe actual problems, while awareness o f long-term advantages seemed to be driven 
by the willingness to hear experienced optimism. Again, the overall cognitive 
legitimacy of Other ReDox and Hot Batteries, and even Common Fuel Cells, is easy to 
accept because there were many more examples of devices within these PTs than
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others. Several other PTs contained only one definitive example, so publicity in those 
PTs should be expected to be proportionately less.
In sum, the cognitive legitimacy of relative price advantages and disadvantages 
was not generally as high as the cognitive legitimacy of relative performance 
advantages and disadvantages. That is, judging by the absolute frequencies of all eight 
measures of legitimacy, performance was "argued" more often in the media in general. 
This supports theory, which asserted that though the substitution of one technology for 
another is a function of comparable price/performance ratios, superior performance is 
the more influential variable (Foster, 1986). It makes sense that since technological 
leadership primarily means performance leadership, a struggle for legitimacy would 
tend to that dimension more often. Focusing only on price advantages and 
disadvantages, however, cognitive legitimacy was skewed towards short-term concerns, 
which heavily favored the dominant design. Lead-Acid, Other ReDox, and Hot 
Batteries altogether garnered most of the publicity (pro and con), though the two latter 
PTs accounted for a clear plurality of all distinct and feasible competence-destroying 
innovations.
However, this is no small point; observing the population of each PT is not 
merely to, in a sense, roughly control for different sample sizes in each PT. In an 
earlier discussion, it was pointed out that some subtle phenomenological differences 
carried very, very dramatic paradigmatic implications. SBLA, Other ReDox, and Hot 
Batteries, as well as Regenerative Fuel Cells, were all part of a similar automotive 
paradigm from a total lifestyle point of view. They all were basically rechargeable 
batteries that needed to be plugged in and recharged to be "refueled". Thus they were 
tied to power grids and in effect would transform the automobile industry, or at least 
create the EV industry, into being an extension of the electric utility industry. Zinc-Air 
and Aluminum-Air Batteries, as well as Common and Hot Fuel Cells, were
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paradigmatically different. They all needed replacement of depletable fuels, and 
though electric, only needed access to an infrastructure o f "filling stations". Replacing 
Zinc or Aluminum cassettes in batteries in effect would make this sub-paradigm a 
direct extension of mineral extraction industries, and refiieling a fuel-cell-driven 
vehicle with a hydrogen-based liquid or gaseous fuel would also be a sub-paradigm 
directly tied to natural resources extraction.
The point is that if  any industry was "winning" the technological and 
institutional struggle for the initial configuration of the upcoming (but not inevitable) 
electric vehicle paradigm, it was the electric utility industry. Rechargeable Lead-Acid 
Batteries were the strongest candidate in the short-term, and were also one o f the 
strongest candidates for a possible period of transition. Rechargeable Other ReDox and 
Hot Batteries, en masse, captured the majority o f attention where competence- 
destroying innovations were concerned -  they might destroy the competences of Lead- 
Acid Battery manufacturers and possibly Big Auto in the process, but PTA, PTB, and 
PTD would collectively only enhance the revenues of the electric utility industry. The 
amount of publicity -  pro and con -  generated by industrial activities in pursuit of 
these three Phenomenological Types of innovations were making highly legitimate the 
basic idea that electric vehicles would be "battery-powered vehicles very similar in 
operation to portable razors, laptop computers, camcorders, and the like. Details 
presented in this study were by no means exhaustive, and the amount of publicity on the 
matter made obvious that the whole issue was enormously complex. But if cognitive 
legitimacy was truly an indication of a strong head start, it was not certain that elements 
of the emerging paradigm represented the most superior technological trajectory from 
either a performance or cost/price point o f view.
Since this part of the discussion is concluding, it is appropriate to add 
perspective to the very strict focus maintained in this study. Again, the technological
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problem was very strictly defined, as being the challenge of improving the specific 
energy of an electrochemical device for all-electric vehicles, and the specific functional 
problem was defined as improving the range of all-electric vehicles. One of the reasons 
that this focus was chosen, aside from its amenability to a relatively simple and 
understandable morphological analysis, was that the goings-on at higher levels of 
analysis were technologically and institutionally obvious.
Where technologies were concerned, it was necessary to exclude hybrid electric 
vehicles from consideration because, despite their capacity to vastly improve (decrease) 
automobile emissions, they could never completely eliminate them. As the name 
implies, hybrid EVs are vehicles with combined internal combustion and 
electrical/electrochemical features, and any internal combustion of any oil-based fuel 
whatsoever is incapable of being completely non-polluting. This is not to say that 
hybrid vehicles are bad ideas -  but they are technically non-compliant with the 
California legislation used as the basis for defining the present experimental context.
On the other hand, flywheel, ultracapacitor, and solar/photovoltaic technologies 
were compliant with the California legislation, but were not considered in this study 
because their morphological distinctions were one-and-the-same with their places in 
resolving the range problem. First, ultracapacitors provide short surges of great 
amounts of power, which affect range only indirectly because they ameliorate the trade­
off between acceleration and range. Second, no reasonable technologist expected solar 
and photovoltaic technologies to be directly competitive with batteries and fuel cells as 
central technologies in the overall solution to EV range at any time in the foreseeable 
future, though they also held potential as range extenders.
But flywheels, or mechanical batteries, had very, very much more 
phenomenological potential than any electrochemical device, but likewise faced 
technological obstacles that also made them very, very much more expensive than
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electrochemical choices. A flywheel can be thought o f as the spinning component of a 
gyroscope. There is an enormous amount of kinetic energy that can be stored in such a 
component, that can be reconverted into electricity in an electric vehicle. In terms 
developed for this study, flywheels were potentially adequate solutions to the EV range 
problem -- but their dependence on kinetic rather than electrochemical phenomena 
placed them on an entirely different morphological map, the implications of which 
were explained during the theoretical development o f this dissertation. In short, 
choices among electrochemically-based options defined discontinuities on one map, or 
at one level of analysis, while making a leap from electrochemical to kinetic 
phenomena would be to make a discontinuity so large that it would jump from one 
map, or level of analysis, to another. The technological difference between these two 
maps was so distinct that performance and cost characteristics were incontrovertible.
Where institutions were concerned, the point is much the same. This study 
chose a focus that was below a level o f analysis where the contrasts were patently 
obvious, and not worth verifying through laborious and time-consuming research. As 
implied above, the major automobile manufacturers naturally were ambivalent about 
the advent of electric vehicles, and the petrochemical industry naturally was adamantly 
opposed, and these general patterns o f advocacy were obvious in the public media. As 
well, electric vehicles naturally were favored in principle by environmentalists, 
suppliers of electronic and electrical equipment, and suppliers of electric power. In fact 
the electric utility industry probably had the most to gain, because by virtue of high 
daytime demands for electric power, the industry had enormous excess nighttime 
capacity — exactly the time frame when (hopefully millions and millions of) EV 
batteries would need hours and hours of recharging. So in the media the "pro" EV 
constituencies were just as obviously promoting the whole movement as the "anti" EV 
constituencies were attacking it.
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Jobs were an important issue as well. Paradigmatic change from the internal 
combustion paradigm to any electric paradigm would certainly trigger some job 
migration, and antagonists were clearly defined both geographically (e.g., Michigan v. 
California) and institutionally (e.g., the United Auto Workers v. thousands of displaced 
defense industry engineers).
In other words, the results of this study were doubtlessly associated with the 
non-obvious, relatively low level of analysis chosen and maintained. The advent of the 
EV was assumed, in terms defined by California law, and fortunately, this scenario did 
not change during the period of time under study. For practical purposes, the contest 
mandated by law was for the best electrochemical device. On a grander scale, the 
outcome of the drama was not certain, but the stakes were plain, and the battle was not 
a subtle one.
Summary
Gaining an understanding of actual industry activity en route to interpreting 
patterns of legitimacy was a prudent decision. Otherwise, interpretations of the very 
elegant overall pattern o f public media reports would have been unfounded and very 
possibly incorrect.
The U.S.- based storage battery industry was not the main impetus behind 
developing electrochemical devices for electric vehicles. In fact, the U.S.-based storage 
battery industry was not even the impetus behind developing storage batteries for 
electric vehicles. Rather, the impetus was dispersed both geographically and 
industrially. Innovative activity was being driven by activities dispersed among a 
complex web of firms, coalitions, industries, individual entrepreneurs, and private and 
public institutions advocating a wide variety o f concerns. Strictly at the level of 
analysis maintained in this study, and strictly from the technological point of view, the
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new EV power source industry ~  wherever were its boundaries — seemed to be 
relatively fresh and unburdened from the impediments o f powerful "incumbents".
Nevertheless, there were distinct patterns of activity in the cognitive 
legitimation, or legitimacy, of various technological choices. From the broadest 
perspective, performance was the issue argued more often. Here, technology s-curves 
could be estimated that suggested that technologies were evolving very much in 
agreement with theory. The only real surprise was that a few competence-destroying 
innovations were encroaching upon the dominant design much sooner than expected. 
Then, as measured in ways specifically developed for this study, it was found that the 
general public held a balanced and accurate understanding of both the actual short-term 
and relatively certain, long-term performance trends. Naturally there were a few 
exceptions such as the occasional under-appreciation o f relatively unusual innovations 
germinating in other countries, and there was some qualitative evidence of a time lag 
between an event like product commercialization and broad-based public awareness of 
its availability. But on the whole the general public accurately understood actual 
industry activity which was progressing very much like theory would predict. It is 
oversimplified but correct to say that in terms of performance, the pattern of cognitive 
legitimacy agreed with the pattern o f technologically legitimate pursuits.
In very distinct contrast, the general public was acutely aware o f short-term 
cost/price characteristics, which very much favored the dominant design, and was 
relatively unaware that the future cost/price characteristics of competence-destroying 
innovations looked promising to many insiders. Competence-destroying innovations 
faced an important public image problem because of short-term costs and prices; yet 
many industry players were just as confident that long-term cost/price obstacles would 
be conquered, as they were confident that long-term performance potentials would be 
achieved. Apparently, in terms o f cost and price, the dominant design was more
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legitimate because short-term problems faced by makers of its alternatives were severe 
enough to cloud expectations o f their futures.
CHAPTER 7: IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION
In 1990 the California legislature fired a starting gun which challenged all 
comers to develop marketable, non-polluting automobiles by 1998. From early 1993 to 
early 1995, political resolve had not changed and innovators had made much progress 
towards developing devices that would power all-electric vehicles; most were 
electrochemical. For the most part, the U.S.-based storage battery industry was not 
participating in this race in newsworthy ways, but at least 100 firms from other 
industries and nations were dedicating serious amounts of resources towards getting 
into the new industry early. Within that group of innovating firms, most of the 
competition was aimed at developing storage batteries that were capable of producing 
greater specific energy (hence vehicle range) than that which was then available from 
state-of-the-art Lead-Acid Batteries. Some firms were seeking to merely improve Lead- 
Acid Batteries, while others were developing storage batteries with electrochemical 
couples made of materials other than lead, and some of these required sophisticated 
thermal management systems just to keep key materials molten. Each had fairly clear 
short-term performance characteristics and long-term performance potentials.
Generally speaking, performance and commercial availability were inversely related.
However, other types o f innovations were under development as well. One 
unconventional type of battery departed from the normal characteristics of storage 
batteries in that it required the periodic replacement o f depleted reactant materials, as 
opposed to recharging. This Zinc-Air battery showed better short-term performance 
and promised better long-term performance than any other battery under development. 
Different types of fuel cells were also under development: all but one type also required 
refueling rather than recharging, and by storing fuel outside the device itself, had 
inherently greater vehicle range potentials than most conventional storage batteries.
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A coarse but structured analysts o f the way the public media represented these 
industrial developments indicated that the general public was much more aware of the 
pros and cons of developments in the competition among conventional storage 
batteries, than it was aware of the pros and cons in the wider competition which also 
involving less conventional innovations. If total public awareness was a simple kind of 
legitimacy that could be ascribed to innovations, and if the more legitimate innovations 
were more likely than the less legitimate innovations to eventually replace the dominant 
design, then the emerging EV automotive paradigm was one that was probably going to 
be powered by rechargeable storage batteries. Though other, more discontinuous or 
competence-destroying innovations showed greater performance potentials, with (from 
one point of view) no greater eventual disruption of lifestyles and industries,
"legitimate" EVs were the kind that consumers would have to plug in periodically like 
familiar, rechargeable electric accessories.
Performance was generally the main concern, but the price of all 
electrochemical devices was sure to be very high in the short-term, especially for fuel 
cells. EVs based on Lead-Acid technology would be expensive too, but about a 
century-long head start positioned them as being the least expensive in the short term. 
Many industry players were confident that just as the performance of EVs would 
continuously improve, prices would also fall, to points where non-Lead-Acid 
alternatives would be price-competitive in the long-term. However, the general public 
did not share this confidence in the same way that it shared confidence in performance 
improvement. Storage batteries were the "legitimate" performance choice and within 
that realm of technologies, Lead-Acid was clearly the "legitimate" choice based on 
price.
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This chapter explores the theoretical, practical, and research implications of 
these findings, organized in the same manner as was the literature review. Conclusions 
are then presented.
Strategic Management
It was argued in earlier chapters that adopting the underdeveloped but 
accommodating Resource/Competence-based view of strategy was an appropriate way 
to focus on technology and technological change in Strategic Management research.
The implications of this study support this argument, but identify limitations as well.
When wrestling with the ambiguities and imperfections of operationalizing 
industry incumbency, it was argued that when the enhancement and/or destruction of 
competences is at issue, then the most meaningful dimension of incumbency is deep 
expertise in the technologies that are at the heart of the matter. In this study, for 
example, the core technology (and thus core competence) was expertise in the 
reduction-oxidation phenomenon; Lead-Acid was the particular ReDox of the dominant 
design, and success principally hinged on firms' abilities to extract practical specific 
energy from the phenomenological potentials contained in various ReDox pairs, or 
electrochemical couples.
But theoretically, a core technology or core competence has the potential to be 
competitively advantageous to the extent that it is difficult for outsiders to understand, 
imitate, or at least observe (Godfrey & Hill, 1995). To an academic researcher this is a 
severe metaphysical conundrum, because researchers are outsiders, too. Specifically, in 
order for research to yield conclusive results, positivism demands empirical 
observation. Strict adherence to a positivistic research paradigm implies that 
researchers interested in studying core competences are attempting to observe and 
measure firm-level expertise that is deeply embedded, tacit, and at least at some point, 
unobservable. Thus this study did not attempt to operationalize industry incumbency
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beyond identification of products which represented specific combinations of 
competences (stage of development notwithstanding). In other words, in the 
technology-is-competence view, products do not contain technologies as much as they 
provide evidence of them.
If technology is competence (Betz, 1993), and if knowledge is a main 
component of competence, then by implication technological change involves learning 
(Clarke & Wheelright, 1993; Cooke & Morgan, 1994), and discontinuous technological 
change involves either re-leaming or new learning (Cohen & Levinthal, 1995; Hamel, 
Doz & Prahalad, 1995), Learning can be serendipitous, o f course, and the variation- 
selection-retention (ecological) model o f evolutionary technological change has even 
been proposed as being fundamental to an intra-organizational strategy o f innovation 
and environmental adaptation (Burgelman, 1983). But in the present scenario learning 
was mostly a matter o f choice. The future technological environment was basically 
mandated by law, and serendipity would surely be an unreliable firm-level strategy 
aimed at capitalizing on the California mandates. Clear (or at least resolute) 
technological goals and deadlines restricted and/or distorted underlying ecological 
mechanisms so severely that attempting interpretations strictly in these terms would be 
to dismiss the obvious.
In this scenario, the more distinct mechanism at work was choice. The findings 
of this study clearly implied that some technological trajectories are consciously 
intended trajectories of learning, and some very non-accidental, non-probabilistic 
technological trajectories can be crafted to knowingly and willingly cause the de­
maturation, rejuvenation, or complete destruction of entire industries (Abernathy & 
Clarke, 1988). Furthermore, non-market forces for technological change are likely to 
become more common in the future (Porter, 1990; Carlsson, 1994; Marceau, 1994;
Skea, 1994; Tushman & Rosenkopf, 1995). Technological "progress" has become a
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major social issue, and has become a key component of national economic agendas. 
This means that some emerging industries are, and will continue to be, very much 
enacted.
Choosing to not learn, then, is to risk obsolescence (Foster, 1986). In this study, 
for example, 37 of the 45 firms identified as incumbents -- based strictly on the fact that 
publicly available business information identified them as being manufacturers of 
storage batteries -  were never reported in a very large sample size of public media 
items as pursuing innovations intended for the EV market. Theory says (Tushman & 
Anderson, 1986; Utterback, 1994) that these 37 firms (or at least the subset which 
concentrated on manufacturing Lead-Acid batteries) were all risking obsolescence to 
the extent that electric vehicles would someday replace internal combustion engine 
automobiles, either in niches or eventually on a grand scale.
On the other hand, it would be premature to imply that strategists in these 37 
firms were necessarily being foolish in their risk-aversion. In the first place, the U.S. 
"market" for electric vehicles had been mandated by political decree, which is probably 
one o f the more tenuous business realities. This particular decree created a stable and 
excellent experimental setting, but it really mandated supply, not demand. Political 
will, or at least political power, was not certain to remain stable in the long-term, and 
neither was the requirement to produce EVs. Second, if the major automobile 
manufacturers failed to develop road-worthy electric vehicles, they faced massive fines 
or expulsion from doing business in California, not the battery manufacturers. Thus the 
demand for advanced electrochemical devices was actually coming from the 
automobile manufacturers, not automobile purchasers per se -- at least not yet, and not 
for a long time. The real market for EV power sources was very much being 
circumscribed by the strategic goals of the automobile manufacturers, whose 
sentiments and agendas were mixed to say the least (Cronk, 1995). Third, there seemed
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to be a reasonable amount of time (even in strategic terms) to monitor the EV industry 
and join it later as close followers. On this point, it is important to recall the irony that 
the instigators of technological discontinuities have been found to rarely be the 
proprietors of the eventual (legal or de facto) dominant design (Anderson & Tushman, 
1990; Utterback, 1994). Fourth, the market for automotive Lead-Acid batteries would 
shrink only as fast as the EV industry developed, giving incumbents time to re-orient 
themselves (to re-leam and re-enact their environments) towards other more certain and 
exciting markets -- true markets -  for stored, portable electric power. Even then, if the 
EV industry did succeed, and especially if it succeeded only in niches, it is conceivable 
that the market for even the prevailing dominant design might continue to grow, as 
global economic integration progresses, trade barriers continue to fall, and the demand 
for simple, reliable and low-price (automotive and other) products grows in developing 
nations (Porter, 1990).
Despite the main implications of Technology Cycles frameworks, then, SIC 
3691 firms who were avoiding the EV market should not automatically be impugned 
for their risk-aversion, because their competences were related to basic user 
functionalities that varied in detail but were consistently promising. The silent 37 SIC 
3691 players might in retrospect be understood as having been strategically wise, 
technologically competent, and politically shrewd. In the long run, the results of this 
experiment might suggest that Technology Cycles frameworks be extended to consider 
unstable political agendas (Tushman & Levinthal, 1995), munificent market 
opportunities (Tushman & Anderson, 1986), and globalizing environments (Whiston, 
1994).
But indeed, over 100 firms from a wide variety of industries and nations were 
determined, to various extents, to refute the "you can't mandate technological 
breakthroughs" naysayers, and long-term results of the experiment were not at all
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certain. Either way, the relative (political) artificiality of the "market" did help make 
this scenario an almost pure example of "technology push" -- the creation, based on 
scientific knowledge and engineering acumen, of devices with substitution 
(price/performance) characteristics that hopefully would be attractive to the point 
where at least pioneer-type consumers would purchase them, en route to much grander 
schemes (Goodman & Lawless, 1994; Rothwell, 1994). At the level of the EV itself, 
the "push" needed was so comprehensive that clean-sheet automobile designs were 
thought by many to be necessary. From this focus, a clean-sheet product-type was 
driving the creation of, in effect, a clean-sheet industry. And because advanced systems 
engineering was such a critical ingredient to the overall mix of required competences, it 
was often difficult to disassociate the EV industry from the EV power source industry. 
So the EV power source industry was clean-sheet itself -- already global, full of joint 
ventures and alliances, organized into non-pre-existing coalitions, and being led by a 
diverse front of the most technologically competent players, whoever and wherever that 
might be (Marceau, 1994; Cronk, 1995).
When industry incumbency was originally operationalized, it was argued that 
firm size did not automatically confer or penalize firms' abilities to innovate (Pavitt, 
1994; Rothwell & Dodgson, 1994) -  hence all SIC 3691 firms were considered equally 
likely to be non-innovative or incrementally innovative. The results o f incumbent 
activity have been assessed at length. At this point and in the same vein, it is 
interesting to note that, also as expected, not all newcomers to the industry were small, 
young, and stereotypically entrepreneurial. Some very big concerns with some very 
deep pockets were innovating aggressively (e.g., 3M, AT&T, Delco, Fuji, Hewlett- 
Packard, Hitachi, Lockheed, Matsushita, Samsung, Sony, and Westinghouse), and 
seemed very capable of employing material rather than organizational advantages to 
their innovation efforts (Audretsch, 1995). Many small companies were o f course
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evident, and some were new start-ups and spin-offs from the extant automotive industry 
(e.g., ECD, Electrosource, and Ovonic). Morphologically speaking, one would intuit 
that some newcomers had come from afar (e.g., AT&T, British Aerospace, Johnson 
Controls, and Lockheed) while others seemed to be morphological neighbors (e.g., 
Powercell, Trojan, and Japan Storage Battery). Geographically, of course, the point is 
more obvious; newcomers came from such places as Israel (ZincAir), Russia (Sovlux), 
and many triad nations.
One "extreme" kind o f newcomer that was conspicuously absent in the public 
media, however, was the backyard or basement tinkerer. Whether or not much 
basement tinkering was actually happening was arguable. On the one hand, and as 
previously discussed, one would not suspect that unorganized activity would 
automatically (or institutionally) attract widespread attention (Herman, 1995). On the 
other hand, there were many public media items that focused specifically on backyard 
tinkering in EVs themselves. Perhaps whole electric vehicles were simply more 
newsworthy than specific electrochemical devices being designed for electric vehicles. 
The intent of this short discussion was not to renew the analysis, but to make it clear 
that no particular point of view, framework, or theory which identifies the "typical" 
frame-breaking innovator was strongly supported or rejected in this study, except one; 
non-incumbency was a nearly ubiquitous characteristic o f new industry players 
(Tushman & Anderson, 1986; Anderson & Tushman, 1990; Utterback, 1994).
In other words, the new industry (EV, EV power source, or an integration of 
them both) certainly was not emerging as the youthful image o f its industrial 
antecedent. The extant automobile industry is oligopolistic, and the major automobile 
manufacturers in a sense dictate to a vast hierarchy of suppliers in their respective 
industries (Cronk, 1995). In contrast, the EV industry(ies) already had characteristics 
similar to contemporary powerhouse industries -  electronics and computers in
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particular, as well as a touch of aerospace, specialty materials, and chemicals (Cawson, 
1994; Hobday, 1994; Sharp, 1994), The new industry seemed to be aggressively 
adopting the lessons learned by other industries, rather than poised to merely repeat the 
evolutionary pattern typical of other long chapters o f American industrial history 
(Chandler, 1962).
Perhaps a more profound observation concerning the way the industry was 
beginning its evolution, however, is that relatively small "gales" have the potential to 
cause massive "destruction" (Schumpeter, 1976). In this research setting, in fact, it was 
the least competence-destroying innovations that had the most dramatic implications 
for not only industrial change, but overall socio-economic and techno-economic change 
as well.
To illustrate, consider that if Lead-Acid Batteries could be quickly and 
inexpensively improved enough to yield a level of practical specific energy that would 
result in minimally acceptable vehicle range (but could never be improved much 
beyond that point for phenomenological reasons), this would place extreme demands on 
other, very truly synergistic EV technologies such as aerodynamics, tires, lightweight 
composites, environmental control systems, and electronics management systems, to 
progress rapidly so as to maximize their abilities to contribute to solving the basic range 
problem. (Here, "minimally acceptable" means a level o f performance acceptable to 
the mass market, an entirely arbitrary expression that was chosen only to make the 
following points distinct.) Thus a minimally acceptable Lead-Acid innovation would, 
for practical purposes, require the most extensive and systemic renewal of automobile 
technologies. As previous discussions made clear, however, this was not the only kind 
of broad change that would probably be triggered. A society full of Lead-Acid Battery- 
powered EVs, due to their inherently low phenomenological ReDox potentials, would
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require the most elaborate extension of power grids, since Lead-Acid Batteries would 
require the most frequent recharging of all options.
And there is more. Where the generation of electric power is relatively clean 
(e.g., hydroelectrical, nuclear, wind, or solar), the net pollution benefit of electric 
vehicles was fairly obvious (MacKenzie, 1994). But in places like the heavily 
populated northeastern United States, where a great deal o f electric power is still 
generated by burning coal or oil, the net pollution benefit of electric vehicles was very 
arguable. To some analysts, veiy widespread use of EVs seemed senselessly disruptive 
unless the electric utility industry was also overhauled (MacKenzie, 1994). Extensive 
replacement of internal combustion automobiles with Lead-Acid-powered EVs, then, 
would cause and/or encourage widespread disruption of lifestyles, endless temporary 
inconveniences as power grids were extended and made more elaborate, the destruction 
of the extant automotive paradigm, and the regional overhaul o f a large part of the 
electric power generation industry. Other storage batteries -  Other ReDox and Hot 
Batteries in particular -  would o f course have the same general effect, though their 
greater phenomenological potentials might allow a lower level of disruption to 
socioeconomic infrastructures, and place less pressure on other automotive 
technologies to advance.
Ironically, the more "competence-destroying" electrochemical innovations 
might have less disruptive overall effects. Devices like Zinc-Air Batteries and 
Common and Hot Fuel Cells would destroy the competences of Lead-Acid Battery 
manufacturers, and would also cause a paradigmatic change to the automobile industry. 
But because o f their high phenomenological potentials, they would not absolutely 
mandate a total re-engineering o f the entire automobile concept. Fuel cells, in fact, 
would only require extensive vehicle redesign, not such total re-engineering that re- 
invention is really the more accurate word. Also, in this simplified scenario, since
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these devices would require replacement of reactant materials/fuels, power grids would 
not need extension and elaboration, the electric power generation industry would not 
need an overhaul, and lifestyles as they relate to the "car" would not be different.
Owners would have to patronize filling stations, o f course, and in the short-term it 
might be difficult to find stations selling Zinc cassettes or whatever hydrogen-based 
fuel emerged as the best choice for fuel cells, but never would a vehicle need re­
charging, publicly or privately. Of course, these descriptions are general, while the full 
details are much more elaborate and controversial. The above points were specifically 
chosen not to take any position of advocacy, but merely to illustrate one particular set 
of possibilities that is related to theory.
The main point of making this contrast is that small discontinuities on one level 
of analysis can cause large discontinuities at higher levels of analysis, while large 
discontinuities on the same initial level of analysis can be less disruptive at the higher 
levels o f analysis. Alternatively and more conservatively, the more general assertion is 
that different low-level discontinuities can trigger different upper-level discontinuities, 
whether or not they are o f the same magnitudes.
This theoretical point is easily translated into a practical implication. It would 
be wise for a strategist o f any type to think through the multi-level ramifications of an 
argument for or against any particular technological innovation. The "let's be 
conservative and introduce little changes at a time" view of technological progress can 
be strategically unsound because markets and communities might be unwilling to make 
massive economic and psychological adjustments for small gains in performance, and 
rightly so if  less disruptive choices seem realistic, albeit farther off (Granstrand & 
Sjolander, 1994), An entire new industry can be foiled in the process, and be rather 
easily defeated on political grounds, The "let's work long and hard at the pre- 
commercial stage and then score a 'big hit'; let's not ruin the market early" view is no
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doubt justifiable in some scenarios. Policy makers ambitious for social change might 
take very great care as well.
An ancillary implication is that technological "progress" is path-dependent 
(Coombs, 1994; Freeman, 1994; Lissoni & Metcalfe, 1994; Arthur, 1995; Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1995). That is, small decisions at one point in time can have enormous 
future leverage. At least during the period of time under study, it was unclear which 
specific electrochemical couple, innovation, or even PT would win over any extended 
period of time, and the previous discussion only hinted at how complex the overall 
issues were. But obviously, once product substitution started occurring and larger-scale 
socioeconomic infrastructures started developing or changing, it would only become 
more difficult with the passage of time to engender renewed paradigmatic change.
Here, long-awaited breakthroughs in some PTs or in specific innovations -  even huge 
breakthroughs making impressive leaps in performance -  might be much too late if 
even modest, short-term innovations gained early market and social appeal and fostered 
appreciable, socially paradigmatic sunk costs. In more strategic terms, a generational 
approach to new product introduction, by either one or several firms, seemed 
problematic unless all expected generations morphologically adhered to the same, or 
very similar, grander vision (Wheelright & Clarke, 1995; Wheelright & Sasser, 1995).
On that note, this scenario also illustrates how truly important are the 
implications of establishing "share o f mind" (Prahalad & Hamel, 1994) in new, 
uncharted and unstructured competitive space. The "popularization" of Lead-Acid,
Other ReDox and Hot Batteries, collectively, was a very important observation. 
Regardless o f which PT would eventually win, or regardless of how specific ReDoxes 
might come and go in the relatively foreseeable future (Figure 6.1), all of the 
innovations defined by these PTs were part of a similar trajectory, or paradigm, being 
established in the collective mind of potential future consumers. Ironically, the more
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often the pros and cons of each specific PTA, PTB, and PTD innovation were argued, 
the more cognitively legitimate became the paradigm it symbolized, or the vision it 
conjured. Even competition on a head-to-head basis was popularizing in the minds of 
readers and listeners expectations about the operating characteristics of electric 
vehicles, what society might look like if the California mandates worked, and what it 
would cost not only in terms of the exorbitant price of vehicles, but also in terms of 
non-trivial economic externalities.
The above descriptions also allude to another important implication for theory.
If it is reasonable to assert, as this study has shown, that a carefully developed 
morphological analysis can explicate parameters in a way that identify core 
competences, the potential structure of new markets and industries, and technological 
trajectories that can redefine whole communities, then it is also reasonable to assert that 
these parameters have the potential to be technological delimitations of strategic 
groups. In the situation described above, for example, the competition among PTA, 
PTB, and PTD innovations that resulted in so much media attention might be 
interpreted as a form of tacit collusion, "contrived deterrence" (Caves & Porter, 1977) 
to the entry of technologically superior alternatives using morphological non­
complementarity as a mobility barrier. It is perhaps the case that extant understandings 
of strategic groups underestimate their technological underpinnings and 
phenomenological antecedents.
Finally, there are interesting research implications of the "technology is 
competence, but competence should be tacit to be competitive" dilemma. In prior 
discussions it was noted that Strategic Management research has always been very well- 
fed (qualitatively and quantitatively) by research in Economics, Marketing, and 
Administrative Behavior. It was also noted that these fields developed views of 
technology that missed its central role, so Strategic Management inherited a flawed
170
view of technology. At this point of the study, since it has become appreciated both in 
theory and in findings that technology is competence, but that truly competitive 
competence is tacit and unobservable, it would be especially harsh and inappropriate to 
suggest that these fields should have developed views of technology that fully grasped 
and theoretically developed its central role. The contributions that these fields have 
made to the understanding of technology have understandably been limited to observing 
not technology, but the artifacts o f technology germane to specific theories (e.g., 
number o f patents in Economics, product differentiation in Marketing, and innovative 
cultures in Administrative Behavior). The real point, however, is that if technology 
really is one o f the centrally important dimensions of Strategic Management, then the 
field should endeavor to develop a tacit understanding of technology of its own, through 
much more cross-disciplinary research, which obviously means joint research with 
Science and Engineering scholars. The other more traditional fields can not and should 
not be expected to supply the ability to understand technology at a level of 
understanding that borders on intuition. The most ironic implication of this dissertation 
is that technology has been relatively misplaced in Strategic Management research not 
because it is a secondary or peripheral issue, but because it is so elusive and difficult to 
grasp -  precisely the reason it is so strategically important to practitioners.
To summarize this section, a major implication of the results of this study is that 
the Resource/Competence-based view is indeed an appropriate framework to use when 
focusing on the central importance o f technology in Strategic Management. Despite 
many complexities, "technology is competence" facilitated a consistently fluid 
approach to, and subsequent management of, a difficult integration of considerations. 
Operationalizing any kind of competence is difficult-to-impossible because of 
observability problems, however, so proxies are almost required. In this study,
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combinations of phenomena in product innovations were successfully used to represent 
fundamental kinds of knowledge that were their fountainheads.
Second, small discontinuities in technology on one level -- which is the same as 
saying small discontinuities in the development and application of knowledge and 
learning -  can trigger large disruptions on other levels, and vice versa. (Each scenario 
is likely to be idiosyncratic and bears extensive and careful scrutiny.) By implication, 
modest discontinuities are not necessarily more likely to be accepted than more radical 
discontinuities. Technological conservatism can be a risky strategy for reasons that go 
beyond the basic implications o f s-curve and Technology Cycles frameworks. An 
associated irony is that complete risk-aversion (inactivity) in the presence of possible 
discontinuous technological change is not necessarily foolhardy, especially in the 
presence of strategic alternatives. Thinking in terms of competences and user 
functionality helps bring these alternatives into focus.
Third, there are possible conceptual links among phenomenologically-defined 
technological trajectories and paradigms, the establishment of mind share in future 
competitive space, and the early stages of strategic group formation. What seems 
certain is that early technological decisions, however modest, can have enormous 
leverage and almost intractable results.
Fourth, new industries can resemble contemporary successful industries at least 
as much as they can resemble their immediate ancestors. New high-tech industries 
might never have to go through classic evolutionary stages in order to become highly 
sophisticated in many ways. Fundamental management principles and techniques are 
public knowledge and the pioneers of new industries should be expected to capitalize 
on lessons learned by others.
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The implications discussed in the sections that follow are not necessarily less 
strategically important than the implications discussed above and should be considered 
to be extensions, focused on particular streams of literature.
Management of Technology
As implied by specific references, portions of the preceding discussion could 
have been framed Management of Technology issues as cogently and comfortably as 
they were framed Strategic Management issues. Without being redundant, at this point 
it will simply be re-emphasized that technology is such a strategically important 
management concern that demarcations between some samples of literature are no 
longer clear. This section focuses specifically on the literature which describes s-curve 
and Technology Cycles frameworks, which constitute the bedrock of this dissertation.
The main implication concerning s-curves and Technology Cycles frameworks 
is how extraordinarily useful they are, despite their limitations. To the extent that s- 
curves (at any level of analysis) can be predicted, plotted, or derived, some dynamics 
seem certain to be associated with their shapes and relative positions. Recall, for 
example, that most o f the statistical tests of the main hypotheses in this study either 
rejected or failed to reject the null hypothesis by such wide margins that even the 
inherent imprecisions of the test methodology paled. (That is, tests of most hypotheses 
either rejected the null hypothesis at alpha = .01, or sometimes .001; or they failed to 
reject the null at alpha = . 1 or cutoffs even well above that figure. Thus very few test 
results were uninterpretable because o f the limitations o f the methodology.) But some 
test results contradicted each other, thereby insinuating theoretical contradictions as 
well.
When the tests were revised and the analysis extended to consider available 
technical and symposium data, however, it was found that the contradictions among 
the results of testing the original hypotheses were easily explained. The pattern of
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cognitive legitimacy was, with only a few important exceptions, accurately reflective of 
the pattern of actual overall industry activity (not the pattern of legitimacy that was 
expected to result from incumbent manipulations), which was proceeding very much in 
agreement with what Technology Cycles frameworks would predict. In other words, 
the momentum of actual Technology Cycles in-the-making was so potent that media 
patterns were not, in aggregate, dissuaded from depicting them truthfully. Without the 
aid of s-curve and Technology Cycles frameworks, it is difficult to speculate what the 
interpretations of the original test results would have been. It suffices to say that the 
public media should not be impugned for biased reporting, when in the aggregate 
reports generally agree with the technical truth. Whether or not the pattern of public 
awareness (legitimacy) had a momentum and possible impact all its own is not 
presently the issue.
Of course, s-curves and Technology Cycles frameworks are themselves human 
inventions, intended to help make sense out of a certain type o f multidimensional and 
complex human endeavor. In their simplest forms they describe the unidimensional 
performance growth, exhaustion, and replacement o f technologies, in environments that 
are assumed to be mostly unencumbered by forces other than the intentional human 
effort to make technological progress. Yet the present scenario made clear that this 
ostensibly simplistic framework is rigorous enough to withstand some severe 
complications and encumberences. The following discussion provides an explanation.
As discussed in the literature review, s-curves and Technology Cycles are 
composite understandings of the results of the work done by many scholars and 
practitioners. Naturally, some work has become more popular than others. The view 
presented most forcefully in this dissertation can be most succinctly understood to be a 
combination of the work done by Tushman & Anderson (1986), Anderson & Tushman 
(1990), and Utterback (1994). Briefly, this view holds that a technological
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discontinuity (wherever its genesis) initiates a period of ferment, a relatively wild and 
economically undisciplined competition among ideas and products all based on the 
opportunities made possible by the basic discontinuity. Sooner or later, and after a veiy 
complex and idiosyncratic set o f events, (usually only) one configuration comes to 
dominate the scene. This design becomes so dominant in the marketplace that non- 
adherents face the extreme probability of failure, while adherents struggle, over a 
period of stability that can last decades, to basically either differentiate the dominant 
product design in some value-adding way or continue to lower its cost/price through 
process innovations. Eventually because of inherent natural limitations, significant 
performance improvements can only be accommodated by the inauguration of another 
discontinuity, and the drama is renewed (as discussed at great length during the 
development of propositions and hypotheses).
The conditions of the natural experiment chosen for this dissertation were not so 
simple; in fact, they were veiy convoluted. First, the discontinuity which triggered the 
period of ferment was not technological, it was political. The State of California socio- 
politically legitimated (not to be confused with cognitive legitimation, which is simple 
awareness-building (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994)) -- in fact, mandated -- a technological 
regime that was profoundly rewarding to (or coercive of, depending on one's point of 
view) innovation of a pre-conceived type. The (hoped-for) technological breakthrough 
was in the future, not the recent past. Furthermore, due to the path-dependent nature of 
technological trajectories (see previous section), the technological breakthrough in this 
scenario stood a very good chance of defining the dominant design, instead of 
triggering the wild competition for one. In sum, instead o f complying with the 
technological discontinuity-ferment-dominant design-stability model o f Technology 
Cycles, the present scenario looked more to be political discontinuity-ferment- 
technological discontinuity/dominant design-stability.
175
Yet despite this extreme practical distortion of the theoretical model, the basic 
dynamics of s-curves seemed unperturbed. A dominant design was evident. It had an 
early lead in performance and cost/price. But to some, its phenomenological 
limitations cast a dark cloud on its future. Alternatives clearly had higher potentials but 
most were not yet commercializable. And they were all expensive, or at least they 
would be in the short-term. In general, the higher the performance potential of the 
alternative, the higher its cost, and the less clear its imminence. Competences required 
to bring these alternatives to fruition were discontinuous from the core competence of 
the dominant design, so non-incumbents were, for the most part, enacting the industry 
and most of the ferment. There were a few exciting exceptions, o f course, but 
identifying exceptions is an important part o f the practical utility of Technology Cycles 
frameworks -- the identification of some exceptions indicates fidelity, not failure.
In sum, the implication is that whether technology is pushed or pulled, 
mandated by law or demanded by consumers, socio-politically simple or complex, s- 
curve dynamics seem to be stubborn masters. S-curve dynamics are so pervasive, and 
associated frameworks are so rigorous, that any explanation or theory of technological 
progress (at least at the level of the firm or industry) that does not consider them 
carefully runs a high risk o f being badly underspecified. S-curves are theoretically 
sophomoric, but they represent fundamental dynamics.
As important as they are, however, s-curves and Technology Cycles are 
imprecise. It is one thing to plot the paths of historical events and note persistent 
patterns o f technological progress; it is another to extrapolate recent progress far into 
the future and be correct. Consider once more Figure 6.1. At face value, the figure 
implies that Lead-Acid Batteries might not be worthwhile developing, since their s- 
curve lies below the s-curves of all the other batteries presented in the figure; and at the 
other extreme, that Zinc-Air Batteries are so phenomenologically superior to other
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choices that they are almost destined for success. Between these extremes, the general 
interpretation is that batteries that are superior in the short-term might not be the best 
choices for the long-term.
But these straightforward implications can become complicated quickly, and 
reasonable changes o f basic assumptions can have radical effects on expectations.
First, the passage of time will not, of itself, cause technologies to progress. As a 
dimension of the figure, time is merely representative of cumulative R&D effort 
(Foster, 1986). There is never any guarantee that R&D effort will get results, especially 
specific results. Second, though specific energy is the appropriate performance 
consideration, and though this was argued to be related most importantly to ReDox, it is 
likely that the comprehensive set of obstacles encountered along each s-curve is or will 
be seen to be relatively unique. Previous discussions have alluded to various and 
sometimes idiosyncratic producibility problems; likewise, ReDox is 
phenomenologically interactive with other performance parameters such as specific 
power, depth of discharge, recharging time, etc. Getting each electrochemical couple to 
yield its potential is a unique and complex problem of managing trade-offs, as well as 
simply pushing out one unidimensional frontier. It should always be remembered that 
s-curves depict only one performance parameter at a time, that most complex products 
have more than one performance parameter that is of keen interest to both technologists 
and consumers, and that there are likely to be phenomenological interactions among 
several technical constraints.
Third, it is very important to realize that the actual s-curve of any battery will 
probably never reach its phenomenological potential. These potentials are indeed upper 
limits, but practical specific energy (specific energy delivered to the wheels) was in all 
cases expected to be a fraction o f its theoretical specific energy. In other words, in this 
scenario upper limits were optimistic; experts agreed that they would never be nearly
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fully exploited (Chemtech, 1994). The reason this practical observation is theoretically 
important is because in the extant literature, s-curves are usually depicted as "topping 
out" very near their theoretical upper limits. Theoretical upper limits are derived from 
scientific knowledge of how nature works. In many cases, however, the engineers' task 
is much too daunting to expect such radical levels of efficiency. As such, using specific 
s-curves in the forecasting mode should take into account practical (engineering) as 
well as theoretical (scientific) limitations.
Examining the general development of Lead-Acid Batteries helps illustrate how 
important this observation can be. After many decades of development, the practical 
specific energy (25-40 Wh/Kg) o f Lead-Acid technology was still only about one-sixth 
of its theoretical specific energy (175.7 Wh/Kg). It can be assumed that the former 
figure is about where returns to R&D effort became ineffective; that the s-curve of 
Lead-Acid technology flattened near this practical limit. The Lead-Acid s-curve 
depicted in Figure 6.1 is really a depiction not of the latest segment of its overall, 
century-long s-curve, but only the renewed effort that has been described previously as 
the sailing ship phenomenon (hence its irregular shape).
Finally, since an underlying premise of this dissertation is that innovation is 
pursued with commercializable performance improvement and profit as its ultimate 
goal, not random invention for its own sake, s-curve development is probably 
interactive with cost and price characteristics. Obviously, cumulative production is 
very closely associated with cumulative sales, cumulative sales is generally negatively 
associated with price, and price is generally a reflection of cost. Unit costs fall as 
cumulative production rises, and sales/production volume has an impact on 
organizational learning and overall experience curve effects (Goodman & Lawless, 
1994). Therefore the rate of growth of firm-level s-curves is probably positively 
associated with cumulative volume, and is probably negatively associated with cost and
178
prices. The strategic implication, o f course, is twofold; the development of s-curves 
can be accelerated if  costs can be contained and this containment is translated into 
lower price; and s-curves can be retarded in their development by high absolute costs 
which boost prices and inhibit sales. Absolute costs, scale economies, and of course 
proprietary information are barriers to entry (Porter, 1980) partly because they obstruct 
the growth of technology s-curves.
So as simple as they seem to be, interpretations of s-curves should take into 
account certain caveats: returns to R&D are never certain; theoretical upper limits are 
likely to be optimistic; the critical dimension of performance is not always independent 
o f other important performance dimensions; s-curves of even very similar products are 
likely to depict different sets of technological hurdles; and though performance is key 
to innovation and technological substitution, cost and price management is likely to 
affect the shape of any technology's s-curve. The technicalities of any scenario will 
make it unique; nevertheless, the above caveats are generalizable to many other 
situations, particularly those involving complex products.
The discussion would not be complete if the contributions of the other authors 
noted in the literature review went overlooked. Interpreting these contributions in 
terms of the findings of this study will help emphasize, enrich and extend some of the 
implications made to this point.
Abernathy & Utterback's (1988) argument has become an important cornerstone 
of the Management of Technology literature. Again, they identified the first stage of 
technology development as "Fluid" -  the period of time when functional performance is 
key, product users are the prime stimuli for innovation, and manufacturing processes 
are small scale and flexible. Obviously, in the present scenario all MD>0 innovations 
were in a Fluid stage o f development, except of course that the stimulus for innovation 
was primarily political. Otherwise, achieving practical specific energy was the
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overriding goal and there were only a few announcements that mass-production was 
even imminent. In the "Transitional " stage a dominant design emerges -  the 
transitional stage in this scenario was likely to be about the same period of time for 
both electric vehicle power sources and electric vehicles themselves. The dominant EV 
design was likely (but not inevitably) to be powered by the early "breakthrough" in 
electrochemical innovations that would meet the (admittedly nebulous) threshold of 
mass-market acceptability. The Transitional stage was at least several years away. In 
the "Specific" stage product differentiation is difficult, and cost reductions and quality 
are key. In the present scenario, products were most meaningfully differentiated by 
their practical specific energies. Since MD 0 innovations had the lowest 
phenomenological potential, it was unlikely that anything but a short-term sailing ship 
phenomenon would differentiate them successfully, in terms of performance. Their 
cost characteristics were already superior, o f course; so much so that they seemed to 
some to be the optimal technology, despite performance limitations.
Ford & Ryan's (1988) view was oriented towards a practical problem which was 
not of central concern to this dissertation: at which points and under what conditions 
should a firm market a technology to other firms, rather than develop it in-house? 
Answering this question has been the focus of a stream of literature that transcends the 
scope of this study (Hobday, 1994), but intuition suggests that even some of the short­
term dynamics of the present scenario would bear fruitful further examination. That is, 
characteristics o f some devices seemed to fit into Ford & Ryan's phases. Devices in the 
stack or cell stages o f development, as well as MITI's agenda and approaches like 
Sodium-Polymer technology, would seem to be in the Technology Development phase; 
technologies in the module or prototype stage would seem to be in the Technology 
Application phase, or nearing Application Launch; devices like Nickel-Cadmium, 
Nickel-Metal Hydride, and Zinc-Air would seem to be at Application Launch, or in the
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early part of Application Growth; and Lead-Acid technology would seem to clearly be 
in the Technology Maturity phase. Previous discussions have hinted at some of the 
licensing and venturing arrangements being pursued by several manufacturers. The 
issue of which firms would be likely to capture the economic rents of their endeavors, 
however, was left completely unaddressed. Details exposed in this study invite such a 
study.
Trying to envisage the present scenario in terms of Abernathy & Clark's (1988) 
matrix is a stimulating exercise. Two comers seemed clearly defined, while the other 
two seemed to be more in dispute. MD 0 innovations were clearly "Regular" 
innovations because they built on established technical and product competences, and 
served to entrench existing skills and resources. This would be true of Lead-Acid 
Battery innovations in any scenario, of course, even one in which electric vehicles were 
not considered at all. Then approaching the idea of electric vehicles skeptically and 
conservatively, MD 0 innovations would also quality as "Market N iche" innovations 
because they built on established competences, but improved their applicability in 
emerging market segments. If the California mandates remained in place, but 
"breakthroughs" in other technologies were never substantial enough to justify 
widespread substitution because of their exorbitant prices, then at the minimum, 
improved Lead-Acid Batteries would fulfill the requirements of, and therefore the 
demand coming from, the manufacturers of electric vehicles. Again, this conservative 
view seemed to generate some ironically risky strategies -  in the long-term, true market 
niches (upscale individuals, commercial and municipal fleets, specific military 
applications, etc.) would seem much better served by any of several MD>0 innovations. 
At this (niche) level of socio-economic and techno-economic change, perhaps most 
MD>0 innovations should be considered to be potential "Architectural" innovations -
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those that establish new linkages to markets and users, while creating new industries or 
reforming old ones.
In the vision that was perhaps mid-range between the most skeptical and the 
most optimistic, some MD>0 innovations on the strategic horizon seemed capable of 
performing adequately not only in upscale, commercial, municipal, and military niches, 
but also of performing well enough to foster the development of a broad "second family 
car" or "commuting car" niche. Collectively, the size of these markets would probably 
have a substantial effect on improving cost/price economies. The most optimistic 
visionaries, of course, understood some MD>0 innovations (and no MD 0 innovations) 
as having the (phenomenological, and therefore market) potential to be "Revolutionary" 
innovations -- those that render entrenched technologies and product competences 
obsolete, but are applied to existing markets and customers. A really "big hit" which 
would yield a practical specific energy capable of giving an electric vehicle anything 
like the range that an internal combustion engine automobile has with a tankful of 
gasoline, would have obvious market potential. In morphological and other terms, only 
the most radical innovations could possibly compete so well: some types of fuel cells 
and mechanical flywheels, combined with range extenders like ultracapacitors.
In short, due to the exploratory nature of this study, the propositions and 
hypotheses were developed in the hope of capturing contrasts between the extremes; 
between the most incremental (Regular) innovations and the most technologically 
discontinuous (Revolutionary) innovations. Results o f the study were clear enough, and 
details were rich enough, to suggest but not explain fully, non-dichotomous 
interpretations grounded in the literature.
Revisiting Burgelman, Kosnik & van den Poel's (1988) contribution accentuates 
this point. Lead-Acid Battery technology was clearly "base" -  not only materials, but 
relevant competences were commonly available (imitable and observable) and
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commodity-like; and improvements in overall performance were likely to be relatively 
modest, or at least it would be disingenuous to suggest that most of the remaining five- 
sixths of Lead-Acid's untapped potential was likely to be exploited. Perhaps Nickel- 
Cadmium technology was the one alternative to Lead-Acid that had already 
demonstrated the characteristics of a "key" technology; one that exhibited cost, quality, 
or (in this case) performance characteristics that were a present basis for competitive 
advantage (Lead-Acid technology was no doubt "key" based strictly on cost). In rough 
terms, several other alternatives were on the brink of being "pacing" technologies, 
because they demonstrated the potential to be the basis of competitive advantage ~ 
most notably, Nickel-Metal Hydride and Zinc-Air. Other, less-imminent technologies 
were the better examples of "emerging" technologies -  technologies that have not yet 
demonstrated the potential to alter the basis of competition. Fuel Cells in particular 
were probably best thought of as emerging technologies, because of cost problems and 
specific technological obstacles (like miniaturization) that seemed relatively 
intractable.
Of course, this attempt to categorize certain technologies was only suggestive. 
Demarcations between the different categorizations were not unambiguous, and the 
scheme might best be thought o f as a continuum. But here, it is interesting to note that 
if  base, key, pacing, and emerging technologies are relative positions in a continuum, 
the above interpretation placed PTA, PTB, PTD, PTE, and PTH innovations in exactly 
the same sequence. In the present scenario, Burgelman, Kosnik, and van den Poel's 
scheme seemed related to the morphological concept of "distance", in light of a 
previous observation that the alphabetical ascendance of the different 
Phenomenological Types of competence-destroying innovations was really just a more 
specific way of depicting morphological distance. After all, depicting 
Phenomenological Types alphabetically rather than numerically was an arbitraiy
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choice, one that was prudently made at an earlier point in this study only to avoid 
confusion.
To summarize this section, this study has corroborated the general utility o f s- 
curve and Technology Cycles frameworks. Their dynamics seemed so pervasive, in 
fact, that even extreme socio-political pressures did not seem to seriously distort them. 
This study has also corroborated several known limitations of s-curves and Technology 
Cycles frameworks. As forecasting tools, they are imprecise and probably interactive 
with other technological and business considerations, and it is critical to understand 
that their usefulness lies mostly in attempting to make interpretations o f the relative 
positions of curves and upper limits. Finally, this study has generated enough detail to 
make rough assessments o f associated and supportive frameworks, which suggested 
their general validity and opportunities for additional research in the same experimental 
scenario.
Technological Forecasting and Morphological Analysis
Of the tools available for forecasting technological innovation, Morphological 
Analysis was selected for use in this study for reasons that have been discussed at great 
length. This section reviews how well the technique performed, relative to 
expectations.
First, it should be remembered that morphology is simply the study of form, and 
that Morphological Analysis is an approach to problem-solving that can be applied to 
virtually any arena (Betz, 1993). The fundamental objective of morphological analysis 
is to penetrate a set of conditions until their most fundamental dimensions are 
identified. Once this is done, the problem-solver is able to consider combinations of 
options that have not yet been considered, thereby facilitating the innovation process.
When this approach is applied to the problem of forecasting technological 
innovation, the most difficult part is having, or having access to, the scientific or
184
engineering acumen that enables precise and correct identification of the problem* 
and/or the patience to learn enough about the area in question so as to not produce an 
analysis which merely breaks down an existing product into its physical components. 
Rather, the whole point is to dissect a product into the scientific or engineering 
principles and phenomena (and therefore competences) which the components 
articulate in physical form (Betz, 1993). (Even this statement is an oversimplification, 
because the physical boundaries between components are not always the same as the 
natural boundaries between/among phenomena, and being able to exploit this very non- 
superficial realization is the essential opportunity afforded by using Morphological 
Analysis.) In other words, the technique is conceptually simple, but it can be difficult 
and time-consuming to implement, and each morphological analysis is unique.
At any rate, the results of morphologically analyzing electrochemical devices 
proved to be profoundly useful. The morphological analysis developed in Appendix 1 
described the fundamentals of these kinds of devices in a way that was (a) guided by 
the rules consistently found in the literature (Jantsch, 1967), (b) flexible enough to 
accommodate the idiosyncrasies o f the present research issues, (c) replicable and 
objectively communicable, (d) detailed enough to get into the "black box" of what 
turned out to be batteries and fuel cells, (e) not powerfully influenced by existing 
economic or industrial structures like SIC (Betz, 1993; Jantsch, 1967), (f) not so 
detailed that its usefulness was limited to the insight worthy of an R&D technologist,
(g) not so detailed that a strategist could not impute its implications, and (h) not so 
detailed that the statistical test methodology was rendered impotent. The following 
discussion provides illustrations of these assertions. They are presented not necessarily 
in order of their importance, but in an order that facilitates transitions between the main 
points.
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Morphological Analysis showed that outward appearances can be deceiving not 
only in terms of how devices work, but also in terms of the grand-scale implications of 
their inner workings. In other words, a systems view of new product innovation should 
consider how small changes in technology can affect larger paradigms or 
infrastructures. The obvious example of this was the observation that some batteries 
will work like fuel cells while some fuel cells will work like batteries, and that the 
implications of the difference are very important. Specifically, Zinc-Air and 
Aluminum-Air Batteries (and any other examples of PTE and PTG innovations that 
might be attempted) will need replacement of reactant materials, which is an operating 
characteristic that is morphologically similar to the operating characteristics of non- 
regenerative fuel cells. On the other hand, Regenerative Fuel Cells (PTF) will be self- 
contained, as the electrochemical process within them will be reversible. They will 
need recharging by being plugged in for a period of time, like most types of 
conventional batteries. In short, the analysis conducted in this study showed how some 
non-obvious groups of innovations would transpose the basic relationship between the 
consumer and the product-type, while others would not.
An even more glaring example of how easy it is for a casual observer of 
technological change to overlook important product characteristics concerns the term 
"mechanical battery". Mechanical batteries are flywheel batteries, devices which rely 
on the conversion of kinetic energy stored in spinning discs into electricity, not the 
conversion of electrochemical potential into electricity. Mechanical batteries are so 
different from conventional batteries that they did not even belong on the same 
morphological matrix, or map, that was developed for this study -- in terms of the 
problem as it was identified. As such, it is illustrative to note that mechanical batteries 
presented unique technological problems, such as (a) what happens when a disc rotating 
at many thousands of rotations per minute reaches fatigue and comes apart only a few
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feet away from automobile passengers, and (b) what happens, because of the natural 
laws governing gyroscopy, when an automobile tries to go uphill or turn sharply; 
flywheels are essentially gyroscopes and gyroscopes have tremendous angular 
momentum which resists displacement in certain directions relative to the plane of spin. 
During the period of time under study, it must be conceded that these and other 
problems associated with mechanical batteries were being successfully addressed. The 
point of the above discussion is twofold; (a) terminology should never be automatically 
associated with an underlying morphology; devices with similar nomenclatures can be 
very morphologically different; and (b) as morphological distance increases, 
technologies generally differ; in particular, devices which belong on different 
morphological matrices/maps are very likely to be associated with very different 
competences.
So depending on the research issue, contrasts between matrices/maps can be so 
clear that the strategic implications can follow intuitively. Contrasts within maps are 
more problematic. For example, the present problem was identified so as to enable a 
consistent focus on only electrochemical devices. Here, statistical analysis of the tests 
of the hypotheses might well have been hopeless in the absence of some attempt to 
group devices according to their phenomenological characteristics. Recall that in many 
of the frequency tables, some of the expected frequencies in individual cells were low, 
even when they represented entire Phenomenological Types of innovations. By 
extension, had each electrochemical couple been deemed its own Phenomenological 
Type (i.e., Lead-Acid=PTA, Nickel-Cadmium=PTB, Nickel-Metal Hydride=PTC, etc.), 
it is doubtful that tests o f most o f the frequency tables would have been statistically 
interpretable. Anyway, doing so would have been anathemic to the idea of mapping out 
future competitive space, because all it would have done was analyze the list of the 
ideas presently being considered, making no connections among morphological variants
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which, in the view that emerged in this study, mapped different within-matrix 
trajectories.
Next, during the development of propositions and hypotheses, this study 
carefully acknowledged the known limitations of Morphological Analysis, particularly 
the caveat that Morphological Distance should not be used too literally or in a cavalier 
way. Yet results of this study indicated that Morphological Distance, albeit crude and 
metaphorical, does have the ability to do more than just identify dichotomous groupings 
of innovations. On the one hand, using Morphological Distance (1 ,2 ,3 , and 4) to 
represent groupings of innovations based on how many parametric options were 
switched would have been misleading because it would have resulted in 
morphologically different innovations sharing the same MD. But when the 
fundamental idea was pursued more rigorously, and morphologically distinct 
combinations o f options were grouped into Phenomenological Types, statistical results 
were interpretable, often to the point of being obvious.
Furthermore, the alphabetical ascendance of PT was qualitatively observed to be 
related to what one would expect to be the characteristics o f innovations that were more 
competence-destroying than others. That is, the alphabetically "higher" PTs seemed to 
be more expensive, less commercially imminent, phenomenologically superior, and 
pursued by fewer players than the "lower" PTs, and the few incumbents pursuing 
competence-destroying innovations were all pursuing innovations of low PTs.
In the same vein, Morphological Distance corroborated the idea that innovation 
is usually pursued with profitable commercialization in mind, not random invention for 
its own sake (Amfield, 1969). Recall, for example, that the alphabetical ascendance of 
the PTs of the specific batteries presented in Table 6.5 was precisely associated with 
the numerical ascendance of their theoretical specific energies. It would be incorrect to 
interpret this observation as meaning that all Morphologically Distant possibilities are
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inherently likely to perform better than Morphologically "Close" possibilities -  because 
thousands of phenomenologically senseless possibilities (permutations of 
electrochemical couples) did not appear in the table (Bright & Schoeman, 1973; Jones 
& Twiss, 1978). It is much more reasonable to suggest that innovators are competent 
enough to understand how wasteful it would be, especially from a business perspective, 
to pour resources into the difficult and uncharted development of a morphologically 
distant possibility unless it was known or at least theoretically suspected to have 
superior phenomenological potential.
Also, no natural law says that the first innovation of its kind must be the one 
variant that represents a morphological grouping (of some definition) that will be 
proven in the long-term to be the most phenomenologically inferior of all possibilities. 
Some morphologically distant possibilities will be poor ideas and foolish to pursue. It 
is important for innovators in innovative firms to be open-minded about 
phenomenologically superior possibilities, not blind to known limitations.
An associated implication is that, as argued during the development of 
propositions and hypotheses, it is not always necessarily the case that technological 
progress always means exploration of the "terra incognita", either at the frontier (MD 1) 
or in leaps (MD>1) (Ayres, 1969). Metaphorically speaking, sometimes it can be 
worthwhile trying to go backwards, to re-examine "territory" (besides MD 0) that has 
been explored before. In the early part of this century, for example, Thomas Edison 
was convinced that electric vehicles were, on the whole, superior to both gasoline and 
steam-powered automobiles, but noticed precisely the same technological bottleneck 
that was at the heart of this dissertation -  limited range. So in his indomitable way, he 
invented and according to him, perfected an actually quite good Nickel-Iron battery 
(Schiffer, 1994). It is humbling to note that Nickel-Iron technology was one o f the very 
viable options being re-visited as of 1993-1995,
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Next, it is interesting to note how easily Morphological Analysis identified the 
critical performance parameter (phenomenon), which by virtue o f the attention it 
attracted, was interpreted as being the core competence. On the other hand, the 
discussion that laid the foundation for the morphological matrix developed in Appendix 
1 suggested as much anyway. In a sense, the other three parameters and their options 
were somewhat obvious derivations of the choice of a particular electrochemical 
couple. But only through a discussion which started from a consideration of nature's 
fundamentals did the obvious become obvious. In contrast, consider Figure 2.1 
(Zwicky's original morphological analysis of jet engines). In that matrix, the core 
phenomenon and core competence are far from obvious, except perhaps to an industry 
insider who has comprehensive expertise in a broad range of aerospace technologies. 
The relatively pedestrian properties of electrochemical technologies made the present 
analysis so easy to understand, that their morphology sometimes seemed to be 
redundant to common sense. The exotic natures of many other product technologies, 
which are not nearly so obvious and demand competences truly unfamiliar to the casual 
observer, are only so much the better as candidates for an industry analysis focusing on 
the morphology of its products' technologies.
Similarly, since reduction-oxidation was so clearly the key parameter, 
technology, and competence in terms that were meaningful to this study, it would be 
interesting to redefine the original problem and perform a more penetrating analysis. In 
other words, from the point o f view of this study, it was appropriate to consider 
reduction, oxidation, and the catalytic contribution of electrolytes as being so 
dynamically interrelated that they were considered to be one phenomenon. Now that 
the importance of that phenomenon is so clear, it would be appropriate to renew the 
analysis focusing specifically on the basic, much more intellectually challenging
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elements of that core technology. The apparent legitimacy of storage batteries 
underscores the potential usefulness of such a study.
In the above discussion* the most crucial implication is perhaps the most subtle. 
As is the case for many other problem-solving techniques, it is absolutely essential in 
Morphological Analysis to spend whatever amount of time that might be required to 
correctly identify the problem as it relates to the issues of keenest interest. The 
California mandate created a relatively well-identified and neatly-bounded socio­
economic and techno-economic experiment, worthy of academic scrutiny. Even though 
the problem seemed clearly defined, however, this study still encountered boundary 
problems such as correctly defining industry and incumbency. Had the problem been 
identified more abstractly — for the sake of argument, had the problem been identified 
as the development of an automobile that did not depend on the internal combustion of 
gasoline for automotive power — any or all o f the following possibilities would have 
had to have been considered in the analysis: batteries, fuel cells, flywheels, 
ultracapacitors, turbines, a large handful of "alternative fuels" like propane and 
methane, and most confusing o f all, hybridized versions of all the above. Furthermore, 
the morphological matrix developed for this problem would also probably have 
suggested the consideration of pure hydrogen, nuclear, and other fuels. In truth, recent 
developments in the automobile industry do invite such a study (Betz et al., 1995; Keys, 
1993; Keys, 1995). The present study was exploratory, however, so it was focused on a 
well-defined contrast o f conflicting groups of technological alternatives. Again, the 
point is that definition of the problem is the most important part of conducting a valid 
morphological analysis. Even subtle differences in the definition of a problem can have 
very great impacts on the identification of the main parameters o f the problem and the 
options available for implementing each required phenomenon.
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At any rate, the results o f this study imply that when empowered by analytical 
forecasting tools like morphological analysis, discontinuous technological change can 
be studied in real-time. Of course, this statement rests on the observation that it was 
possible to identify specific technologies (competences) and roughly gauge their 
relative potentials to enhance or destroy an extant technological paradigm. It was not 
possible to confidently make specific forecasts, but it was possible to group 
competences into very different and socially meaningful trajectories. It was also 
possible to observe how the dynamics of relatively open competition might establish a 
specific trajectory, possibly at the expense of other trajectories that might be 
uncomfortably exotic to common consumers, but might be potentially superior in the 
long-term. However, once more it is necessary to emphasize that the analysis and 
discussion presented in this dissertation should not be interpreted as taking any position 
on the very volatile EV issue. Certain events and possibilities were specifically chosen 
to help illustrate a simple point: that which is becoming popular is not all that is known 
to be possible, but that which is becoming popular stands a good chance of becoming 
permanently entrenched.
A final implication in this area considers the passage of time between the 
initiation of this study and its pending completion. As of early 1996, the basic 
framework of conditions had not changed (de Neufville, 1996). But deadlines were no 
longer very far off, at least not in strategic terms. It will be informative to compare the 
dynamics o f the emerging industry as deadlines arrive, to the dynamics which were 
happening during the period of time when deadlines were not ominous. Retrospection 
accomplished in years subsequent to the deadline should prove equally informative.
Summarizing the implications discussed in this section is straightforward. 
Morphological Analysis is a general approach to problem-solving that has important 
potential towards improving the ability to understanding technological progress.
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Naturally, as is the nature of most tools, it is only as useful as the user is skilled. It 
affords the opportunity of viewing technology inside the "black box" of a product type, 
but not in such great detail that the opportunity to see general trends, or perform 
objective statistical tests, is lost Surprisingly, the Morphological Distance metaphor is 
indeed useful, but it is only a metaphor and should not be interpreted as possessing 
strict one-to-one correspondence with implied discontinuities. Morphological Analysis 
has no level o f analysis limitations, but adhering to a carefully developed problem 
specification is critical to its utility. As hoped, the technique was very useful in 
studying technological discontinuities in real-time, though retrospection will probably 
always be the sterner judge.
Institutional Theory
This dissertation did not challenge Institutional Theory as much as it assumed 
its general validity, especially the validity o f the concept of cognitive legitimacy. It was 
asserted that as industrial structures change, the competition for future competitive 
space is, early-on, partly the competition for share of mind (Prahalad & Hamel, 1994) 
and that establishing share of mind is essentially a matter of awareness-building, or of 
establishing cognitive legitimacy (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994). Since industry players might 
be prescient enough to perceive this, they might also be expected to actively participate 
in the cognitive legitimation of their technologies, to the point o f pro-actively engaging 
in attempts to shape media representations of specific technological developments 
(Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Rao, 1995). Specifically, this dissertation tested the main 
hypothesis that entrenched and powerful industry players — i.e., incumbents — defend 
the destruction of their competences and technologies by engaging in information 
campaigns which are designed to promote the advantages of their technologies and 
attack the disadvantages of the technologies o f new entrants.
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However, in this study the activities of only 8 o f 45 incumbents were reported at 
all over a two-year period, in several thousand media items. In terms of the main 
hypothesis, this finding could be interpreted several ways. The most obvious 
interpretation is that the tests were simply inconclusive. There were not enough 
incumbent-initiated innovations to enable a sound statistical assessment of how they 
fared in the media, especially relative to the number of non-incumbents' innovations.
On the other hand, intuition suggests that this finding refutes the general hypothesis. 
Since many hundreds of items reporting the innovations being pursued by non­
incumbents did appear in the media, it would be unreasonable to conclude that SIC 
3691 firms were very successfully obstructing the cognitive legitimation of impending 
electrochemical innovations that could render their competences obsolete.
Several implications for Institutional Theory and the cognitive legitimacy 
construct are fairly direct. First, if it can be assumed that the public media is an 
instrument by which emerging technologies gain cognitive legitimacy, then it is 
reasonable to assume that most new cognitive legitimacy will (literally and figuratively) 
be ascribed to newsworthy events, not the status quo. As obvious as this might seem, 
the implication to researchers is that when public media items are used as raw data, a 
bias towards newsworthiness is likely to be present. Observing a pattern of reports in 
the public media is to observe a pattern o f cognitive legitimation first-hand, and is to 
observe actual industry activity second-hand. This study showed that there can be a 
disparity between what might be assumed from media reports to be an overall industry 
profile, and a fuller truth. Most SIC 3691 firms seemed uninterested in participating in 
a theoretically exciting scenario, but this was not a direct empirical observation; it had 
to be pointed out as "file drawer" activity (or non-activity).
Rather, the struggle for cognitive legitimacy had the characteristics of a more 
conventional, direct competition among mostly non-incumbents (new entrants). Here,
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it proved prudent that reports o f disadvantages were considered as well as reports of 
advantages. Had reports of disadvantages been overlooked, important symmetries and 
asymmetries might not have become evident. In general, innovations that were 
frequently reported for their advantages were also frequently reported for their 
disadvantages — some innovations simply got more attention than others, and the 
attention was generally balanced and technically accurate. These symmetries implied 
that if information campaigns were actually being waged, overall popularization might 
have been one successful outcome. But there was little widespread evidence of 
factually incorrect representation of the advantages and disadvantages of any 
phenomenologically-defined category of innovation.
An important theoretical implication of these findings is that cognitive 
legitimacy is not an attribute that is simply either absent or present. It is not always true 
that any notoriety is good notoriety, so all "units" of cognitive legitimacy are not 
qualitatively the same. Cognitive legitimacy can be absent, present in a qualitatively 
good way, or present in a qualitatively bad way. Observing that 37 of 45 incumbents 
were not reported at all is an observation that their phantom innovations were simply 
not being cognitively legitimated one way or the other in terms that were meaningful to 
this study. Likewise, some of the higher-performing and more cost-effective 
innovations were relatively non-legitimate, in the sense that they simply did not get very 
much media attention one way or the other.
But in general, when a report o f an innovation implied that it was (or would be) 
in some way superior, it gained positive cognitive legitimacy; and when a report of an 
innovation implied that it was (or would be) in some way inferior, it gained negative 
cognitive legitimacy. In a previous discussion the former was termed legitimation, and 
the latter was termed de-legitimation. In scenarios where information campaigns are
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successful, asymmetries between positive and negative cognitive legitimacy should be 
apparent.
Interestingly, however, interpretations of the findings o f this study indicated that 
negative legitimacy does not always negate, or cancel out, positive legitimacy. Recall 
that in the present scenario, the overall publicity (the positive cognitive legitimacy plus 
the negative cognitive legitimacy) received by three Phenomenological Types (PTA, 
PTB, and PTD) of competence-destroying innovations was interpreted as being the 
overall cognitive legitimation of the technological trajectory they collectively 
represented.
However, this interpretation was idiosyncratic, for several reasons. First, it was 
focused on the cognitive legitimation of a technological trajectory, to the detriment of 
the cognitive legitimation of other possible trajectories. The issue of immediate 
concern was the widespread development of a cognitive profile o f what an EV-based 
society (or a subset thereof) would be like. The issue of which specific device 
(basically, which electrochemical couple) would "win" was secondary. Furthermore, it 
was suggested earlier that the former issue was so critical that activities concerning the 
latter issue could be interpreted as a form of tacit collusion -  collective attention- 
getting.
From the Institutional perspective, collective attention-getting for the purpose of 
enhancing the likelihood of a particular technological trajectory is akin to the more 
manipulative tactics suggested in Oliver's (1991) spectrum of strategic responses to 
institutional pressures. Earlier it was noted that the USABC was participating in the 
legitimation of PTB and PTD innovations, though it was not asserted that this largely 
publicly-funded consortium had any specific technological agenda that was not 
rationally oriented towards developing the best-performing technologies. Much less 
subtly, the Advanced Lead-Acid Battery Consortium was privately funded and focused
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on the development of PTA innovations. Disregarding the specific charters o f these 
two organizations, it is interesting that Oliver specifically identified active membership 
in consortia and trade organizations as co-optation and influence tactics, respectively. 
Whether or not it was coincidental, the trajectory that received most of the absolute 
amount o f publicity was completely circumscribed by the activities of these two 
consortia.
Also, the tacit collusion interpretation hinged on the observation that amounts of 
positive and negative cognitive legitimacy were about equal; that legitimation and de­
legitimation were symmetrical. Asymmetries -  especially had they not accurately 
reflected the underlying technical truth -  probably would have required a different 
interpretation. Disproportionate AND incorrect reports of advantages and 
disadvantages would not have been suggestive of tacit collusion among 
phenomenologically-defined strategic groups. It would have been interpreted as 
successful media manipulation, and the idea that strategic groups are 
phenomenologically identifiable probably would not have presented itself.
Next, it is important to acknowledge that Institutional Theory scholars have 
always recognized the importance of personal, organizational, and cultural values 
(Selznick, 1957); in a sense, institutions are legitimized value systems (Scott & Meyer, 
1994). Furthermore, the professions have been recognized as being important agents of 
value creation and change in and among institutions (Scott, 1995). Since it is difficultt
to identify boundaries between institutional fields (Di Maggio & Powell, 1983), and 
since it would also be difficult to argue that professionals in one field can not affect 
institutional processes in another field, it is important to acknowledge that labelling 
different measures o f legitimacy as being positive or negative is ultimately value-laden. 
That is, choices made by academic researchers are not always value-free, and this 
includes choices regarding terminology. The very idea that cognitive legitimacy can be
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either positive or negative is evidence of the ubiquity of values; exercising the idea by 
specifically appointing such labels is to show, or at least cooperate with, certain values.
The point o f this momentary introspection was not to introduce a complicated 
philosophy to the argument, but to simplify it. Now it can be conscientiously explained 
that the tacit collusion interpretation was affected by underlying assumptions 
concerning the nature of the key dimensions of interest, and the way they were 
specifically measured. For example, it could have been argued that safety, not range, is 
always the most important dimension of an automobile's performance in any scenario. 
Intuition might suggest that reports of a safety flaw, for example, are negative in a 
qualitatively different and more profound way than reports of mediocre vehicle range.
This argument is not merely academic. During the period of time under study, a 
Ford EV (nicknamed EcoStar) equipped with a Sodium-Sulfur battery erupted in fire 
during a public demonstration. The problem was quickly traced to a software problem 
in the battery's electronics and resolved. But the event itself was reported widely and 
details of the fire were repeated for many months, even in media items that obviously 
had other issues as their foci. Obviously, from a strategic and/or institutional 
perspective, it would not be reasonable to assert that these reports were completely 
helpful to the effort to advocate the advent of electric vehicles in general, and the 
introduction of Sodium-Sulfur batteries in particular -- regardless of what the articles 
otherwise said about vehicle range or cost. Widespread dissemination of the awareness 
o f a safety problem -- even one that was successfully resolved -  could be argued to 
retard, not promote, public acceptance of an innovation.
Alternatively, it could have been argued that focusing on any performance 
parameter other than net reduction in harmful automobile emissions was ultimately 
senseless, since reducing air pollution was the main goal o f the California mandates.
On this issue, there was a great deal of debate as to whether or not electric vehicles
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would have the desired effect. As discussed earlier, in some regions the net effect on 
pollution might be its exportation, instead o f its reduction. Also, it was often argued 
that the costs incurred by developing electric vehicles would only slow down the 
development of alternative technologies, and/or that the prices of electric vehicles 
would never be low enough to have any real effect on taking the small percentage of 
very poorly maintained vehicles, which cause such a hugely disproportionate 
percentage of the total automobile emissions problem, off the road (Cronk, 1995). In 
fact it was often argued that the subsidization that would be required to price EVs 
attractively would only be borne in the sticker prices of new gasoline-engine models, 
resulting in a net economic disincentive to improve population-wide automobile 
emissions. So the "positive" and "negative" legitimation of the chosen characteristics of 
electrochemical devices, vis-a-vis each other, consciously overlooked views which 
might vehemently argue these labels.
The point o f the above discussion and examples is to illustrate that labelling 
different measures of cognitive legitimacy as being either positive or negative is 
intuitively appealing, but it is plagued by incessant value-based assumptions and 
obfuscations. Any reasonably sophisticated product has at least several important 
performance parameters, and peripheral parameters are not necessarily trivial from all 
points o f view. In the present scenario, it was even possible that each very technical 
performance parameter -  i.e., specific power, mean time between failure, system 
lifetime, weight, recharging time, disposability, etc. -- was qualitatively unique. Any 
disciple of s-curve frameworks should carefully note that technical performance is 
seldom one-dimensional and never value-free. Any interpretation of the legitimation 
and de-legitimation of any performance parameter should be crafted carefully as it is 
likely to be very contextually dependent. Level of analysis, sociological and 
socioeconomic climate, and researcher perspective are serious considerations.
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At risk of taking this point too far, it must also be conceded that cost/price has 
more than one measure and each can have a qualitatively different meaning. In this 
study, cost/price was considered in a general sense, but in the most important sense: the 
total costs of manufacturing electrochemical devices that were the main drivers of the 
"sticker prices" o f electric vehicles. (The cost o f any electrochemical device was 
generally estimated to have at least a doubling effect on the sticker price of a vehicle 
(Cronk, 1995.)) The exorbitant prices o f electric vehicles were certainly impediments 
to their overall positive cognitive legitimation (or were contributions to their de­
legitimation). But sticker price was not the only facet of this general dimension.
Others, also partly determined by advancements in electrochemical technology, 
included replacement costs (which were expected to be extremely high; in some cases, 
battery packs accounting for half the price of a vehicle would need replacement every 
two or three years), maintenance costs (which were arguable, because electronics are 
reliable but the lack o f a repair infrastructure would make any repair costly), resale 
value (which was a conspicuously absent concern), and other total-ownership-cost 
considerations which are so familiar to any experienced automobile owner — any of 
which, especially in the scenario outlined here, could be a more important personal 
concern than sticker price.
The point is that in this study, performance and price considerations were both 
simplified to the point of being simplistic. The multi-dimensionality, or at least the 
multi-measurability of both performance and cost/price suggests that the cognitive 
legitimation and de-legitimation o f technologies is complex even at low levels of 
analysis. The present study was appropriately focused on practical specific energy and 
overall production costs of electrochemical devices because they were the main' 
determinants of vehicle range and vehicle sticker price, and maintaining this focus 
facilitated a relatively clear and simple way to observe the possible advent of a
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significant technological discontinuity. As naturally "controlled" as this experiment 
was, however, it was still complicated enough to remind researchers of the 
extraordinary complexity of technological evolution and revolution.
Next, the Institutional implications of the general technical "accuracy" of the 
media representations are intriguing. Recall that the statistical tests of the original 
frequency tables, the statistical tests o f the revised frequency tables, and the qualitative 
analyses o f the technical and symposium data, were mostly in agreement. It was 
concluded that in general, media representations o f the industry were accurate 
depictions of actual industry activity (disregarding the file drawer of inactivity) and the 
aggregate expectations of the industry players. The most important disparity was that 
the general public's awareness o f the short-term cost/price problems of competence- 
destroying innovations, relative to the likelihood that these problems would probably be 
successfully solved in the long-term, did not accurately match the optimism held by 
industry players.
This was not a trivial observation. It might not be true that the general public 
was unduly pessimistic about the cost problems facing the further development of 
electrochemical innovations. Instead, it might be true that the awareness of the general 
public concerning costs was a better representation of the technical truth than industry 
players would admit. As was quoted in an earlier discussion, all players seemed to 
claim that after a period of time, the costs o f producing their innovations would meet 
the long-term cost guidelines set forth by the USABC. Obviously, it would not be to a 
player's advantage to claim otherwise. Yet players just as consistently claimed to be 
able to meet the long-term performance guidelines set forth by the USABC -  and the 
general public did share this optimism. The observation that the general public shared 
optimism about future performance characteristics, while it did not share optimism 
about future cost characteristics, begs a meaningful theoretical interpretation.
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One plausible explanation lies in the observability of competences. If 
technology is competence, and if a truly advantageous competence is tacit and 
unobservable, then a firm's claim about the future performance of a product, especially 
if the underlying technology is in any sense proprietary, would be difficult to dispute.
Since phenomenological limitations are derived from scientific knowledge, and 
since scientific knowledge diffuses rapidly, performance limitations are highly credible 
and easily communicable. But the ability to translate scientific knowledge into 
consumer functionality is technology, and if  technology is difficult to observe, then it 
would be difficult for outsiders to wage credible counter-claims (or at least well- 
informed counter-claims) that reports of important, actual or forecasted, firm-specific 
technological progress were wrong. Firm-specific technological breakthroughs are 
apparently newsworthy, and simple claims o f breakthroughs can be strategically useful.
Ethics aside, it would also be a strategic blunder for a firm to divulge 
particulars, known only to itself, about claim-related technical obstacles that would 
likely perplex and stupefy its technologists in both the short and long-terms. It would 
be foolish for a strategic manager to popularize a technical obstacle, unless mere 
popularization of the innovation was the more pressing concern. As long as known 
phenomenological limitations substantiate firm-specific claims, then, the claims are 
more difficult to successfully dispute than they are to successfully proffer. (The cynical 
term "vaporware" has even become a common expression of this type o f market 
signalling, a term which in the computer software industry describes premature but 
effective product announcements designed to stake out market segments before 
software products even exist.)
Cost and price obstacles, on the other hand, are arguably more visible, and/or 
related to non-core, observable and imitable competences. In this scenario some cost 
obstacles were obviously not firm-specific; for example, it was easy to observe that
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Cadmium is both rare and expensive, so it was easy to dispute any predictions about the 
long-term cost/price competitiveness of Nickel-Cadmium Batteries. Less obviously, it 
might also be true that firm-specific, or at least firm-level, cost containment and 
abatement competences are relatively transparent, observable, and imitable.
As a simple example, it is reasonable to assume that the cost of producing a 
battery that needs a thermal control system that is able to reliably and safely maintain a 
sulfuric electrode at precisely 635 degrees, will be much higher than the costs of 
producing a battery that requires no thermal control system, other considerations held 
equal. It could also be argued that such an obvious and expensive requirement is 
simply very much within the grasp of media professionals to describe and media 
consumers to comprehend, compared to explanations o f many performance hurdles 
which tend to be either very cryptic (due to the tacitness of technology), or grossly 
oversimplified (due to attempts to de-mystify technology). In short, it is conceivable 
that the mismatch between the optimism shown by industry players about the future 
cost/price competitiveness of their innovations, and the public media's confidence, was 
attributable to the ease by which cost/price characteristics can be disputed, relative to 
the difficulties of disputing performance projections.
The implication for Institutional Theory is that in information campaigns 
designed to selectively guide the cognitive legitimation and/or de-legitimation of 
specific technologies, claims of future performance might be easier to legitimate than 
de-legitimate. As long as phenomenological limitations allow the possibility that a 
claimed or forecasted level of performance can be achieved, the newsworthiness of the 
claim is likely to promote its diffusion. The more firm-specific the claim -  i.e., the 
more proprietary the technology -  the more groundless will be the counterclaims of 
outsiders. (Groundlessness, of course, is not necessarily the same thing as 
incorrectness. Outsiders might correctly contradict a claim, but not on the grounds that
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a firm does not possess a competence which can not be observed from the outside one 
way or the other.)
Conversely, claims of future cost containment and abatement are relatively 
difficult to legitimate, and relatively easy to de-legitimate. Cost management is a 
relatively transparent skill, and is comprehensible even on a pedestrian level. Cost 
problems are fairly obvious and once identified, easy to communicate; optimistic cost 
predictions based on the inevitability o f economies o f scale and so forth can fail to 
address specific solutions to intractable, obvious and comprehensible problems. The 
results of this study imply that it is relatively easy to sow specific doubts about another 
firm's claimed ability to overcome observable cost problems; and it is relatively 
difficult to sow specific doubts about another firm's claimed ability to overcome 
obscure product-technology bottlenecks.
Intuition suggests that this theoretical possibility underscores the importance of 
a firm's reputation, and the importance o f the idea that legitimacy is generally 
communicable from an organization to its products (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994). For 
example, it is possible that some firms reported in the present study, which are highly 
respected for their innovative prowess (e.g., 3M, Lockheed, and Sony) were able to get 
more (or more favorable) media attention than some other firms which have not 
established reputations as being particularly innovative (e.g., General Motors, Rolls- 
Royce, and Rover).
Individual track records aside, it is difficult to assert unequivocally that the 
organizational "liabilities" of newness and smallness, which were credibly theorized as 
injuring firms' abilities to control the media (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Rao, 1995), were 
also inherently injurious to the credibility and newsworthiness of a claim. Whether 
fashion or permanent change, by the mid-1990's the business climate in the United 
States was plainly championing the innovative capabilities o f young and small firms
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(Imperato & Harari, 1994; Leonard-Barton, 1995; Nadler, Shaw & Walton, 1995). 
Quantitatively big firms were trying to get qualitatively small through organizational 
realignments, and quantitatively old firms were trying to get qualitatively young 
through the development o f corporate entrepreneurship -  partly for the sake of 
enhancing the ability to innovate (Burgelman, 1995). So, at least in the absence of 
active incumbents who were theorized to have the ability to influence the public media, 
it was not surprising that the performance claims made by young and small firms, as 
well as the claims of reputed innovators from other industries, were popularized. 
Newness and smallness can be an asset as well as a liability, even in the same scenario. 
An interesting theoretical question implied by this observation, for organizational 
ecologists (Hannan & Freeman, 1977; Scott, 1993), is whether smallness and newness 
are net advantages or disadvantages when innovation is the main determinant of 
survival during periods of technological discontinuity.
Before summarizing, it is important to stress an observation that was made in a 
prior discussion. The above arguments pertain specifically to the dynamics happening 
at the level of analysis maintained throughout this study. At higher levels of analysis 
institutional partisanship was so obvious that the need for rigorous research in the 
specific assertions underlying the present hypotheses was obviated. Compared to the 
information campaigns that were admittedly being crafted (Cronk, 1995) by players in 
industries like automobile manufacturing, petrochemicals, electric power generation, 
etc., the institutional dynamics at the level of electrochemical innovation seemed 
subdued, almost moot. Great institutional forces were defending and attacking the 
California mandates and the concept o f electric vehicles in general, but this was not the 
focus of this study. It is testimony to the overall validity o f s-curve and Technology 
Cycles frameworks that they had such a great deal o f explanatory ability in an
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institutional field which was embedded in another field so plainly characterized by 
sociopolitical forces.
In summary, the main points presented in this section are as follows. As argued 
in the literature review, growth of the popularity of Institutional Theory (Scott, 1995) 
can in part be observed by noting the rapid proliferation of viewpoints concerning the 
legitimacy construct (Suchman, 1995). This dissertation successfully borrowed the 
interpretation of cognitive legitimacy as meaning overall public awareness (Aldrich & 
Fiol, 1994) to help dissect and analyze the cognitive legitimation of a new industry in 
terms of the most urgent measure of performance, and the most urgent measure of 
cost/price.
Adding to the proliferation of interpretations and usages of the legitimacy 
construct, the results o f this study suggest that if cognitive legitimacy is something of a 
continuum (which "total public awareness" suggests), then it extends negatively as well 
as positively. There are important differences between cognitive non-legitimacy, 
positive cognitive legitimacy, and negative cognitive legitimacy.
However, applying this abstraction to any specific scenario is likely to demand 
some flexibility and extensions. Negative cognitive legitimacy can but does not 
necessarily have to negate positive cognitive legitimacy in mathematical fashion; 
"positive" and "negative" aspects o f cognitive legitimacy reflect human values, not 
mathematical values. There are likely to be qualitative differences in the natures of 
different dimensions of cognitive legitimacy and even of specific measures of a 
particular dimension.
Furthermore, intuition suggests that interpretations can vaiy a great deal across 
levels of analysis. Paradoxically, negative cognitive legitimacy at one level of analysis 
can be interpreted as being positive cognitive legitimacy at another. As plain and 
straightforward as the construct might seem, then, the state of theoretical development
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of cognitive legitimacy is not in final form. Overall public awareness is not a simple 
construct.
The results of this study also implied that the observability o f a competence may 
be associated with the relative ease by which related claims are cognitively legitimated 
or de-legitimated. In some scenarios, claims related to developments in firm-specific 
abilities to translate scientific knowledge into user fiinctionality -  i.e., technologies -  
can be relatively easy to cognitively legitimate because they are newsworthy, 
optimistic, and difficult to dispute. The overall legitimacy of an organization (i.e., its 
reputation) as well as the general legitimacy o f an organization's characteristics (e.g., 
smallness and newness) might be communicable to or even synergistic with this 
dynamic. Conversely, claims related to competences that are not firm-specific, and/or 
are easy to comprehend and interpret by media players and their consumers, can be 
relatively easy to cognitively de-legitimate. In some scenarios, unobservable articles of 
faith may be easier to cognitively legitimate than calculations of observable "facts". 
Limitations and Conclusion
This section concludes the study by summarizing the main implications 
discussed above, and then by offering suggestions for further research.
But before doing so, it is appropriate to acknowledge limitations o f the study.
The weakest aspect of the present study was its methodology. Specifically, all variables 
were measured categorically and frequency analysis was used to test all hypotheses. 
Qualitative extensions of the analysis were extensive and necessary, not merely 
illustrative.
First, the nominal measures used were coarse. It is not difficult to argue that 
industry membership/participation can be operationalized dichotomously, but it can just 
as easily be argued that incumbency is a metric variable; hence, it is easy to argue that 
operationalizing industry incumbency dichotomously threw away important data. On
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the other hand, the measure proved to be sufficient for exploratory purposes, and 
discussions indicated that a more rigorous operationalization might have distracted 
attention from the opportunities afforded by Morphological Analysis which only 
became more apparent as the study progressed. An explanation follows.
Statistical inconclusiveness o f the tests o f the hypotheses concerned with the 
relationship between industry incumbency and the fundamental categories of 
innovation was rooted not in the weaknesses of the operationalization of industry 
incumbency, but in the strength of the main tenets of the Technology Cycles literature 
in this scenario. Certainly, somewhere within or around the boundaries of SIC 3691 
were the boundaries of the set o f those U.S. firms which were primarily engaged in 
manufacturing Lead-Acid Storage Batteries for the automotive sector. U.S. 
manufacturers of storage batteries in general, and Lead-Acid Batteries in particular, 
were just not reported very much as developing electrochemical innovations for electric 
vehicles. As imperfect as SIC 3691 was as an operationalization of industry 
incumbency, imperfections did not distort the reality that SIC 3691 firms simply were 
not very active. No refinement o f this operationalization came close to changing any 
interpretation of any finding. In fact, the consistency of this finding established footing 
from which to improve an understanding of the concept of industry incumbency.
Intuition suggests that when the enhancement and/or destruction of competences 
is at stake, a sensible way to operationalize incumbency is to measure the main 
competences of concern. The more competent a firm is at something, the more 
incumbent it is to the relevant industry. Other measures such as firm size, age, market 
share or volume, etc., would at best be proxies for competences. But since, 
theoretically, competitively advantageous competences are tacit and unobservable, 
operationalizing incumbency in terms of competences contains an inherent and severe 
range restriction. The more competent a firm is, the more difficult it is for an outsider
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to observe it, or to at least understand it. Therefore virtually any measure of a firm* 
specific competence must be a proxy. The issue is which proxy is best.
This study used Morphological Analysis to dissect electrochemical innovations 
by observing them to be combinations o f options needed to embody necessary natural 
phenomena. In doing this, it dissected the product-technology competences that were 
being applied to the development of each innovation. Morphological measures (MD 
and PT) used in this dissertation were proxy measures of product-technology 
competences, though they were categorical measures.
The painfully obvious and very direct way to associate these categories with a 
metric measure is to also evaluate innovations in a critical dimension of performance. 
From a purely technical point o f view, a firm is incumbent to a technologically-defined 
industry (a definition which relates phenomenological function to user functionality) to 
the extent that its products perform. It makes just as much sense to say that a firm will 
be unwilling to destroy its own ability to produce high-performing products, as it does 
to say that a firm will be unwilling to destroy years o f investment, capital imbededness, 
and so forth. Saying the former, in fact, in a technical sense is just a more direct and 
clear way of saying the latter.
The point is manifold, but straightforward: (a) industry incumbency is a difficult 
construct to operationalize; (b) when the enhancement and/or destruction of 
competences is at stake, "industry" is intuitively associated with types of product- 
technology competence, and "incumbency" is intuitively associated with levels of 
competence; (c) since competences are theoretically unobservable, proxies must be 
used; (d) by categorically dissecting product technologies, Morphological Analysis also 
categorically dissects product-technology competences; (e) by associating 
morphological categories with s-curves, competences can be measured metrically,
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Therefore the limitations of using Morphological Analysis are far outweighed by its 
potential. This is the fundamental conclusion o f this dissertation.
It is important to understand the limitations of Morphological Analysis, 
however. Perhaps the most imposing is that it takes a great deal o f time, patience and 
researcher interest to develop an analysis that produces even a simple matrix. Second, 
each analysis is accordingly only as good as the skill and assumptions behind it. Third, 
each analysis and matrix is idiosyncratic, limited to a specific problem definition, and 
limited to a specific level of analysis. However, these limitations are typical of the 
problems developing typologies, which are what morphological analyses essentially 
produce, and which are very common to research in Strategic Management. Fourth, 
analyzing product technologies only dissects product-technology competences; there 
are, of course, other firm-level competences of very great and often greater importance. 
But here, it should be recalled that Morphological Analysis is in no way limited to 
considering only product technologies. It is a general approach to problem-solving that 
is extraordinarily flexible, and is applicable to a wide range of problems, business and 
otherwise.
The limitations o f operationalizing cognitive legitimacy as being the number of 
reports of advantages and disadvantages of performance and cost/price are fairly clear. 
First, every report in every media item was considered equally. Obviously, not every 
media item could have an equal effect on overall public awareness. Some readerships 
were large, while some were small; some constituencies were broad, while some were 
narrow; some items were rich and lengthy, while others were pithy and short; some had 
no purpose other than information dissemination, while others editorialized liberally.
No attempt was made to weight the gravity of each report in each item. On the other 
hand, the real issue of concern in the latter four propositions was not public awareness 
as much as it was the possibility that the public media might be influenced by industry
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players. The precise issue was not actually overall public awareness, but the possibility 
of biased reporting.
Next, operationalizing all variables in categorical terms virtually mandated the 
use of frequency analysis, which is not a rigorous technique. Even strong results 
demand some subjective interpretation. Small samples can be particularly 
uninterpretable. The form o f any relationship, and especially causality, is 
indeterminable. Low expected frequencies (and skewed distributions in general) inject 
the likelihood of Type II error. The test o f independence (chi-square) is an 
approximation. Measures o f Association (such as C) are relative and difficult to 
otherwise interpret.
These limitations would have seriously injured the present analysis had the 
statistical results not been so clear. That is, in most cases tests o f hypotheses either 
rejected or failed to reject the null hypothesis by such wide margins that the above 
dangers were avoided to a great extent. Failure to reject the null at even alpha = . 1 
made the likelihood of Type II error low even in the presence o f statistical bias. Where 
tests failed to reject the null, it could be confidently assumed that there was truly no 
statistical association between variables. Conversely, rejections of the null at alpha = 
.01, and in some cases .001, made statistical association a virtual certainty; so much so 
that face value interpretations were likely to be correct. In fact, the general air of the 
discussion seemed to become one where a mostly qualitative assessment was being 
corroborated by simple statistics, as opposed to an abstract discussion of a cacophony 
of statistics in search of a congealing rationale. The main issue became not the 
interpretation of each individual test (note that Measures o f Association were presented 
but not much discussed), but interpreting the basic theoretical contradictions implied by 
bipolar contrasts (standardizing tables greatly facilitated such comparisons).
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Interpretability was greatly enhanced, not limited, by sample size. In fact, one 
could argue that two thousand public media items, collected systematically and 
professionally over a two-year period, all addressing a fairly narrow band of all possible 
newsworthy events, was a very, very substantial portion of the total population of media 
items on the subject. It is very likely that the frequencies observed in the population 
sample were highly representative o f the actual, total population. This helped low 
observed and expected frequencies, which are statistically troublesome, to be 
meaningful at face value. In this study, sample size was an important strength which 
went far towards ameliorating other worries about statistical interpretability.
However, interpretations ultimately relied on comparing statistical results with a 
qualitative assessment o f technical and symposium data. Though the sources of 
information used in these assessments were highly credible, interpretations were 
entirely subject to the skills o f one individual. Several thousand pages of technical and 
symposium data were difficult to succinctly, no less accurately, summarize and present 
without some selection biases. A replication of this portion of the analysis might show 
differences. On the other hand, recall that one of the basic strengths of Technology 
Cycles studies is their richness. As such, all suffer symptoms common to qualitative 
research. This dissertation added rigor to a stream of largely qualitative research as 
much as it suffered from lack o f rigor relative to some other bodies o f literature.
In other words, strategy-oriented research in the evolution and revolution of 
technology faces trade-offs between positivistic rigor and contextual completeness.
This dissertation did not resolve any associated dilemma. It added richness to what 
might otherwise have been an empirically rigorous oversimplification, meaningless to a 
technologist; it added rigor to what might have been a non-replicable and value-driven 
case analysis, unacceptably idiosyncratic to a strategist. More importantly, it made 
progress towards integrating several o f the major concerns of several bodies of
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literature, which after much additional work could help develop a new and challenging 
synthesis of the strategic elements of technological change.
The main contribution of this study to the Strategic Management literature is the 
illumination o f a view that is already established in the Management o f Technology 
literature: technology, first and foremost, is not the result o f competence -  technology 
is competence. One reason that this view has been slow to develop in Strategic 
Management research might be the very reason it is so important. Technology, as 
competence, is difficult to observe and is often tacit at the level o f the firm. Tacitness 
is what affords some of its proprietary characteristics and potential for competitive 
advantage; meanwhile, tacitness is the characteristic which makes it difficult for many 
academic researchers to observe, understand, and embrace.
At any rate, if technology is competence, and if  knowledge and skill are key 
components of competence, then technological change involves learning. Learning can 
be serendipitous, but it also can be conscious, goal-oriented, and pro-active.
Serendipity implies probabilistic occurrence and variation-selection-retention models of 
technological change. To outsiders (and academic researchers are outsiders), 
technological change may seem to be random, unpredictable, and wholly probabilistic. 
Insiders -  technologists -  know that precise technological forecasting is next to 
impossible, and that nature has a way of stubbornly refusing to relinquish its secrets on 
orderly command, or at least in neat proportion to the allocation of resources. But at 
the same time they know that resources are very purposively allocated towards the 
resolution of fairly specific technological bottlenecks, at all levels o f organization -  
and that focused breakthroughs are not uncommon and always accidental. What can 
seem to be happenchance and sporadic to the outside observer is not, by far, always 
accidental to technologists who daily make it their professional lives to realize progress. 
One can choose to learn serendipitously, or one can choose to learn specific new things.
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Or one can choose to learn along a trajectory and make the most o f serendipitous 
discoveries along the way.
The gravity o f these distinctions is nowhere more evident than in the path- 
dependency of technological choices. Success at learning in one area only invites more 
learning in the same area. The successful inauguration o f a technological trajectory has 
tremendous leverage towards its entrenchment. Only when it becomes clear that 
performance growth along one technological trajectory is phenomenologically limited, 
does it become clear that if  greatly superior performance is to be achieved, a new 
trajectory must be inaugurated at non-trivial cost, potentially on several levels of 
socioeconomic organization.
Furthermore, there is no necessary correspondence, or association, between the 
size o f the "gale" on one level o f analysis, and the amount of "destruction" it can cause 
on another level o f analysis. This is not the same as saying that a modest innovation 
can have a great impact. Anecdotally, many people are aware o f the enormous impact 
o f innovations like the integrated circuit, the incandescent light bulb, gunpowder, the 
stirrup, and so forth. The point is that a strategy of rolling out successive, small 
discontinuities is not necessarily as conservative and risk-averse as it might seem.
Small discontinuities can potentially impose huge externalities, socioeconomic 
disincentives so severe that an entire trajectory can be stillborn. It is sometimes 
possible that a more radical, destructive, different, or morphologically "distant" 
technological discontinuity, viewed ffom the product level, can be more acceptable at 
the socioeconomic infrastructure level. Strategists should carefully consider this irony 
vis-a-vis short and long-term organizational goals.
Also, some consciously intended paths o f learning can be difficult enough to 
demand significant amounts o f organization. The backyard or basement tinkerer can 
not be relied upon to rejuvenate every industry in the throes o f such a need. Industrial
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metamorphosis has more than two options: complete suicide/rebirth or assassination 
and takeover by the unheard-of. Logically enough, industrial metamorphosis can be 
viewed as morphological migration -  the realignment of competences aimed at 
bringing new levels of product function to new or existing consumer functionalities. In 
less cryptic language, new industries can develop through new, synergistic alignments 
of existing, as well as new, firm-level and/or firm-specific competences. Backyard 
entrepreneurship is important, but so are inter-industry joint ventures and alliances, 
consortia, trade organizations, some degree of public-sector coordination, and so forth. 
Organizational amorphousness (at any level) is not a completely reliable structure for 
imposing significant, goal-oriented (non-random) morphological migration.
A final conclusion offered to strategic managers and strategic management 
researchers alike is that they would do well to gain an appreciation of the technological- 
phenomenological antecedents o f the products offered by their respective industries of 
concern. The limitations and demands of nature are imposing and make requirements 
of product technologies and organizational competences. Created, or at least 
impermanent, realities like market segments, industry boundaries, strategic groups, and 
so forth, can have phenomenological underpinnings that this dissertation has only 
implied. The simple but important suggestion is that the limitations and opportunities 
of natural phenomena, when mapped, might be real, reliable, and useful maps of 
potential industrial change.
The main contribution o f this study to the Management of Technology literature 
is additional confidence in the fundamental tenets of technology s-curve and 
Technology Cycles frameworks. Despite many complexities, virtually inextricable 
causal direction, and in this scenario severe sociopolitical distortions, technological 
progress can be understood in terms that are consistent and rigorous.
215
Unfortunately, and to risk a contradiction in terms, the rigor is qualitative, not 
quantitative, That is, the history of technological progress is roughly but almost 
invariably explainable by s-curve and Technology Cycle frameworks. Often, specific s- 
curves of actual developments can be plotted. The general dynamic is so consistent that 
the future can, with much confidence, be expected to display s-shaped patterns of 
performance growth, and the last o f innumerable, inevitable and important 
technological discontinuities is far into the future. But specific forecasts are inherently 
problematic -  since the essence of innovation is doing (or creating) things that have not 
been done (or created) before, or metaphorically, since innovation means exploring 
territory that has not been explored before, one can not draw a detailed map of 
unknown terrain until one is at least in the process of exploration.
And exploration is a choice. It is not inevitable, at least not monolithicaliy on a 
broad, comprehensive, and always perfectly rational frontier. Going in specific, 
challenging directions mandates organization and resource allocation; in such cases, 
performance growth is the direct result of technologists' effort. From the Strategic 
Management perspective, pure ecological models of technological progress condescend 
human intelligence and will. They may go far towards explaining the sociology of 
technological change, but offer few helpful suggestions to practicing technology 
strategists.
Therefore, underdeveloped areas conundrums in s-curve and Technology Cycles 
frameworks should not be interpreted by academic researchers as being clear signals 
that further theoretical development is impossible. This study, for example, has 
suggested that the discontinuity-ferment-dominant design-stability model of 
technological change is not inviolable. The present scenario seemed to be better 
depicted as political discontinuity-ferment-technological discontinuity/dominant 
design-stability. Yet s-curves still seemed to be pervasive and powerfully explanatory.
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This oddity should not be dismissed as being anomalous. It might be a harbinger of 
things to come, as governments appreciate more and more the pros and cons of pro­
active technological development from social, economic, and other points o f view.
In a sense, the results o f this study suggested that s-curves are solid first 
approximations, but that there is still much to be done about developing the theoretical 
basis of subsequent approximations. For example, it is important to realize that 
phenomenological (theoretical) limits are derived from scientific knowledge. Practical 
limits will very often be lower than phenomenological limits, as engineers are always 
likely to encounter many practical problems between the laboratory and the 
marketplace. This observation does not discount the validity of s-curve frameworks as 
they are, it just suggests that applications beyond a rudimentary understanding must 
consider practical as well as theoretical asymptotes. Again, it can not be 
overemphasized that performance growth is a direct result of human effort, made 
mostly (or at least most directly) by technologists. Generally speaking, performance 
growth is not directly caused by the passage o f time, variations in market demand, or 
political mandate. Performance growth is the direct result of technological competence 
and all competences are subject to management and mismanagement.
Additionally, performance growth in one measure is not always independent of 
growth in other measures, and not all interactions are positively synergistic. In fact, 
performance trade-offs are common. Any s-curve should be appreciated as being a very 
focused representation of performance growth in one and only one measure and should 
never automatically be considered to represent a pattern of growth in overall 
acceptability.
Though no very specific form of the relationship was ever proposed, this study 
consistently implied that a main non-phenomenological variable that interacts with 
performance growth is cost/price. In general, it is accepted that product substitution
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becomes likely as product price/performance ratios become similar, though 
performance seems to be the more formidable element o f this dynamic. Results o f this 
study supported this view. Considering all available options and their 
phenomenological limitations, it seemed inevitable that storage batteries intended for 
use in electric vehicles, superior in performance to the dominant design, would appear. 
The handwriting was on the wall, so to speak, and crude but credible performance 
expectations were not seriously distorted between the publications written by directly- 
involved technologists and media professionals who surely ranged in their degrees o f ■ 
short-term disaffection from the issue. Performance seemed assured.
The battleground was cost/price. Cost containment and abatement was either 
not inevitable or relatively easy to argue, or both. The spoils of winning portended to 
be spectacular. Ostensibly, and regardless o f ultimate performance potential, if one 
trajectory could be successfully dissuaded from gaining short-term popular appeal 
based on cost/price exorbitance, the associated delay could give the proponents of 
another trajectory (tacitly collusive or not) the opportunity to establish a path- 
dependent, though in other terms tenuous, foothold. Once a trajectory is successfully 
inaugurated, other factors are likely to then positively synergize and accelerate 
improvements in performance and cost/price in that trajectory, severely dissuading 
continued allocation of resources to competing trajectories, even ones that had/have the 
potential to be superior in most meaningful measures in the most long-term view.
The main contribution of this study to the Technological Forecasting (R&D 
Management) literature is the observation that the meaning of product morphology 
might bear extensive conceptual expansion. That is, the morphology of a product's 
technologies might be a boilerplate for other structures related to the product. In the 
most immediate sense, a product’s morphology seems to be a reasonable representation 
of the separate technological competences needed to develop it. Additional inspection
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of a morphology is also likely to identify what in the Strategic Management literature 
are termed "core" and/or "distinctive" competences. Morphological Analysis gets into 
the black box o f technology in a rational, systematic and replicable way, producing 
typologies o f feasible alternatives that form distinct patterns that relate 
phenomenological function to user functionality, and depict technological trajectories, 
possible market segments, strategic groups, and industries. Inasmuch, the potential of 
Morphological Analysis increases as does the complexity of the product. At the same 
time, the technique is extremely flexible; so much so that idiosyncricity o f results is an 
important caveat. At any rate, R&D managers have tools and insights that make them 
uniquely qualified to help develop not only technology strategies for practicing 
managers, but also the theory o f technological evolution and revolution from the 
strategic perspective.
A contribution of this study that is of mutual benefit to both the Management of 
Technology and Technological Forecasting communities is an enhanced understanding 
of the relationship between s-curve frameworks and morphology. That is, the strengths 
of each help ameliorate some of the weaknesses of the other. S-curves are 
unidimensional and oversimplified, a weakness that becomes troublesome at high 
levels of analysis such as Technology Cycles. A Morphological Analysis of any 
complex product, however, produces a disjointed matrix of phenomenological building 
blocks that suggests thousands o f possible combinations. With the insight that a 
morphological analysis can provide, s-curves can be thought of as simple 
representations o f multi-parametric patterns o f exploration. With the elegance that s- 
curve frameworks can provide, rough patterns of exploration can be forecast. In short, 
the literature indicates that exploration of a map tends to occur at or near the frontier; 
more distant leaps tend to be expensive, tend to be risky because of the additional 
uncertainties involved, and tend to be pursued by players with little "incumbency" to
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lose. Consequently, distant leaps tend to be aimed at combinations that have clearly 
superior performance and profit potentials.
The main contribution o f this study to the Institutional Theory literature is the 
simple but important observation that cognitive legitimacy, interpreted as overall public 
awareness, is not nearly as simple as this definition implies. The mere awareness of the 
existence of something, such as an impending technological innovation, can easily be 
interpreted in different ways. The simple awareness of a technological innovation is 
likely to be intertwined with an understanding of its features; for example, how well it 
will perform and how much it will probably cost. There will often be a point of 
reference, such as a prevailing or dominant design, against which one can reasonably 
assert that observations o f an innovation's features are either negative, by way of their 
relative inferiority, or positive, by way of their relative superiority. Thus not all public 
notoriety is necessarily advantageous, depending on the specific question at hand. 
Researchers should take care to consider the converse of their operationalizations of 
cognitive legitimacy, as full understandings of symmetries and asymmetries can wholly 
change interpretations. As well, academic researchers should consider the value- 
ladenness of their operationalizations and research questions, because academic 
researchers participate in the cognitive legitimation of issues and their dimensions.
Another contribution to the Institutional Theory literature is a first-known test of 
Aldrich & Fid's (1994) assertions about how firms should be expected to use their 
ability to influence the public media to defend the legitimacy of their product 
technologies and attack the legitimacy of the technologies o f competing firms. On this 
specific issue, however, results were inconclusive. A level of analysis was chosen 
below one that would have produced results that were already obvious. Unfortunately, 
at the level of analysis chosen, the predictions of the Technology Cycles literature were 
so overwhelmingly true that direct empirical contrasts of institutional considerations
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could not be established; that is, incumbents were so inactive even in developing 
incremental improvements to the dominant design that their hypothesized ability to 
disproportionately profit from legitimation/de-legitimation processes could not be 
determined. Furthermore, in general the public media's representation of actual 
industry activity seemed accurate and fair, leaving the analyst at a loss to conclude 
whether media campaigns were ineffective or simply non-existent.
On the other hand, there was little doubt concerning several serendipitous 
findings. First, from the academic researcher’s point of view, it is reasonable to expect 
public media data to contain a bias towards newsworthy events. Second, it was 
important to observe that one technological trajectory clearly got a huge plurality of the 
overall publicity. Had the hypotheses asserted that phenomenologically-defined 
trajectories would be legitimized differently based on the possibility of tacit collusion, 
instead of the more basic incumbent-v.-non-incumbent argument, results would have 
been discovered more directly. In other words, the MD dichotomy was too coarse­
grained a measure to get affirmative statistical results (concerning differences in 
legitimacy), and PT was too fine-grained a measure. It seemed that a 
phenomenological definition and measure of the concept "technological trajectory", 
based on tacit collusion and strategic group logic and literature, would have worked 
well.
Finally, for the sake o f perspective it is important to note a simple Institutional 
Theory version of an interpretation that has been consistently phrased in other terms. It 
has been argued that because some competences are tacit and unobservable, they might 
be easier to legitimate than competences that are observable, imitable, and arguable in 
comprehensible detail. In Institutional terms, ininimitability and unobservability are 
akin to buffers (Scott, 1992). Technological competences might be more mythological 
(Meyer & Rowan, 1977) than others, making them more difficult to refute. A firm's
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reputation for innovation might be one of the most important organizational resources 
towards enhancing its ability to survive, and perhaps lead, technological discontinuities.
Implications for additional research are straightforward. Probably the most 
inviting area for further development is the potential that appears to be inherent in 
Morphological Analysis or techniques like it. The main potential of the technique lies 
in its ability to enter the black box of technology. Any product at any level o f analysis 
can be dissected about the same way electrochemical devices were dissected in this 
study. Additionally, the technique is not limited to the analysis o f product technology; 
nor is it limited to studying technology. It is simply a way of breaking down any 
problem that has definable boundaries into its most elemental dimensions (or, when 
considering technological innovations, phenomena), so as to allow a full consideration 
of each manner (option) o f delivering each elemental (phenomenological) function, en 
route to being able to consider all possible combinations of options (designs). This 
study has shown that it can produce a matrix, or map, of competences, feasible and 
unfeasible alternatives, phenomenologically distinct categories of innovations, and 
phenomenologically defined technological trajectories. To the extent that these 
structures are valid, the technique is immediately useful to technologists and those 
studying technology and technological change. To the extent that these structures 
represent or foretell socioeconomic and technoeconomic structures, their potential to 
academic research has barely been implied.
A related suggestion for additional research is the need to develop competence- 
based views and operationalizations of industry incumbency. Static views of industry 
are adequately served by using extant methods and structures like SIC. But when 
changes o f structures are at issue, prevailing views are inherently flawed and myopic. 
Visualizing "industry" as a set o f competences, or alignments of competences, has the 
potential to also visualize industrial and technological evolution and revolution. Of
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course, competences are inherently difficult to operationalize; proxies must be used, but 
some are much better than others.
As such, the death-rebirth model o f creative destruction may be oversimplified. 
Serendipitous discovery should be encouraged, of course, but many technological 
directions will, in the future, be made by choice and will involve new forms of private, 
public, and joint private and public organization. A metamorphosis/migration model 
might better represent choice-based dynamics o f technological evolution and revolution 
than a winner-take-all model. Here, variation-selection-retention is not the same as 
metamorphosis because choice is not a main engine of change in ecological models. 
Metamorphosis and migration invite concepts like choice and resource allocation along 
intended trajectories.
S-curve and Technology Cycles frameworks have the potential to become 
theories and there is much room in them for further theoretical development. The 
multidimensionality that underlies almost any high-level s-curve can be explained 
morphologically; likewise, performance-based metric measures will often be 
calculable. Interactive and perhaps recursive models of change should be developed 
that consider not only multiple measures of performance, but dimensions such as 
development cost and price.
Though this dissertation did not delve deeply into the psychology of cognitive 
legitimacy, several implications and conclusions suggest the need for additional 
research. First, it became apparent that the importance of cognitive legitimacy in the 
transitions among technological paradigms and trajectories may vary a great deal by 
level o f analysis. High levels o f analysis imply much public visibility o f powerful and 
distinctly different antagonists struggling for positions in obvious ways. Low levels of 
analysis imply low levels o f public visibility, where antagonists are likely to differ in 
ways that are technologically subtle and semantically cryptic. Therefore, pro-active
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legitimation and de-legitimation in the public media might be difficult to accomplish at 
low levels o f analysis. Second, cognitive legitimacy seems to have a positive side and a 
negative side. Especially where smear campaigns are important to a particular issue, it 
is important for researchers to consider the value ladenness and the converse of their 
operationalizations. "More" cognitive legitimacy can be a help or hindrance to the 
successful introduction of technological innovations.
A summary o f the implications for practitioners is as follows. First, from the 
strategic perspective, managers should take efforts to avoid the potential myopia that 
extant mental structures of industries and markets might impose; aligning competences 
and end-user functionalities affords a fresher perspective from which to identify firms 
that are likely to determine the structure of future competitive space. In that vein, 
managers should appreciate that technology is first and foremost human-based 
competence, the ability to translate scientific knowledge into commercializable 
products; and that technologists have well-precedented tools for mapping out the 
present state of industrial affairs and likely paths of progress. Thinking through these 
pathways can lead a manager to consider strategic alternatives less draconian than those 
implied by the most common, intimidating interpretation of the Schumpeterian view. 
"Creative destruction" can, ironically, be managed somewhat incrementally, through the 
evolution of innovative forms o f industrial organization — joint ventures, alliances, 
consortia, networks, etc. From this perspective, incumbents are never necessarily 
doomed even in the long-term, but should self-induce careful metamorphoses of 
alignments o f competences.
Managers need to understand the ubiquitous dynamics of s-curves and 
Technology Cycles. Innovation is probabilistic in the sense that detailed apportionment 
of resources never guarantees the accomplishment of specific goals, but the general 
shape of progress within phenomenological potentials is predictable. Managers should
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track performance growth assiduously over time, and understand that what is ultimately 
being tracked is learning. Hence managing performance growth is to manage learning, 
which is likely to be synergistic with firm-level variables like sales volume and cost.
Therefore, managers should understand that though new competitive space will 
take shape primarily through the delivery of performance, short-term cost problems are 
far from irrelevant, even if  they are likely to be resolved in the long-term. Slow starts, 
caused in part by communicable pessimism about high costs, can allow other firms 
pursuing innovations o f inferior performance potentials the opportunity to establish 
intractable trajectories, or path-dependencies. Therefore, managers should understand 
where their firms' innovations fit amidst developing trajectories and potential 
technological bandwagons. For example, a firm closely following technological 
developments within an increasingly popular trajectory might be in the best position to 
slingshot technology fellowship into market leadership. In this example and elsewhere, 
reputation for innovation is important to develop and guard.
Managers must continue to develop their understanding of non-market forces.
In a broad sense, technological progress can be legislated, though the results of 
mandating a "push" approach are very likely to differ from the results of a "pull" 
approach. Personal preferences aside, managers must understand that perspectives of 
technological change will ofien vary across stakeholder groups and levels of analysis. 
Public forums for debate, such as a free press, are likely to show patterns of 
representation that, aside the issue of technical accuracy, can be interpreted in different 
ways. Public priroties will not always mirror the firm-specific priorities, and a tactical 
perspective will sometimes conflict with a strategic perspective. As well, a global view 
will not always be the same as a national view.
Consumers of the results o f this study should carefully consider the 
generalizability of all interpretations and conclusions. For example, this study focused
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on manufactured/ assembled products. Dynamics in the service sector might differ. 
Similarly, process innovations can be as important as product innovations, even in the 
manufactured/assembled product sector. The difference between a product innovation 
and a process innovation is sometimes obscure, a point which can be particularly 
troublesome when equating technology to competence. The boundary between product 
and process innovations is not always clear when both result in added value to the end- 
user.
Also, the literature consistently shows that industry is an important moderator of 
strategic dynamics. The automobile industry should be appreciated as being globally 
critical, politically volatile, enormously visible, extremely oligopolistic, and an 
important part o f the fabric o f twentieth century, western civilization. The evolution of 
related industries and/or subsectors is embedded in this milieu. The evolution o f many 
other industries will obviously be affected by other, often less extreme conditions.
All things considered, a final suggestion is a call for much more multi­
disciplinary research. Strategic Management theory typically portrays itself as being a 
synthesis o f the contributions o f several bodies of literature. This dissertation does not 
take the position that fields like Industrial Organization, Marketing, and Administrative 
Behavior should contribute less to the further development of Strategic Management 
theory. This dissertation does take the position that the Management of Technology 
also be considered as being centrally important to Strategic Management research and 
the strategy process. This position might not be the most popular one, but in no sense is 
it new. At least in the economics literature, the central importance of technology and 
technological change to economic development and growth has been recognized since 
the seminal contributions of Adam Smith and David Hume, who both wrote at times 
when the entire industrial revolution was anything but obvious.
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APPENDIX 1
Research Scenario and Morphological Analysis
The growing concern for air quality has been an important factor towards 
motivating a movement to develop automobiles which do not pollute (Considine, 1994; 
Cronk, 1995; Fortune, 1993; Meyer, 1994; Winn, 1994; Pratt, 1992). Not surprisingly, 
the State of California has taken the lead in the promotion of zero-emission vehicles 
through legislative action. Succinctly, beginning in 1998,2% of all new autos sold in 
the state by the major auto manufacturers must be zero-polluting, and the percentage 
grows in the out-years. If an automaker does not comply, it will be fined $5,000 for 
every vehicle it sells in the state. A body of 12 northeastern states, led by New York 
and Massachusetts, has enacted or is considering very similar statutes. Altogether, 33% 
of all autos sold in the United States could soon be affected by these laws.
In the foreseeable future, the only viable auto technology capable o f zero- 
emissions is an all-electric vehicle (EV). Besides having (arguably) positive effects on 
the quality of air, EVs have other inherently appealing qualities: quietness, convenient 
home refueling, extremely low maintenance, and a reduced dependence on oil. 
However, they presently have drawbacks: high cost/price, short driving range, lack of 
public recharging infrastructure, lack of available maintenance expertise, unproven 
safety, and "concerns simply about new technology... 'Legislation has forced an initial 
market for EVs, but creating a self-sustaining, long-term market for these vehicles 
requires widespread public acceptance... Ultimately, this acceptance will depend not 
only on the cost and performance of the vehicles themselves, but also on the 
convenience o f owning an EV in this gasoline-dominated society'" (Fortune, 1993, no 
page).
Initially, however, the main obstacles are indeed technical. At present, electric 
vehicles do not perform as well as gasoline-powered autos in several ways. Most
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experts agree that the main problem is limited range; EVs do not travel very far on one 
charge. This deficiency has fomented an enormous amount of attention on electric 
vehicle power sources. Testifying before the United States Congress, a General Motors 
spokesman articulated perhaps the most common perception of the problem: "I think 
the emphasis has to be placed on the dollars spent in the research and development of 
alternative battery technology. The lead-acid battery is a first step on a journey, or an 
evolution of electric vehicles. You have to get started; somebody has to make the 
beginning step to put high-volume vehicles in the marketplace... There is a substantial 
amount of ongoing research that has to be done in alternative batteries" (Hearing 162, 
1990; 137). Testifying before Congress several years later, a GM Vice-President 
rephrased the problem: "Beyond the mid-term, a 'next-generation' battery is needed that 
will allow electric vehicles to be a competitive alternative to gasoline-powered 
vehicles. These long-term technologies will require extensive scientific development at 
the electrochemical cell level to determine technical feasibility and commercial 
viability" (Hearing 28,1993; 79).
Though these two testimonials sound very similar, from the viewpoint 
developed in this dissertation they are distinctly different. The most obvious difference 
is the long-term (i.e., more strategic) orientation of the Vice President's comments. The 
second difference is the phenomenological focus of the Vice President. Though the 
first spokesman correctly identified the most popular hardware -  in fact, he identified 
the dominant design (lead-acid batteries) -- the Vice President correctly identified a 
technology/competence in terms immediately amenable to a morphological analysis. 
With the words "electrochemical cell," he identified the basic group of phenomena and 
level o f analysis that are most appropriate to a Morphological Analysis of the EV range 
problem.
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In order to conduct a Morphological Analysis of electrochemical cells, a precise 
statement of the problem must first be made. In the view of technology described 
earlier, this means that the problem should be phrased in both functional and technical 
terms. Based on the above discussion, the functional problem is to increase the 
distance a "battery"-powered all-electric vehicle can travel between charges. Though 
this statement seems simple, it assumes the following: electrochemistry is the preferred 
means of converting stored energy to auto-locomotion; the vehicle is a passenger 
automobile; the automobile is new; the space available for battery storage is fixed (total 
volume, but not shape); velocity (and hence acceleration) is fixed/optimal. These 
assumptions are necessary in order to focus on the problem as it has been stated, for 
the following reasons. First, electrochemistry is not the only source o f electric power 
that can propel an automobile, but alternative technologies seem very unlikely to 
develop in the time frame of concern (Hearings 1990,1993; Winn, 1994). Second, 
many "alternative fuels" are extremely low-emitting but none are zero-emitting (Lawlor, 
1994). Therefore, no hybridization of electrochemistry with any form of internal 
combustion engine is considered. Third, niche products like buses and delivery 
vehicles present less of a space constraint than do passenger autos. However, the 
theoretical and practical problems expressed earlier address mass-market 
commercializability. Passenger autos must be developed in order to change the 
automobile industry on the scale envisioned, and these vehicles are limited in available 
space to the extent that volume is fixed, at least to a very modest range. Finally, the 
range o f an EV, much like the miles-per-gallon of a gasoline engine, is affected by its 
age and how it is used. Optimal conditions will be assumed.
Translating the functional problem into a technical/technological problem, it 
becomes: improve the energy density (gravimetric or volummetric) o f  an 
electrochemical cell (or "battery" o f  cells). This statement, as well as the following
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discussion, is derived from an understanding of the basic natural laws that govern 
electrochemistry and electrochemical cells, (Brant, 1994; Bockris & Khan, 1993; 
Encyclopedia Britannica, 1988; Hackleman, 1992;),
"Energy density (or gravimetric energy density)... also known as specific energy 
... is the amount of power available from a battery for a certain length of time (under 
optimal conditions) measured in watt-hours per pound of battery weight. It translates 
directly to the range performance your EV can get out of its batteries... Volummetric 
energy density... is energy density measured in watt-hours per gallon or watt-hours per 
cubic foot" (Brant, 1994; 230-231).
Fortunately, a basic knowledge of electricity is all that is required to derive the 
phenomenological parameters that govern the energy density of an electrochemical cell. 
First, Ohm's Law holds that in any electric circuit, voltage or electromotive force (E) is 
equal to amperes or current (I) times the total internal and external resistance (R) in the 
circuit: E=IR. The power o f a device is expressed in watts, which equals the product of 
voltage and current: P=VI.
Since the numerator o f either volummetric or gravimetric energy density is watt- 
hours, and since a watt is volts times amps, one watt-hour is equivalent to one volt- 
amp-hour. This means that volts and amps must phenomenologically "happen" in an 
electrochemical cell, and therefore are two of its most fundamental parameters.
In a cell, some kind of anode (or negative electrode) must be available that, 
because o f its electrical charge at the molecular level, has a surplus of electrons that it 
"wants to" release. Some kind o f cathode (or positive electrode) must be available that, 
because of its electrical charge at the molecular level, is deficient in electrons and 
"wants to" accept them. The former process, because it originally involved molecules 
containing oxygen, is termed oxidation; the latter is termed reduction. The 
combination o f a specific anode and a specific cathode is called an electrochemical
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cell ~  the differential o f the electrical states between the two electrodes determines the 
voltage of the device (the higher the differential, the higher the voltage). Therefore, 
oxidation and reduction are so dynamically interrelated that either is essentially 
meaningless without the other. Morphologically, voltage arises from combined 
oxidation-reduction (Redox) phenomena and each specific couple has an inherently 
different voltage. Therefore, Redox is a phenomenological parameter, where the 
options are identifiable by the labels which many observers will find familiar: lead- 
acid, nickel-cadmium, sodium-sulfur, and so forth.
Next, amperes (current) must be considered. As the term "current" implies, 
amperes is an expression of electron flow. Now one of the aforementioned 
assumptions becomes very important. In an electrochemical device, rate and duration 
of flow are very much inversely related; at a constant velocity, however, rate of flow is 
constant and maximizing range is to maximize the duration of flow. This means that 
the time component of the battery's "capacity," or amp-hours, must be maximized.
At constant velocity, amp-hours is a function of the number o f available 
electrons. The number o f available electrons is directly proportional to the amounts of 
reacting materials. In the case described above, where the anode and the cathode 
contain the reacting materials, this means that amp-hours are limited by the amounts of 
materials in the anode or in the cathode. For any electrochemical couple, this amount is 
absolutely limited by the size (volume) o f the device, which has been assumed to be 
fixed. Other than making incremental improvements to the device's internal geometry 
and architecture which would make better use of available space, one way to improve 
amp-hours, and one that is phenomenologically different from the case described 
above, is to choose materials such that the electrodes and the reacting materials are not 
one and the same. In this way, the reacting materials can be stored outside the device in 
vehicle space not consumed by the device itself, then transported into the device as a
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type of consumable "fuel" (for all practical purposes, this also means that the reacting 
materials must be either liquid or gaseous as they are transported into the device). This 
describes most "fuel cells," which are phenomenologically very similar to the more 
commonly heard expression "batteries." (Fuel cells are sometimes referred to as 
"reverse batteries" or "reverse electrolysis" devices, but the basic underlying 
phenomenon is, nevertheless, oxidation-reduction). In sum, the commonality o f (a) the 
materials undergoing oxidation-reduction and (b) the materials that constitute the 
electrodes, is a phenomenological parameter that affects amp-hours. Two distinct 
options that have very different limitations are "common" and "separate."
Also, electric currents must travel through a medium. In an electrochemical 
device the medium is called the electrolyte (a medium is also required outside the 
device in order to have a complete circuit, but this has been assumed). In some devices, 
the electrolyte is chemically reactive; in others, it is inert. In all devices the electrolyte 
provides unavoidable internal resistance. However, the performance characteristics of 
specific electrolytes are dynamically interrelated with the chemical properties of the 
electrochemical couple. That is, electrolytes are chosen to optimize oxidation- 
reduction, and phenomenological differences are driven by the need to accommodate 
the choice o f electrode materials. In the same sense that O-R was considered to be one 
phenomenological parameter, the dynamic participation of the electrolyte is considered 
part o f it as well. This is true of both batteries and fuel cells, even though fuel cells' 
nomenclatures typically identify the composition of the electrolyte, rather than the 
electrodes.
To be complete, Brant (1994) listed the following factors as affecting a device's 
capacity: area or physical size of the plates (electrodes), weight and amount of materials 
in plates, number of plates and types o f separators, quantity and specific gravity of the 
electrolyte, age, condition, temperature, voltage limit, and discharge rate. Most of these
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factors have either been accounted for in the above discussions, or have been fixed by 
assumption, but some deserve additional explanation.
Most importantly, many construction features/choices affect the size of the 
surface area o f the chemical reactions that produce the current, which determines the 
rate of current flow, which defines a crucial parameter called specific power or power 
density. This phenomenon translates to speed and acceleration. As discussed above, 
while there is a crucial trade-off between specific density and specific power, the range 
problem demands a focus on specific energy. Current EV technologies provide 
adequate acceleration and speed characteristics; it is range that is critically inadequate. 
In principal, power density is an important parameter, but as it applies to this specific 
problem, conditions that determine it can be assumed. Furthermore, it should be noted 
that innovations that affect the surface area o f the cell reactants are by definition 
incremental improvements to existing morphs. While these are no doubt important, at 
the present level o f analysis, they do not constitute phenomenologically different 
options.
As well, a battery's weight is crucial. This is a function of its size and the 
density of the constituent materials. However, size is assumed as fixed (which obviates 
the denominator o f volummetric energy density), and the density o f materials is driven 
by the more urgent choice of choosing materials based on their material (voltage) 
properties (which obviates the denominator o f gravimetric energy density). Thus while 
size and density are important, there are no phenomenologically different "options" that 
are not already automatic in other choices.
Similarly, thermal efficiency affects power, so it affects range. Thermal 
efficiency is principally a matter of power that is lost due to the unavoidable conversion 
of some chemical energy into heat instead of electricity. This is a function of the total 
resistance in the circuit. Since speed and acceleration are fixed, and other external
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conditions are not considered variables, external load is fixed. Internal resistance is 
largely a function o f the device's construction and type/amount of electrolyte and other 
materials used. Again, though there are some important trade-offs here, there are no 
phenomenologically different "options” that are not automatic in other choices.
Specific energy is also a function of the simple temperature of the device. Cold 
devices do not flow as readily as warm devices, as a rule, and in fact some devices need 
fairly precise conditions. More specifically, some devices will not operate at all under 
normal driving conditions; they need to be maintained at hundreds o f degrees to operate 
at all. Fundamentally, then, considering that operating conditions have been assumed 
as optimal, the two basic options concerning temperature are whether it will be 
controlled, or not. The performance differential between these two options is so 
dramatic, it is essentially a "go/no-go" determination.
Finally, "range extenders" should be considered. Many technologies (such as 
aerodynamics, tire chemistry, etc), are undergoing rapid rates of development in order 
to extend the range of EVs. But maintaining a focus on the problem as it has been 
stated, they do not affect a device's specific energy while in the state of discharge. 
However, it is possible to partly recharge some types of devices even while they are 
functioning, by capturing and feeding back energy losses (due to friction, thermal 
losses, etc.), reconverted to electricity. However, devices that consume non- 
regenerative fuel can not be recharged this way. For the sake of simplicity, it will be 
assumed that any device that can be regenerated while in discharge, will be engineered 
as such. Therefore where regeneration is a phenomenological parameter, basic options 
are feasible/present and infeasible/absent. Essentially, this groups primary (non- 
rechargeable) batteries with most types of fuel cells (which operate in the manner 
described earlier) as one phenomenological type of option, and secondary 
(rechargeable) batteries with other possibilities (such as rechargeable fuel cells) as the
254
other type of option; a division which is otherwise not obvious. Rechargeability while 
in operation is an interesting parameter, and the phenomenologically distinct options 
directly affect range.
(At this point it should be noted that whether a device can be "refueled" by 
either recharging or replacing its "fuel," are two options of a parameter that is not of 
concern to the problem as it has been stated. From another interpretation of the range 
problem, a very important issue is the lack of public infrastructure whereby EV owners 
can conveniently either recharge their batteries or physically replace a consummable 
fuel. However, the focus of the problem at hand is the range that a vehicle can travel 
on a single amount o f fuel, in which case the method o f refueling or replacement is not 
a range constraint. In fact, even a long-life primary battery is an entirely feasible 
solution, theoretically speaking).
In ail the above, the more sophisticated reader will be familiar with the many 
ways that electrochemical cells might be altered and possibly improved in terms of the 
selection o f materials other than those discussed (separators, connectors, casings, etc.), 
manufacturing technique, the internal architecture of the device, and so forth. In the 
morphological view of the problem as it has been stated at the level o f analysis of 
concern, however, these are either process improvements or incremental improvements 
to existing morphs. The above discussion leads to the following morphological matrix.
Table A.I. Morphological Matrix o f Electrochemical Devices.
Parameter Option Option Option
Redox Lead-Acid NiCad Other
Commonality Combined Separate




1.) Before you are 25 articles that all pertain to the advent of the electric automobile, read one 
article at a time, completing all of the following instructions for each article before proceeding to 
the next.
2.) As you read an article, mark it up liberally as you look for the following information. First, 
identify any/all of the devices listed on the attached list of "Power Types." Second, identify and 
mark the manufacturers) of each device. Third, mark/note any statement that infers how (a) the 
price/cost, and or (b) the range (distance it allows a vehicle to travel on one charge) 
characteristics of the device COMPARES with the price/cost and range characteristics of its 
"alternatives" (see below).
3. On the coding sheet, indicate the number of the article (handwritten on each article) under 
"NUMBER". Write the name of each device under "POWRTYPE" and use the attached sheet to 
also code its "MD" and "PT". Write the name of the manufacturers) under "POWRMFG” and 
refer to the attached sheet to code the manufacturer’s incumbency: if the name appears on the 
list, mark a " 1" under "INC"; otherwise mark a "0". use as many lines on the coding sheet as 
necessary to account for each POWRTYPE and POWRMFG (but don't code one POWRTYPE 
more than once per article unless there is more than one manufacturer).
4. Refer again to your impressions about relative cost and range characteristics, and consider 
this basic question for each POWRTYPE you identified: if POWRTYPE is a type of Lead-Acid 
batteiy, how does it compare to any other POWRTYPE that is NOT Lead-Acid; if POWRTYPE 
IS NOT Lead-Acid, how does it compare to Lead-Acid? More specifically, for each 
POWRTYPE identified, subject it's description to the following questions. Any time an answer 
is "yes", mark a " 1" in the appropriate column on the coding sheet. Otherwise just leave spaces 
blank.
Present range: does the article say that POWRTYPE
provides a better (higher) range than its alternative, NOW? (NOWBETR) 
provides a worse (shorter) range than its alternative, NOW? (NOWWORS)
Future range: does the article say that POWRTYPE
WILL provide a better range than its alternative, IN THE FUTURE? (THENBETR) 
WILL provide a worse range than its alternative, IN THE FUTURE? (THENWORS) 
Present Cost/Price: does the article say that POWRTYPE
is cheaper than its alternative, NOW? (NOWCHEAP) 
is more expensive than its alternative, NOW? (NOWEXP)
Future Cost/Price: does the article say that POWRTYPE
WILL be cheaper than its alternative, IN THE FUTURE? (THENCHEP)
WILL be more expensive than its alternative, IN THE FUTURE? (THENEXP)
Remember that you are comparing Lead-Acid Batteries to any other POWRTYPE, and any 
other POWRTYPE to Lead-Acid Batteries. Consider "Lead Acid” and "anything else" as two 









CASE NUMBER POWRTYPE MD PT PWRMFG INC N0W8ETR THENWORS NOWCHEAP THENEXP NOWWORSE THENBETR NOWEXP THENCHEP
1 1001 Lead-Acid 0 DuraceO 0 1
2 1002 Lead-Acid 0 Eveready 0 1 1
3 1003 NICad 1 1 Electricar 1
4 1003 Zinc Air 2 SAFT 1 1 1 1
5 1003 Nickel Iron 1 1 ABCo 1
6 1004 NIMH 1 1 Ovonlc 1 1
7 1005 Molten F.C. 3 Fuelslnc 1
8 1006 Sodhim Sutr 2 Duetscti 1 1 1 1
9 1006 Zinc Chi 1 1 Detco 0 1 1
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